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ABSTRACT 
How and why are genetically modified (GM) food policies in the United 
States (US) and the European Union (EU) different? This is the research question 
addressed in this dissertation. 
The regulatory structures underlying United States and European Union 
policies regarding genetically modified food and crops are fundamentally 
different. The US regulates GM foods and crops as end products, applying the 
same regulatory framework that it would to non-GM foods or crops. The EU, on 
the other hand, regulates agricultural biotechnology products as the result of a 
specific production process, and has developed a series of rules that regulate GM 
foods and crops. This key difference is reflected in distinct procedures for the 
authorization of field trials and commercialization. The result is a relatively 
permissive US regulation of GM food and crops, and a relatively restrictive 
regulatory system in the EU.  
Drawing on policy process theory, comparative historical analysis, and 
science and technology studies, this dissertation contends that differences 
between genetically modified food policies in the US and the EU can be 
explained by three main elements. First, US and EU policies regarding 
recombinant DNA research in the 1970s and 1980s and events leading up to early 
GM food and crop regulation allow a deeper understanding of how current 
policies were able to develop (“preceding policies”). Second, underlying beliefs 
and values condition the content of current GM food and crop policy 
(“paradigms”). Third, actors for and against agricultural biotechnology have 
achieved different levels of success in influencing GM food policies in the US 
and the EU (“actors and actor coalitions”). These three explanatory variables are 
further influenced by context factors such as political systems, public opinion and 
“shock events”. 
 
Keywords: genetically modified food, genetically engineered food, agricultural 
biotechnology, regulation, public policy, policy process theory, comparative 
historical analysis, science and technology studies. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Research question 
Genetically modified (GM) food has been a prominent area of worldwide 
public controversy since the late 1990s. Agricultural products of “modern 
biotechnology”1 began to be developed starting in the 1980s and early 1990s, 
mainly by United States (US) multinational corporations, with the help of so-
called rDNA technology (recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid technology) 
developed by US scientists in the 1970s. 1996 saw the first planting, harvesting, 
and exporting of GM crops. First food products containing genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs)2 found their way onto US supermarket shelves shortly 
afterwards. In 1996, the acronym GMO was largely unknown to the US and 
European publics and the value of the GM crop market was estimated at US$115 
million (James 2004: 26). By 2004, this figure had leapt to US$4.66 billion 
(ibid.), and GM foods had become the object of a major international debate. 
Over the past few years, European consumers have rejected GM foods relatively 
consistently (European Commission 2003, European Commission 2005b). In 
contrast, US consumers remain comparatively accepting (Pew Initiative on Food 
and Biotechnology 2004b). Moreover, since 2003, the United States and the 
European Union (EU) have been engaged in a World Trade Organization (WTO) 
dispute over international trade in GM crops. 
Central to these turbulent years is the question of how to regulate GM 
foods and crops. Since the 1980s, regulators on both sides of the Atlantic have 
                                                     
1 Biotechnology is the use of living organisms and biological processes to manufacture products. 
In its traditional sense, biotechnology includes the methods used to ferment beer, bake bread and 
culture cheese. Within the GM food debate, the word “biotechnology” has taken on the meaning 
of “biotechnology using genetic engineering”, i.e. technology that can modify biological 
processes and organisms, and specifically their genetic makeup. Main areas of application of this 
“modern biotechnology” are agriculture (“green biotechnology”: GM foods and crops), medicine 
(“red biotechnology”: pharmaceuticals), and industry (“white biotechnology”: enzymes, plastics, 
fuels, etc.). In this dissertation the term “biotechnology” is used to mean modern biotechnology. 
On the meaning of modern biotechnology versus traditional or conventional biotechnology, see, 
for example, Glowka 2003, McKelvey et al. 2004, or Reuter 2003. 
2 A genetically modified organism (GMO) is an organism (e.g. plant, animal, bacterium, virus) 
whose genetic material has been altered. GM foods and crops are examples of GMOs. 
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struggled to determine whether and under what conditions these biotechnology 
applications should be permitted to be released into the environment and enter 
commercial markets. The questions of GM food labeling and traceability3 were 
widely deliberated during the 1990s. More recent topics debated by regulators 
include the issues of liability4, coexistence5, the labeling threshold for GM seed6, 
and intellectual property rights (IPR)7. 
Both US and EU policies are driven by the general assumption that 
modern biotechnology is a driver of economic growth. The EU reiterated this 
view in 2000 by launching the Lisbon strategy which aims to make the European 
Union “the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in the 
world” by 2010 (European Council 2000). Supporting the development of 
biotechnology is one of the ways in which the EU intends to achieve this goal. 
“Red” biotechnology (pharmaceuticals) and “white” biotechnology (industrial 
products) have been rather successful in both the US and Europe. In contrast, 
“green” biotechnology (agricultural products such as GM crops) has done well in 
the US, but not in the EU, with EU regulators demonstrating a high degree of 
caution in comparison with other biotechnology applications. 
                                                     
3 Traceability of GM food is a concept introduced in 2003 by the European Parliament and 
Council of the EU’s regulation on traceability and labeling (EP/Council Reg. 1830/2003, 
European Parliament/Council of the European Union 2003b). It defines traceability as “the ability 
to trace GMOs and products produced from GMOs at all stages of their placing on the market 
through the production and distribution chains”. 
4 Liability refers to the question of legal responsibility for potential damages caused by GM crops 
and foods. The fundamental issue at stake is who would be liable for damages, for example, to the 
environment: farmers, seed retailers, or agricultural biotechnology companies? In the case of 
damage to health, are supermarkets, food producers or agricultural biotechnology companies 
responsible? 
5 Coexistence is the term used in connection with the debate on setting up rules on how farmers 
should physically separate traditional, organic and genetically modified crops to avoid so-called 
“contamination” or “genetic contamination”. 
6 Proposals for a GM threshold in seed have ranged from 0.3% to 0.7%, but no agreement has 
been reached so far. In September 2005, the European Commission for the first time approved the 
inscription of GM seed varieties (17 varieties derived from MON 810, a specific type of GM 
corn) into the Common EU Catalogue of Varieties of Agricultural Plant Species. GM seed 
varieties can be inscribed only after having been authorized in the EU. 
7 Intellectual property rights (IPR) are the exclusive rights over the use of an invention, often for a 
defined period of time. Forms of IPR used in the field of agricultural biotechnology include 
patents and trademarks. Agricultural biotechnology companies claim intellectual property rights 
over their products in order to guarantee a profitable return on their investments. Critics of GM 
foods and crops, however, question whether it is ethical to allow ownership of forms of life. 
Developing countries fear that industry will come to own elements of their indigenous 
biodiversity, genetic material, and knowledge without authorization and without offering fair 
compensation (“biopiracy”). 
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US and EU policies regulate the same products, and yet they are strikingly 
different. In essence, US policy8 is relatively permissive, while EU policy is 
relatively restrictive9, as is indicated by the fact that the US has authorized 
significantly higher numbers of GM crops and foods than the EU.10 Underlying 
this phenomenon are fundamentally different regulatory structures regarding 
genetically modified food. When confronted with a new GM food or crop, US 
regulators use the same framework that they apply to non-GM products and 
generally assess the safety of GM foods with the help of the principle of 
“substantial equivalence”11. The EU has also periodically used this concept, but 
in building a network of legislation and regulations12 developed specifically for 
GMOs, it now emphasizes the “precautionary principle”13. As a result, processes 
leading to authorizations tend to represent less of an obstacle in the United States 
than in the European Union. 
Despite the forces of globalization14 at work since the 1990s, GM food 
policies are not converging. In fact, the opposite is the case. In the US, although 
regulating agencies have experimented with policy instruments including 
voluntary labeling and pre-market consultations, the regulatory environment 
remains essentially “GM food friendly”, and the few new rules and regulations 
                                                     
8 The term “policy” is defined and discussed under 1.2. 
9 “Permissive” can be defined as lax, unrestrained, unbound. “Restrictive” means stringent, 
restrained, limited. 
10 Chapter 3 offers an in-depth discussion of GM food policy differences, including numbers of 
authorizations. 
11 Substantial equivalence refers to the concept that new food products (e.g. GM foods) can be 
treated in the same manner as an existing food (e.g. non-GMO food) with respect to safety if it is 
comparable in terms of its composition and characteristics (e.g. nutrients, toxicants, allergens). 
The concept was first introduced by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) in its 1993 report on “Safety Evaluation of Foods Derived by Modern 
Biotechnology”, which stated that “[T]he concept of substantial equivalence embodies the idea 
that existing organisms used as food, or as a source of food, can be used as the basis for 
comparison when assessing the safety of human consumption of a food or food component that 
has been modified or is new” (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 1993: 
11). In 1996, the United Nations’s (UN) Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World 
Health Organization (WHO) reiterated this concept (Food and Agriculture Organization/World 
Health Organization 1996). 
12 The term “regulation” is defined and discussed under 1.2. 
13 The precautionary principle refers to the concept that “where there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing 
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation” (Principle 15 of the so-called Rio 
Declaration, United Nations General Assembly 1992), see 6.2 for further details.  
14 Globalization can be defined as the growing integration of economies, cultures, and public 
policies around the world. 
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that have been applied to GM foods and crops since the mid-1980s are consistent 
with the relatively permissive original regulatory framework. In contrast, 
although the EU does not prohibit GM foods and crops, its policies have become 
increasingly stringent in the wake of a wave of public protest against food 
biotechnology starting in the late 1990s and continuing into the present. 
After several years of failed diplomatic attempts to bridge this widening 
transatlantic gap, US and EU GM food policy differences have led to a trade 
disagreement currently being played out on the level of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). On 13 May 2003, the United States, Canada and Argentina 
brought a WTO complaint against the European Union for hindering trade with 
GM food and crops (World Trade Organization 2003). It lists the EU’s de facto 
moratorium, in place since 1998, as well as individual EU Member States’ 
national bans15 as being inconsistent with provisions of several WTO agreements: 
the 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (“GATT 1994”)16, the 
World Trade Organization Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (“STS Agreement”), and the World Trade Organization 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (“TBT Agreement”). In this still 
unresolved dispute17, while the European Union invokes the precautionary 
principle to justify its policy, the United States views EU policies as protectionist 
measures incompatible with international trade agreements. 
The transatlantic regulatory and trade clash over GM food has also 
extended to the developing world, in particular since the beginning of the new 
                                                     
15 The EU’s so-called de facto moratorium and national bans of GMOs are described in 2.3. 
16 The original General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was signed in 1947 by 23 
nations (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947). It consisted of a series of tariff 
concessions and rules designed to prevent restrictive trade measures. Since then, there have been 
seven further rounds of trade negotiations, culminating in the Uruguay Round (eighth round), 
which lasted from 1986 to 1993. After the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, the original GATT 
of 1947 was updated to “GATT 1994” (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994), and the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) was established in 1995. WTO’s rules are laid down in GATT 
1994 and a series of other agreements. The WTO pursues the goal of promoting free trade, fair 
competition, and economic development. Despite a consistent commitment to free trade, these 
texts contain language that, according to interpretation, could or could not accommodate the 
precautionary measures adopted by the EU in the case of GMOs. For example, the GATT 
Agreement states that “[...] nothing in this agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption 
[...] of measures [...] necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health [… ]” (General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, art. XX). The TBT and SPS Agreements contain similar 
provisions. 
17 The final ruling on the case has been delayed several times. At the time of writing, it is planned 
for the end of March 2006. 
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millennium. Promoters of agricultural biotechnology, including the United States 
government, maintain that GM crops can play an important part in combating 
problems such as hunger and malnutrition, for example, by the use of genetically 
modified drought and pest-resistant crops. GM food critics including 
organizations like Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, as well as some 
European political parties and national governments, affirm that agricultural 
biotechnology does nothing to address the roots of developing countries’ troubles 
while simultaneously rendering them dependent on expensive technologies from 
multinational biotechnology companies. 
This conflict was played out in a flamboyant manner in 2002, when 
Zambia refused a US donation of GM corn to help combat malnutrition and 
starvation, based on its fear of GM varieties entering Zambian agricultural 
production. Zambia’s main reason for its action was the fear that future Zambian 
crops could become at least partly genetically modified, thus impairing Zambian 
trade relations with GM food and crop adverse trading partners such as the EU. 
The United States requested, but was denied, support from the EU in encouraging 
Zambia to accept the donation. The incident led to a polemic discussion in which 
the US charged the EU with partial responsibility for hunger in Africa, while 
some EU countries hinted that the US was exploiting the southern African food 
crisis for commercial and trade purposes. In the end, international donors 
delivered sufficient non-GM food aid to Zambia to diffuse the crisis.18 
In the light of the regulatory differences and recurring disputes between 
the US and the EU, this dissertation seeks to answer the following research 
question: How and why are GM food policies in the United States and in the 
European Union different? A comparison between the EU and the US19 is both 
appropriate and politically relevant. It is appropriate because the EU and the US 
federal government have regulatory authority over GM foods. In European Union 
countries, GM plants to be tested and GM foods and crops to be commercialized 
                                                     
18 On this particular incident, see, for example, the newspaper articles “US to give hungry Zambia 
food despite GM spat” (2002) and “EU Declines US Call to Reassure Africa on GMO” (2002). 
Examples of literature on the debate on whether agricultural biotechnology can benefit developing 
countries include Shiva 2001 and Trewavas 2002. 
19 Considering that positions among EU countries are also different, a further interesting area of 
study is the comparison of EU Member State policies and approaches regarding GM foods. 
Examples of multi-country studies include Bauer/Gaskell 2002, Durant/Bauer/Gaskell 1998, 
Gaskell/Bauer 2001, and Levidow/Carr/Wield 1999a. 
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are regulated at the EU level. Member States implement EU-level laws, often by 
drafting specific national legislation. In the US GM food regulation falls under 
the competence of the federal government. US states cooperate with the 
government to implement specific federal laws. It is politically relevant, 
especially because transatlantic regulatory differences have led to an international 
trade dispute within the World Trade Organization,  initiated by several main GM 
crop producers and exporters (US, Canada and Argentina), but led by the US, and 
directed against the EU.20 
 
1.2 Time span covered and definitions 
This dissertation first and foremost seeks to explain policy differences 
across cases, i.e. to compare the policy outcomes of two cases at a specific point 
in time. It does not seek to conduct a systematic comparison of policy across 
time, as might be done to explain policy change. The analytical focus of this 
dissertation lies in the present and ongoing period of political controversy 
surrounding GM foods and crops, which began in the late 1990s and persists to 
this day. The detailed description of US and EU genetically modified food 
policies (Chapter 3), this study’s dependent variable, takes into account policy 
changes until August 2005. These are the policy outcomes that this dissertation 
seeks to explain. In explaining policy differences across cases, I sometimes make 
reference to policy change across time as part of my analysis. For example, in my 
discussion of policies preceding GM food policies (Chapter 5), I reach back into 
the phase of rDNA research regulation, as well as the early phase of the 
regulation of biotechnology applications (1970s, 1980s and early 1990s). 
                                                     
20 European non-EU countries and countries in North, Central and South America other than the 
United States are not explicitly considered in this dissertation. It is worth noting that non-EU 
European countries' GM food policies are generally more similar to EU policies than to US 
policies, while some other North, Central and South American countries have policies that are 
more similar to US policies than to EU policies (especially Canada and Argentina). On the 
European side, this can be partly explained by trade agreements between the EU and European 
non-EU countries. On the American side, the “US GM food policy-friendly” countries are large 
GM crop and food producers who share the US's interest in promoting trade with regard to their 
produce. It can therefore be argued that studying EU and US policies means studying the two 
main currently relevant GM food policy regulatory systems. Major Asian countries’ regulations 
lie somewhere in between the extreme US and EU positions, with countries such as China, 
Indonesia, India, or Japan adopting intermediate and sometimes ambivalent positions with respect 
to agricultural biotechnology (Barboza 2003, Feffer 2004, Montpetit/Rothmayr/Varone 
forthcoming). 
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Analyses of the role of paradigms, and of actors21 (or stakeholders22) and actor 
coalitions primarily focus on the period from the mid-1990s to the present 
(Chapters 6 and 7). 
Genetically modified foods are foods produced by or containing 
ingredients resulting from genetic transfers between different species. While 
traditional breeding is possible only within the same species, GM crops typically 
include a trait from an unrelated species. Although this dissertation uses only GM 
food in its title, it deals with the regulation of both GM crops and foods. GM food 
and GM crops are inextricably linked since the harvests of GM crops are used as 
ingredients in GM foods.23 Chapter 2 gives an overview of existing GM foods 
and crops. 
European refers to the European Union (and the European Community 
[EC] until 1992)24 and its institutions25, and Europeans to the citizens of the 
                                                     
21 In this dissertation the term “actor” is used to mean an active or passive participant in a policy 
debate. Actors can be individual or collective (organizations, companies, etc.). 
22 For the purposes of this dissertation, a “stakeholder” is an individual or collective actor 
(organization, institution, etc.) who has an interest (a stake) in a policy issue or the outcome of a 
policy decision. 
23 A further, intimately linked area is GM feed (for animal consumption), which is important 
because a large percentage of GM crops is processed to produce GM feed, both in the EU and in 
the US. The issue of GM feed has been addressed only recently by EP and Council Regulations 
1829/2003 and 1830/2003 of 2003 (European Parliament/Council of the European Union 2003a, 
2003b). In contrast, the US does not regulate GM feed at all. In this dissertation, I focus on GM 
food. The issues and actors within the GM feed debate are similar enough to the GM food and 
crop debate to not necessitate separate treatment. Another developing GM plant specialization is 
the production of so-called PMPs (plant-made pharmaceuticals), as they are called by the US 
Department of Agriculture (USDA). The regulation of plants producing PMPs is already being 
discussed, especially in the United States where introduction is more imminent than in the EU. 
24 The European Union is the result of the process of European integration, which began with the 
creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952. In 1957 the Treaties of 
Rome created the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy 
Community (EURATOM). In 1967, these three Communities merged, and became known as the 
European Communities or European Community (EC). After the Treaty of Maastricht came into 
force in 1993, the European Community was renamed the European Union. European Union 
policy areas consist of the so-called Community pillar, which contains policy areas dealt with by 
the previous European Community, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) pillar, and 
the Justice and Home Affairs Pillar (JHA), which was subsequently renamed “Police and Judicial 
Co-operation in Criminal matters” (PJCC). 
25 Main European Union institutions are the European Commission (“Commission”), the 
European Parliament (EP or “Parliament”), and the Council of the European Union (“Council”). 
The European Commission generally proposes new legislation, whereas the Council and 
Parliament pass laws, jointly in many policy areas. 
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European Union’s Member States26, whereas American and Americans are short 
forms for US-American and US citizens. 
Policy should be understood in contrast to polity (the political order and 
institutional rules within which policy is shaped) and politics (the political 
process defined by conflict, bargaining and differing interests, which may lead to 
policy). In this context, policy constitutes the content-oriented dimension 
interacting with and defined by polity and politics (see, for example, Schubert 
1991: 26). Public policy, often abbreviated policy, can be defined as “what 
governments do, why they do it, and what difference it makes” (Dye 1976), or as 
“anything a government chooses to do or not do” (Dye 1972). It can further be 
understood as “a process or a series or pattern of governmental activities or 
decisions that are designed to remedy some public problem, either real or 
imagined” (Lester/Stewart 1996: 5). According to Lowi (1964, 1972), “regulatory 
policy” or “regulation” is a type of policy.27 It can be defined as policies that 
reduce or expand individual actors' alternatives through prohibitions, restrictions 
or rules, usually in the form of laws and administrative regulations. Following 
this definition, GM food policy is predominantly regulatory (see, for example, 
Pollack/Shaffer forthcoming). This dissertation therefore refers to GM food 
policy and regulation interchangeably. 
                                                     
26 At present there are 25 EU Member States. Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and 
the Netherlands are the founding members of the European Coal and Steel Community, the 
European Economic Community, and the European Atomic Energy Community. Denmark, 
Ireland and the United Kingdom joined the European Community in 1973. Greece became the 
tenth Member State in 1981, followed by Spain and Portugal in 1986. In 1995, Austria, Finland 
and Sweden joined what had become the European Union in 1993. In 2004, 10 further Member 
States joined the EU: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
27 Other types of policy are “distributive” (e.g. infrastructure projects within transport policy), 
“redistributive” (e.g. taxes within welfare policy), and “constitutive” (e.g. the creation of an 
agency) (Lowi 1964, 1972). More recent authors transport the notion of regulation into the era of 
globalization. For instance, Majone describes the recent rise of a “regulatory state” in Europe, and 
especially the European Union, based on expert statutory regulation by independent agencies, and 
modelled on the US regulatory state (Majone 1994a, Majone 1994b). Levi-Faur develops the 
concept of “regulatory capitalism”, a hybrid between laissez-faire and welfare capitalism, in 
which the state retains steering functions, while business takes over the provision of services and 
technological innovation, for example, through privatization of functions previously provided by 
the public sector (Levi-Faur 2005). 
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1.3 The transatlantic rift in GM food policy: literature review 
Existing studies that seek to explain US and EU differences in GM food 
policy are embedded within the wider field of literature on the GM food policy 
debate. This area of scholarship exploded in the late 1990s, together with the rise 
of GM food as an area of controversy, and is still growing steadily. The following 
literature review takes the field as a whole into account, but in particular 
emphasizes studies dealing explicitly with GM food policy in the US and the EU. 
These are discussed in terms of empirical fields covered, theoretical approaches 
used, and hypotheses, propositions and results formulated. 
 
Empirical fields 
Recurrent topics other than EU and US regulation A fair share of literature 
on GM foods and crops is written by non-social scientists, for example, members 
of advocacy groups, journalists, former government officials or natural scientists. 
Some is normative28 and takes a more or less clear side in the GM food policy 
debate. These studies are not theory-driven and do not develop hypotheses as to 
why regulation is the way it is. Instead, they often aim to cast agricultural 
biotechnology in a positive (e.g. Federoff/Brown 2004, Miller/Conko 2004) or 
negative light (e.g. Cummins/Lilliston 2004, Hart 2002, Nottingham 2003, Smith 
2003, Tudge 2004). Other studies that are not theory-based are first and foremost 
interested in providing an informative narrative of the GM food and crop debate 
(Charles 2001, Kempf 2003, Lambrecht 2001). 
One prominent area of scholarship within the field of social science is the 
study of the public’s understanding of GM foods and its opinion of them. Studies 
focusing on public opinion (e.g. Bauer/Gaskell 2002, Durant et al. 1998, Gaskell 
2000, Gaskell at al. 1999, Gaskell at al. 2002, Gaskell/Bauer 2001) use opinion 
polls and media sources to describe and explain differences in public opinion. 
They use institutional and interest-based approaches, as well as cultural 
explanations. For example, Gaskell et al. (2002) explain differences between US 
and EU public opinion by considering “media coverage”, “scientific knowledge”, 
                                                     
28 “Normative” means establishing “a standard of correctness by prescription of rules” (definition 
from Flew 1999). 
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and “trust in regulatory systems” for both cases. Their main argument is that 
“different histories of media coverage and regulation go together with different 
patterns of public perceptions, and [that] these in turn reflect deeper cultural 
sensitivities” towards food, novel food, agriculture and the environment (Gaskell 
et al. 2002: 373-374). Studies of the public understanding of science (e.g. 
Greenberg/Graham 2000, Wynne 2001), on the other hand, primarily analyze and 
often critique perceptions of “the public”, and the limited possibilities of 
participation in policy-making processes involving GM foods. Wynne, for 
example, holds that “skeptical public reactions are not a reaction to (supposedly 
misperceived) risks as such, but rather are public judgments of dominant 
scientific and policy institutions […]” (Wynne 2001: 445). In accordance with 
their focus, studies on public opinion do not attempt to explain the reasons for 
policy differences. 
A further important body of scholarship relevant to the topic of this 
dissertation is made up of studies focusing on GM food in the light of 
transatlantic trade issues. Some of these address US-EU differences as a 
preliminary step to discussing their implications for trade. In her 2002 study, 
Hennis's starting point is the observation that recent trade disputes have shifted 
their focus from tariffs and domestic protectionism to food safety and 
environmental protection issues. In her analysis, “regional regulatory differences” 
between the US and EU are a result of globalization and different models of 
agricultural production. Like Hennis, Isaac (2002) presents the differences in GM 
food policy as an obstacle to trade. He argues that new “social regulatory 
barriers” set up to meet moral, ethical and religious preferences have led to 
different regulations or “regulatory regionalism”, and goes on to suggest 
solutions to this state of affairs, implying that it should be overcome. Yet another 
scholar approaching the issue of GM food through a trade lens is Young (2001), 
who discusses implications for trade and the future of divergent regulations. 
Patterson and Josling (2002) take a similar approach, but in addition offer an 
enumeration of possible cultural, political and institutional reasons for regulatory 
differences. Finally, Paarlberg (2002) focuses on trade in relation to the 
developing world, and predicts that the EU will prevail in the transatlantic 
conflict over agricultural biotechnology since big importers like the EU are more 
apt to set the safety and labeling rules than big exporters like the US. 
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A number of trade-related studies focus specifically on the WTO dispute 
(Herwig 2004, La Rosa-Ames 2003, Winickoff et al. 2005). Herwig’s discussion 
of WTO law is constructivist29, and its purpose is to analyze and critically discuss 
the WTO’s regulation of GM foods. La Rosa-Ames’s analysis reviews EU 
regulations on GM foods, and concludes that these are incompatible with WTO 
rules. Winickoff et al. propose to tackle the WTO dispute by using a “judicial 
approach” instead of a science-based approach, i.e. by studying the risk 
assessment process through a social, economic and ethical rather than science-
based lens. 
Studies on the US or on the EU A growing number of non-comparative 
studies look at GM food policy only in the EU or only in the US. Like public 
opinion studies, they take a variety of theoretical approaches. Some important 
works dealing mainly with the EU include Abels (2002), Ashford (1996), 
Christoforou (2004), Groß (2001), Levidow/Carr/Wield (1999b, 2000, 2005), 
Levidow/Murphy (2002), Rücker (2000), and Skogstad (2003). Examples of 
studies emphasizing the US case are Dawkins (2003), Klintman (2002), Krimsky 
(2000), Krimsky/Murphy (2001), Pollack/Shaffer (forthcoming), Pringle (2003), 
Sheingate (2004), Teitelman (1989) and Winston (2002). This literature offers 
detailed empirical information on the individual case studies. 
Literature on the transatlantic rift in GM food policy Amidst the wide field 
of literature on the GM food debate, studies offering comparative views on US 
and EU GM food policy are fairly uncommon, and in-depth explanations of the 
transatlantic rift in genetically modified food policy are quite rare. Significant 
contributions are offered by Meins (2003), Bernauer/Meins (2003), and Bernauer 
(2003). Meins explains different levels of stringency and laxness30 in the cases of 
GM food labeling requirements in the US and the EU, and of food irradiation31 
regulation in France and Germany. Vogel (2001) offers a compelling if compact 
                                                     
29 Constructivism is based on the idea that individuals’ knowledge and understanding of the world 
is constructed through reflection. Applied to the area of science and technology, this means that 
scientific knowledge is shaped by material and cultural resources, and that it is not the result of a 
revelation of a pre-given natural order.  
30 Meins defines stringency as the “dimension of state intervention”. For the case of GM food 
labeling, “regulation is lax if no […] labelling at all is required for the selling of a product” 
whereas regulations “are stringent if they require mandatory labelling” (Meins 2003: 39). 
31 Food irradiation is the exposure of food to radiation, with the goal of sterilizing or preserving 
food. 
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explanation of regulatory differences in his study focusing on the differences 
between US and EU regulation as part of a more general discussion of regulatory 
differences in the fields of health and the environment. Further important 
contributions come from the field of science and technology studies (STS). 
Scholars from this area have explored individual issues relevant to the 
transatlantic debate on GM food policy. For example, Wright (1994) and 
Gottweis (1998) offer detailed discussions of the early phases of biotechnology 
regulation in the US and in Europe. Levidow (1999b) compares the regulation of 
insect resistant GM corn regulation in the EU and the US, and Joly and Marris 
(2001) investigate differences between the ways in which GMOs influence and 
are part of agenda-setting in the US and France, and focus on “identifying the 
different frames of reference utilized” on each side of the Atlantic. An STS 
scholar who explores biotechnology policy from a constructivist, cultural, 
comparative, and legal perspective is Jasanoff (1995). Toke (2004) gives a 
constructivist, but more sociological perspective, and Epp (2003) offers a 
contribution located at the intersection of sociology and law in a study of GM 
food policy in the US and Germany. 
 
Theoretical approaches 
Most studies on the transatlantic rift on GM food policy are based on one 
of two theoretical approaches. They either underline the explanatory role of 
economic interests and institutions (political economy approach), or emphasize 
cultural and belief-based explanations. 
Political economy approach Within the political economy approach, 
important contributions include Meins (2003), Bernauer/Meins (2003), and 
Bernauer (2003). Meins uses rational choice theory, and thus bases her analysis 
on the assumption that actors have a fixed set of preferences which they pursue 
through cost-benefit analysis. She also draws on interest group pluralism, which 
supposes that regulations are the result of competition among interest groups. 
Bernauer and Meins (2003) and Bernauer (2003) build on this explanation by 
discussing GM food regulatory differences in terms of the collective action 
capacity of consumer and producer interests, and of the institutional environment 
in which regulation takes place. A further study within the political economy 
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tradition is Haniotis’s article on the Economics of Agricultural Biotechnology 
(2001). While acknowledging some of the factors mentioned by Meins and 
Bernauer, Haniotis takes a somewhat different perspective in that he especially 
stresses the importance of agricultural policy. Although he does not explicitly 
refer to theory, his conclusions reveal a political economy orientation. 
Cultural and belief-based explanations Cultural and belief-based 
explanations of the transatlantic rift in GM food policy emphasize cultural 
factors, national styles of regulation, and beliefs to explain policy differences for 
different food safety laws. For example, Echols's study dealing with food in 
general suggests that while Europeans trust traditional food practices to ensure 
food safety, US Americans feel more comfortable when food safety is proven 
through science. According to Echols, Europeans value limited processing and a 
link to the land in food, while in the US, consumers have a high regard for 
change, experimentation, technological innovation, and increased productivity 
(Echols 1998). In their study of modes of biotechnology assessment in the US, 
Japan and Denmark, Jamison and Baark seek “to uncover ways in which cultural 
conditioning of technology takes place” (Jamison/Baark 1990: 31). Epp adds to 
this approach by emphasizing the importance of the “outcome of 
interorganizational dynamics” (Epp 2003: 4). She studies the importance of 
organizations through a constructivist lens, which could be characterized as co-
productionist (Jasanoff 2004) in the sense that she develops an “organizational-
based concept of the regulatory process” in which “neither the law nor the 
organizations it addresses [are] conceptualized as dependent or as independent 
[variables]” (68).  
A growing number of studies drawing on cultural and belief-based 
explanations can be classified as belonging to science and technology studies, a 
field that promotes a constructivist understanding of GM food policy and 
emphasizes the social and cultural meanings underlying policy choices. 
According to this perspective, GM food policy is socially constructed. Gottweis 
(1998), Jasanoff (1995), Joly/Marris (2001), Levidow (1999a, 1999b) and Wright 
(1994) are examples of scholars working within this area. A predominantly 
sociological, but also constructivist approach is taken by Toke (2004), who pays 
particular attention to the use of language, as does linguist Cook (2005).  
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Studies combining both approaches A small category of studies combines 
political economy-based and cultural/belief-based approaches, although they 
usually do so more implicitly than explicitly. One is Vogel (2001) who takes a 
predominantly political economy approach, but takes into account the role of 
“civic culture”. A further study is provided by Jamison (1987), who analyzes 
national styles of science and technology in Sweden and Denmark by considering 
“metaphysical bias”, “national scientific interests”, and “institutional structures”. 
Some studies on GM foods in trade (e.g. Patterson/Josling 2002) also present a 
combination of mainly economic, interest-based and, occasionally, cultural 
explanations for policy differences. They do not go into detail on these 
explanations, however, since their focus is on discussing implications for trade. 
 
Hypotheses, propositions, results 
Interest-based Scholars who use political economy-based approaches 
generally formulate hypotheses and propositions revolving around the interests 
and power of individual or collective actors. The central hypotheses suggested by 
Meins are that “[t]he probability of a stringent regulatory outcome is higher when 
public outrage is present and power is redistributed from producers to 
consumers”, and that “[s]tringent regulations are more likely when public outrage 
provokes a change in the interests of producer groups (Meins 2003: 35). Meins 
arrives at the conclusion that stringent regulations “against the preference of a 
producer group [are] likely when public outrage emerges [...] and when industrial 
interests align with consumer and environmental interests” (2003: 2). Bernauer 
reiterates this interest group argument, and further develops the institutional 
dimension through the concept of “regulatory federalism”. He proposes that 
regulatory stringency depends on “subunit autonomy”, which is determined by 
“the extent to which electorates in states with stricter regulation would tolerate 
downward harmonization”, and “the extent of economic damage that would result 
from non-agreement” (Bernauer 2003: 104). He concludes that the EU has seen a 
“ratcheting up” effect, whereas the US has not. Haniotis, on the other hand, 
maintains that in the US, a combination of trade-oriented changes in farm policy 
and widespread approval by a variety of actors and groups explain permissive 
policy. In the EU, in contrast, he suggests that farm policy changes “[point] 
 26
towards the need for output controls, and [do] not provide incentives for 
commercial applications of GMOs in agriculture” (Haniotis 2001: 176). 
Cultural and belief-based Cultural and/or constructivist approaches to the 
transatlantic rift in GM food policy often do not articulate hypotheses as clearly 
as studies within the political economy approach do, but rather present 
propositions or follow an underlying guiding thesis. Rather than setting forth 
hypotheses and making generalizations, many works within this tradition seek to 
illuminate the interaction of politics, society and history through detailed 
narratives. Their unifying, underlying thesis, however, is that beliefs, ideas, 
national rules, and/or culture shape policies. For example, Echols's main message 
is that “ideas about food and what may be eaten safely are strongly influenced by 
local and cultural traditions”. Similarly, Levidow argues that the cultural role and 
meaning of agriculture and the interpretation of risk and the role of science are 
important factors explaining different GM food regulations (Levidow 1999b). 
Jasanoff conducts her analysis of US, UK, and German biotechnology 
regulation guided by the notion that regulation is “a kind of social contract that 
specifies the terms under which state and society agree to accept the costs, risks 
and benefits of a given technological enterprise” (Jasanoff 1995: 311). On this 
basis, she identifies different “paradigms of control” for US, German and UK 
biotechnology policies, which differ in their perceptions of physical, social and 
political risks. In a further study, Jasanoff identifies framing32, styles of 
regulation, the question of what evidence is considered acceptable, different 
forms of expertise, and the nature of regulatory standards (degrees of flexibility 
and uniformity) as factors that help explain policy differences in the area of 
biotechnology (Jasanoff 2000). 
In his comparison of three GM food policy case studies (US, EU and UK), 
Toke finds that three factors “are especially associated with the differences 
between outcomes in the USA and the EU”: different attitudes towards food, 
different resonances of environmentalist discourses, and the Bovine Spongiform 
                                                     
32 Framing can be understood as a way of implicitly establishing guiding principles and 
identifying what exists and what matters. It is another term for the concept of “paradigm” 
developed in this dissertation and used in Chapter 6. Framing often occurs during what policy 
process theorists describe as “agenda-setting” (Cobb and Elder 1972, Kingdon 1984). 
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Encephalopathy (BSE) crisis, also known as “Mad Cow Disease”33 (Toke 2004: 
206). He further underlines that “much of what is called science in [the] GM food 
and crop debate is, in fact, culture” (Toke 2004: 208). Epp conceptualizes 
regulation as “a social process in which a broad range of actors from various 
social realms are involved” (Epp 2003: 36). Accordingly, she finds organizations 
and regulation to be interdependent and “co-explanatory” in the GM food policy 
debate. 
Interest and culture/belief-based In Vogel's view, before the mid-1980s, 
the US developed more precautionary policies than the EU on issues pertaining to 
health and the environment (Vogel 2001). According to Vogel, the situation has 
now reversed. He explains this change towards precaution in Europe through the 
emergence of a new European “risk-averse civic culture”, the growing regulatory 
role of the EU, and a series of regulatory failures within the EU (e.g. BSE). He 
explains the US change towards less risk-averse policies through a declining 
political saliency of consumer and environmental policies, waning political 
influence of civic interests (e.g. environmental non-governmental organizations, 
NGOs) since the 1980s, and a lack of the types of regulatory failures that have 
taken place in the EU. 
 
1.4 Project relevance 
Empirical relevance  
This dissertation builds on contributions from existing literature in 
explaining the transatlantic rift in GM food policy by offering an in-depth and 
systematically comparative analysis that taking into account earlier policy 
developments, characteristics which are uncommon in studies to date. 
Moreover, this research adds to the rapidly developing field of social 
science-based research on the social and political issues raised by science and 
new technologies. GM food policy as a research area emerges where science 
(genetics), technology (genetic engineering), and society (public policy) 
converge. By studying GM food policy, I generate empirical data on the broader 
question of how policy-makers address science and new technologies. 
                                                     
33 Relevant events surrounding BSE are related in Chapter 2. 
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Finally, this study is a contribution to the body of literature comparing EU 
and US policies in depth. It is not habitual to compare the EU, a union of nation 
states, with a single nation like the US (albeit with a federalist structure). Most 
studies relating to the EU and the US are situated in the field of international 
relations and are not comparative. Many public policy studies comparing the US 
and Europe pick one or several European countries instead of the EU as case 
studies. The methodological repercussions of this choice are discussed in Chapter 
4.  
 
Theoretical relevance 
Most existing studies of the transatlantic rift in GM food policy choose a 
political economy and interest-oriented focus or a constructivist and belief-based 
one. I develop an analytical framework that makes use of approaches containing 
both interest-based and belief-based elements. Using these approaches together 
enables me to consider the importance of policy developments preceding the era 
of GM food, the role of deeply-held beliefs, as well as the levels of success of 
actors and actor coalitions. The contribution of this dissertation is to attempt to 
bring these elements together to explain the transatlantic rift in genetically 
modified food. 
 
Practical relevance 
Differing American and European GM food policies are often perceived 
as being based on commercial and trade interests alone. As illustrated in parts of 
the literature review, there is also a tendency to offer a normative assessment of 
who is “right” and who is “wrong” in the policy debate about GM food. I 
endeavor to go beyond this type of approach by addressing the reasons for GM 
food policy differences that are rooted in the politics and polity of the political 
systems in question. By doing so, like Jasanoff, I hope that “comparative analysis 
can play a crucial role in making national policy processes more imaginative, 
self-aware, explicit, and politically responsive” (Jasanoff 2005: 12). This research 
project develops an analytical framework that can help policy-makers gain a 
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better understanding of the issues, which can in turn help prevent transatlantic 
disputes over GM food policy. 
 
1.5 Dissertation overview 
This dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 acquaints the reader 
with introductory information about GM foods and crops. Chapter 3 describes 
GM food policy in the United States and the European Union, the dependent 
variable to be explained. Chapter 4 introduces the theory and method underlying 
this dissertation, as well as the analytical framework developed to analyze and 
explain GM food policy differences. Chapters 5 to 7 present the empirical 
analysis and findings of this study. They investigate the propositions presented to 
explain GM food policy differences: “preceding policies”, i.e. policy 
development during the period of recombinant DNA regulation that preceded 
GM food regulation (Chapter 5), “paradigms”, the world views and beliefs 
underlying GM food policies (Chapter 6), and “actors and actor coalitions”, the 
way in which different actors and actor coalitions in the GM food debate are able 
to influence policy outcomes (Chapter 7). Chapter 8 offers a brief summary and 
concluding remarks. 
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2. GM FOOD IN THE US AND THE EU: OVERVIEW 
 
2.1 Overview of GM foods and crops 
In this dissertation, when I refer to genetically modified food or GM 
food34, what is meant are GM crops, or GM foods derived from or containing GM 
crops35 for human consumption. Genetically modified crops and foods are 
varieties produced by or containing ingredients resulting from genetic transfers 
between different species. GM crops can mimic aspects of the metabolisms of 
unrelated species, something not possible in crops resulting from traditional 
crossbreeding which is possible only within the same species.36 
GM crops have experienced considerable success since their introduction 
in 1996. As illustrated by Figure 1, in 1996, the global area of GM crops 
amounted to 1.7 million hectares. By 2004, this number had grown to 81 million 
hectares.  
                                                     
34 Ever since the topic became controversial in the mid to late 1990s, the term “genetically 
modified food” has been used more readily by EU than US policy-makers. Official US documents 
tend instead to refer to “bioengineered foods”, “foods derived from new plant varieties”, 
“agricultural biotechnology” or “food biotechnology”. Further terms frequently used are 
“genetically engineered” (GE) and “bioengineered”. I use the term “genetically modified food” 
because it is one of the most in use within public debates on the issue, both in the US and the EU.  
35 GM food can also refer to GM animals such as GM salmon, cows, or pigs. The first GM animal 
to be commercialized was the so-called “GloFish”, a fluorescent red zebrafish sold in the US as a 
pet since early 2004. In this dissertation, I focus on GM plants (used in food and feed) because 
they are the most ubiquitous. GM animals are at present much less widespread than GM plants. If 
this changes, however, they have the potential of becoming even more controversial than GM 
plants. 
36 In their university textbook on recombinant DNA, Watson et al. explain the difference between 
traditional plant breeding and plant manipulation through recombinant DNA-technology (the case 
of GM foods) as follows: “traditional genetic manipulation of plants, practiced for many 
centuries, is restricted to plants that can sexually hybridize. Recombinant DNA techniques can 
circumvent these limitations by allowing plant geneticists to identify and clone specific genes for 
certain traits, such as resistance to an insect pest, and to introduce these genes into already useful 
varieties of plants. Sexual compatibility becomes irrelevant, and transgenic plants expressing the 
gene can be selected directly” (Watson et al. 1992: 273). 
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Figure 1: GM crops worldwide, 1996-2004 
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Soybeans (also called soya or soy) have become the most widespread GM 
crop, accounting for 60% of global GM crop production and for 56% of total 
soybean production (including non-GM soybeans) in 2004. A further important 
crop is corn (maize in British English), making up 23% of all GM crops and 14% 
of all corn in 2004. Two other large GM crops are cotton and oilseed rape (also 
know as canola37) (see Figures 2 and 3).  
 
Figure 2: GM crops by type of crop, 1996 and 2004 (in percent) 
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37 Canola is a variety of oilseed rape originally developed through traditional breeding. The term 
is often used interchangeably with oilseed rape. 
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Figure 3: GM crops as a percentage of total crops, 2004 
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In 1997, six countries cultivated GM crops (USA, China, Argentina, 
Canada, Australia and Mexico). The US accounted for roughly 50% and China 
for about 40% of production. By 2004, the top producing countries were the US 
(47.6 million hectares or 59% of total production), Argentina (16.2 million 
hectares or 20% of total production), Canada (5.4 million hectares or 6% of total 
production) and Brazil (5.0 million hectares or 6% of total production) (see 
Figure 4). In 2002, the only producing countries in the European Union were 
Romania (which was not yet an EU Member State at the time), Spain and 
Germany, each producing less than 0.1 million hectares. 
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Figure 4: GM crop production by country, 1997 and 2004 
 
Source: James 1997 and 2004
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In 1996, the market for GM seed was worth US$280 million. By 2004, it 
had increased 17-fold to US$4,700 million (ETC Group 2005a). According to 
some estimates, this represents about one quarter of the commercial (GM and 
non-GM) seed market worldwide (ibid). The seed market is controlled by about 
ten companies, the largest of which are US-based Monsanto and DuPont/Pioneer, 
and the Swiss multinational Syngenta (ETC Group 2005a, 2005b). The company 
with the largest GM seed market share is Monsanto, estimated to hold between 
80 and 88% of the market; DuPont/Pioneer, Syngenta and Bayer CropScience are 
the major companies commanding the remaining market share (Rural 
Advancement Foundation International 2000, ETC Group 2005a). 
In terms of traits38, herbicide tolerance (resistance to herbicide) is the most 
common (approximately 71% of all crops in 2004).39 This trait is present 
especially in soybeans, but also in corn, oilseed rape and cotton. The second most 
widespread trait is insect resistance (19% of all crops in 2004), present in so-
called “Bt-crops”.40 Herbicide tolerance and insect resistance can also be 
                                                     
38 Traits are the qualities that plants are genetically modified to possess. 
39 A prominent such trait is tolerance for glyphosate, the active ingredient in the Monsanto 
Company’s widely used herbicide “Roundup”. Monsanto has developed a series of glyphosate-
tolerant or “Roundup Ready” varieties of key crops (soybeans, corn, cotton, oilseed rape). 
40 Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) is a bacterium that produces crystal proteins (cry proteins) that are 
toxic to many species of insects that feed on crops, such as the European corn borer and the cotton 
bollworm. It is used externally as an insecticide in traditional farming. Bt crops are modified with 
genes from Bt to be able to produce the proteins that are toxic to insects. 
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combined (9% of the global area devoted to biotech crops in 2004) (see Figure 5). 
Taking into account both types of crops grown and GM traits, herbicide tolerant 
soybeans are the most widespread type of GM crop (60%), followed by insect 
resistant corn (14%) and insect resistant cotton (6%) (see Figure 6). 
 
Figure 5: GM crops by trait, 1996-2004 
 
Source: James 1997 and 2004
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Figure 6: GM crops by type and trait, 2004 
 
 
Source: James 2004
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GM foods can be whole foods, such as tomatoes engineered to ripen more 
slowly than conventional tomatoes, or virus resistant papayas. They can also be 
foods containing ingredients made with GM crops. Most GM foods on the market 
are processed foods containing GM food ingredients derived from GM soybeans, 
corn, cotton or oilseed rape. These crops, especially soybeans and corn, are 
versatile and ubiquitous, and are used for various industrial purposes, in animal 
feed and as ingredients in numerous processed foods for human consumption, for 
example as oils or emulsifiers. Table 1 gives an overview of soy, corn, oilseed 
rape, and cotton derivatives and their uses in food. These are the processed foods 
that are potential GM foods.  
 
Table 1: Potential uses of GM crops in food 
 
Crop Derivatives, uses in food 
Soybeans Derivatives: soy lecithin (used as an emulsifier in bakery products, 
chocolate, margarine, powdered milk, etc.), soybean oil, soy flour, soy 
protein 
Examples of processed foods that contain soy derivatives: cereals, tofu, soy 
sauce, ice cream, infant formula, sauces, margarine, crackers, breads, 
cookies, chocolates, candies, fried foods 
Corn Derivatives: corn syrup, corn fructose, corn starch, corn dextrose, corn oil, 
corn flour 
Examples of processed foods that contain corn derivatives: chips, candy, 
ice cream, infant formula, salad dressings, tomato sauces, breads, cookies, 
cereals, baking powder, alcohol, vanilla, margarine, soy sauce, powdered 
sugar, soft drinks 
Oilseed 
rape 
Derivatives: oilseed rape oil 
Examples of processed foods that contain oilseed rape oil: chips, salad 
dressings, cookies, margarine, fried foods 
Cotton Derivatives: cottonseed oil 
Examples of processed foods that contain cottonseed oil: chips, crackers, 
cookies 
 
Source: Cummins/Lilliston 2004: 115-116 
 
Since GM foods are not labeled in the US, and since the EU has a labeling 
threshold of 0.9% GM content per ingredient, the number of products labeled in 
each case is not an indicator for how many GM foods are in circulation. Data on 
how widespread GM foods are in the EU and the US consist of unofficial 
estimates and lists of products likely to contain GM ingredients compiled by GM 
food critics. Estimates are based on the fact that roughly 56% of soybeans and 
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14% of corn grown worldwide are GM varieties (James 2004), and that these are 
widely used by the food industry in processed foods.  
It is generally estimated that 60 to 75% of all processed foods in the US 
contain GM ingredients (Cummins/Lilliston 2004: 5). This estimate has remained 
more or less stable since GM foods entered the US food production chain. For the 
EU, even estimates are hard to find. Before EU consumers and, as a result, many 
supermarkets rejected GM foods in the late 1990s, the number of GM foods 
available was probably similar (or somewhat smaller) since the United States was 
and remains a main source of soybeans and corn for the European Union. With 
the adoption in 2000 of European Commission Regulations (Regs.) 49/2000 and 
50/2000, labeling and thresholds rules for GM content were introduced for the 
first time (European Commission 2000a, 2000b). It is plausible that as a result 
levels of GM content sank somewhat, although many processed foods probably 
retained a GM content under the 1% threshold in force at the time.  
Before the new labeling regulations came into force on 18 April 2004, 
spot checks by consumer associations, environmental groups and the media 
discovered both authorized (under the 1% threshold) and unauthorized GM 
content in food. Most of the studies conducted found about 30% of their samples 
to contain such material. For example, Stiftung Warentest, Germany’s foremost 
consumers association, detected GM content of up to 20% in 31 out of 82 
unlabelled products (“Biss ins Ungewisse” 2000). A further example was a test 
conducted in 2002 by La Repubblica, one of Italy’s main national newspapers. 
Out of 31 products tested in the Turin area, ten contained GM ingredients, 
including four with very high content levels. Two of these products were labeled 
“organic”, which in theory precludes a product being genetically modified, and in 
another product, a type of corn was found that was not authorized in Europe 
(Piervincenzi 2002). A third example is a study conducted by the French Institut 
national de la consummation in 2002. Like the German and Italian studies, this 
study found about one third of the products it tested to contain GMOs (36 out of 
103) (“OGM: la contamination” 2002).  
According to some consumer associations and other GM food observers, 
these numbers seem to have decreased after 2004, when new labeling rules came 
into force (e.g. Transgen 2005b). Not only have the new rules lowered the per-
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ingredient-threshold to 0.9%, but labeling is now obligatory even if GM 
ingredients can no longer be detected in the end product. The implementation of 
this rule is based on traceability requirements. Multinational food producers such 
as Kellogg’s, Kraft, McDonald’s and Nestlé have had to find ways to work with 
or around these new rules in Europe, while they could continue to use GM food 
ingredients in the US. Some food producers secured sources of non-GM food 
ingredients. However, since this is costly and difficult to ensure, many food 
companied have instead reformulated the recipes of their products, avoiding GM 
ingredients or staying under the legal 0.9% threshold per ingredient.  
Greenpeace International’s “Trolley Watch”, consisting of a campaign 
encouraging EU citizens to photograph labeled GM foods on supermarket shelves 
and send them to the Greenpeace website, has received reports of around 70 
labeled GM foods, examples of which are listed in Table 2 (Greenpeace 
International Trolley Watch. GE Food in Europe). 
 
Table 2: Examples of labeled GM foods in the EU 
 
Soy sauce candy bars 
soybean paste  baking mixes 
soybean sprouts  Cookies 
Tofu Syrup 
Dressings / sauces / toppings food coloring 
vegetable oil Popcorn 
Margarine root beer 
 
Source: (Greenpeace International Trolley Watch.GE Food in Europe) 
 
2.2 The pros and cons of agricultural biotechnology 
 GM foods and crops are controversial because they raise a series of issues 
pertaining to consumer and animal health, the environment, socioeconomic 
aspects, and ethics. Table 3 at the end of this section provides a summary of the 
arguments most frequently used by GM food supporters and critics.41 
 A first area of controversy is human and animal health. GM food 
proponents underline that, so far, no health problems have emerged in connection 
                                                     
41 An excellent and complete discussion of health, environmental, socioeconomic and ethical 
aspects is provided by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics (1999). 
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with GM food, and that they are very unlikely to do so. They also foresee a 
“second generation” of GM food products which will bring health benefits for 
consumers, including improved nutritional value, taste, longer shelf-life and 
wider product choice. Critics, on the other hand, are of the opinion that 
agricultural biotechnology brings no tangible benefits to consumers. Instead, they 
emphasize the potential health hazards that GM food might cause, in particular 
food allergies and resistance to antibiotics through the insertion of antibiotic 
resistance markers (ARM)42 into GM foods.  
 The environment is an additional area of contention for agricultural 
biotechnology. GM food supporters maintain that GM crops enable the effective 
control of pests and weeds while at the same time reducing the need for tillage43 
and therefore soil damage and erosion. Another argument for proponents is that 
GM crops reduce the use of pesticides, especially herbicides and insecticides. 
Insect resistant crops are specifically modified to resist pests and therefore no 
longer require as much conventional insecticide. Herbicide tolerant plants are 
modified to resist the use of glyphosate, a relatively benign herbicide in 
comparison with certain other available products. According to proponents, 
farmers using glyphosate resistant crops also use less glyphosate than they would 
if they were growing non-GM crops. GM food and crops critics call these claims 
into question, stating ambiguous results as to reduced pesticide use. In addition, 
they fear the development of weeds (“superweeds”) and insects that are resistant 
to pesticides. They further warn against “genetic contamination” or “genetic 
pollution” of other species if GM plants spread through pollen and seeds in an 
uncontrolled manner. This in turn threatens the ecosystem and biodiversity. 
 Socioeconomic issues are a further aspect of the GM food debate. GM 
food proponents not only emphasize reduced production costs thanks to GM 
crops, but also suggest that genetic engineering can help solve the problems of 
developing countries, for example if drought-resistant crops were developed. 
Anti-GM food voices, on the other hand, denounce agricultural biotechnology 
                                                     
42 In the genetic engineering of plants, antibiotic resistance markers (ARM) are often transferred 
together with the desired gene because they enable the detection of that gene in the engineered 
plant. Antibiotic resistance markers thus help determine if genetic engineering was successful. 
Since these markers are resistant to certain antibiotics, GM food critics feat that they might cause 
resistance to antibiotics in humans and animals. 
43 Tillage refers to the mechanical preparation of soil for planting of seeds. It involves destroying 
weeds and loosening soil, which can lead to erosion. 
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companies for introducing products that promote agribusiness and monoculture, 
thus threatening traditional farming methods. They underline that the GM seed 
market is controlled by a few multinationals which can set prices as they wish. To 
the suggestion that GM crops can solve world hunger, critics counter that the 
developing world needs different kinds of help than agricultural biotechnology, 
leading to sustainable solutions that would not make them dependent on 
industrialized countries. They contend that GM food proponents exploit the idea 
of helping nations in need of food aid for the sake of publicity. 
 Many of the ethical considerations under discussion are closely related to 
socioeconomic issues, and some address legal questions. For GM food 
proponents, genetic engineering is a natural extension of traditional plant 
breeding, and is therefore nothing unnatural or ethically objectionable. At the 
same time, GM food supporters believe that developers of agricultural 
biotechnology should be granted intellectual property rights and be able to patent 
GM products. In this perspective, it is right for biotechnology companies to make 
profits from the applications they develop since they have invested heavily in 
them. In contrast, to many opponents of GM foods, genetic engineering is wrong 
because it is unnatural and means “playing God” or manipulating life. They view 
property rights on any kind of plant as exploitation of nature and life itself- They 
strongly believe that ownership of plant technologies and patents should not be 
permitted. 
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Table 3: The pros and cons of agricultural biotechnology 
 
 Arguments in favor 
of GM foods and crops 
Arguments against 
GM foods and crops 
Human and 
animal health  
 
• no proven risks for human or 
animal health 
• future consumer benefits (2nd 
generation products): 
- improved nutritional value 
- improved taste 
- longer shelf life 
- wider choice of food 
products 
• potential human and animal 
health hazards: 
- resistance to antibiotics 
- potential allergies 
• no significant consumer benefits 
 
Environment   • effective control of pests and 
weeds  
• less tillage needed (soil damage 
minimized) 
• reduced use of pesticides 
• the type of pesticide used 
(glyphosate) is relatively benign 
• use of GM crops leads to insect 
and weed resistance to pesticides 
• genetic “contamination” or 
“pollution” through pollen/seeds 
• changes in the ecosystem 
• threat to biodiversity 
Socioeconomic 
issues 
 
 
• agricultural costs of production 
(e.g. labor) reduced  
• solution of world hunger through 
new varieties (e.g. drought 
resistant crops) 
• enhanced food supply worldwide 
• agribusiness and monoculture; 
threat to traditional farming 
• GM seed market controlled by 
few multinationals, price 
manipulation possible 
• dependence of developing 
countries on technologies which 
they cannot afford 
Ethical and legal 
considerations 
• genetic engineering is an 
extension of traditional breeding 
• successful private investment 
should lead to profit 
• genetic engineering is unnatural 
and means “playing God” 
• private ownership in this area 
means exploiting life itself 
 
 
2.3 GM food and its regulation in the US and the EU: 
chronological overview44 
United States 
1973–1991: From rDNA technology to GM crop field trials A first of 
three main phases in the development and regulation of GM foods and crops in 
the US runs from 1973, when rDNA technology became possible, to 1991, when 
                                                     
44 Further details on the events covered and policy documents mentioned in this chronology will 
be given later in this dissertation. The goal of this section is to give a brief chronological overview 
of events relevant to the GM food debate. 
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first GM foods and crops were being tested in field experiments and would soon 
hit the US market. Key events during this phase were the 1973 announcement of 
rDNA technology as a new tool of molecular biology, the Asilomar conference in 
1975 leading to the 1976 National Institutes of Health (NIH) Guidelines on 
rDNA research, and the publication of the Coordinated Framework in 1986 
(Office of Science and Technology Policy 1986). The Coordinated Framework 
represents a key turning point during this phase as it determined fundamental 
regulatory principles that guide US policy to this day. 
In 1973, scientists Stanley Cohen and Herbert Boyer developed the 
technology necessary to genetically modify DNA. This scientific event marked 
the beginning of what would become the debate on recombinant DNA in the 
1970s, and, later, on GM food in the 1990s. It led to a temporary moratorium on 
certain experiments with recombinant DNA and to a famous conference, the 1975 
“Asilomar Conference”, on how best to address the possible hazards of such 
research. This in turn triggered the development, in 1976, of the first National 
Institutes of Health (NIH) Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA 
Molecules (National Institutes of Health 1976). As scientists gained experience 
with the new technology, and as the public debate on the issue slowly abated, 
these fairly restrictive rules were relaxed. 
 By the late 1970s and early 1980s, it became clear that first applications 
of rDNA technology were “in the pipeline”. The White House’s Office of 
Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), dominated by President Ronald 
Reagan’s “no new law” mantra, responded to the impending possibility of both 
state and national legislation by drafting the Coordinated Framework for 
Regulation of Biotechnology (“Coordinated Framework” for short), which was 
announced in 1986 (Office of Science and Technology Policy 1986). 
The driving principle developed with the 1986 Coordinated Framework 
has not changed since the 1980s: GM crops and foods are regulated as end 
products that are not to be treated any differently from non-GM foods and crops 
because of their process of production.45 The Framework further provided a 
                                                     
45 As will be discussed elsewhere in this dissertation, this principle resulted from an institutional 
struggle between the Environmental Protection Agency, which favored a more process-based and 
precautionary approach, and the US Department of Agriculture’s Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection Services, which, supported by the White House, supported a product-based approach 
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structure for the oversight of modern biotechnology that did not necessitate new 
laws because existing legislation in the areas of agriculture, food and drugs was 
sufficient. It determined which existing federal agencies were able to regulate 
what types of biotechnology under which existing statutes (or laws). Agricultural 
biotechnology fell under the responsibility of the Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection Services (APHIS), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The designated agencies drafted their 
first policy guidelines and rules in 1986, at the same time as the Coordinated 
Framework was announced. 
APHIS was the quickest to specify its rules since it was in charge of 
overseeing field tests with GM plants for which authorizations were being 
requested. In 1987, APHIS began issuing so-called “permits” for field tests with 
GM crops. From the late 1980s to the early 1990s, Monsanto and other 
corporations were hard at work developing first applications of rDNA research in 
the field of agriculture. 
1992–1996: GM foods and crops enter the marketplace A second, 
relatively short, phase in the development and regulation of GM foods and crops 
in the US runs from 1992 to 1996, and covers the introduction of first agricultural 
biotechnology products onto the market. 1992 saw the approval of the first GM 
food, whereas 1996 is the year when GM crops were first planted, harvested, and 
exported. 1996 can be seen as a turning point, since this is when consumers 
worldwide first began to take notice of the phenomenon of GM foods and crops. 
Late 1996 is when the development of public rejection of agricultural 
biotechnology has its roots, especially in Europe, and, in the form of a backlash 
somewhat later, also in the United States. 
Not until the early 1990s did US federal agencies begin to develop 
procedures and policies for commercializing first GM plants. The Flavr Savr 
tomato, the first GM food to be marketed in the United States, jumpstarted 
regulatory activity on GM foods and crops for the commercial market. Developed 
by a small Californian biotechnology company named Calgene, the Flavr Savr 
tomato was genetically modified to delay ripening, the idea being that it could 
                                                                                                                                                             
following what would later be termed the substantial equivalence principle (Sheingate 2004, 
Jones 1999). 
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remain on the vine longer before being harvested, thus enabling a better tasting 
tomato on supermarket shelves. In 1992, APHIS granted the Flavr Savr so-called 
“nonregulated status”, which meant that it could be grown commercially without 
further oversight. 
That same year, prompted by Calgene’s 1991 application to market the 
Flavr Savr tomato, FDA developed its Statement of Policy on Foods Derived 
from New Plant Varieties (Food and Drug Administration 1992). Central to this 
document, which remains the agency’s main policy document on GM food, is the 
principle that FDA treats GM foods just like any other foods, and that therefore 
no specific authorization procedure or labeling is necessary. The Flavr Savr 
tomato was approved in 1994 by FDA and sold in some parts of the US between 
1994 and 1998. Its commercial failure was not connected to its being genetically 
engineered (GE). Instead, the main trouble was Calgene’s lack of experience with 
tomato breeding and marketing. In addition, the Flavr Savr tomato bruised easily 
and did not “save as much flavor” as hoped. Calgene was acquired by Monsanto 
in 1997.46 
In 1994, a second GM tomato made its way onto the US market. British 
biotechnology company Zeneca initiated and completed an FDA consultation on 
another tomato, modified, like the Flavr Savr tomato, to ripen more slowly. This 
GM tomato was also ideal for industrial processing because it was engineered to 
have a firmer, less watery texture than non-GM tomatoes. In the US, this tomato 
was sold in the form of a puree by Safeway from 1996 and until 1999, when 
Zeneca discontinued production for reasons explained below under the EU 
chronology in this chapter. 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, while Calgene experimented with GM 
tomatoes, other biotechnology companies were developing GM crop varieties 
such as GM soybeans, corn and cotton. In 1993, APHIS introduced a streamlined 
“notification” procedure to approve field tests, which was extended to most 
varieties in 1997. In 1994, EPA began the process of adopting rules to regulate 
the Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) toxin in certain GM crops as pesticides, renamed 
“plant-incorporated protectants” (PIPs) in 2001. First GM soybean and corn 
                                                     
46 Charles 2001 (chapter 10) and Martineau 2001 offer detailed accounts of the story of the Flavr 
Savr tomato. 
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varieties were approved in 1995, and FDA issued an informal guidance document 
on consultation procedures regarding GM products in 1997 (Food and Drug 
Administration 1997). GM soybean and corn varieties were sold to US farmers, 
planted, and harvested commercially in the United States for the first time in 
1996. They made their way into US animal feed and processed foods for human 
consumption practically unnoticed by the general public despite some campaigns 
by environmental and consumer groups. 
1997–2005: Mounting public attention and regulatory stability A third 
phase in the development and regulation of GM food began in 1997 and 
continues to the time of writing. It covers a period of mounting public attention 
and, in some cases, concern regarding agricultural biotechnology, which is at the 
same time characterized by a remarkable regulatory stability. Key events during 
this period are crises revolving around the monarch butterfly (1999) and StarLink 
(2000). 
US Americans’ attention regarding GM foods and crops was first 
awakened by Europeans’ negative reaction to first GM grain shipments entering 
European ports in late 1996 and early 1997. However, concern with GM foods 
never was and never became a mainstream phenomenon in the US. There were 
some misgivings, mainly on the part of environmental activists, about the so-
called “terminator” technology, for which the US Department of Agriculture and 
the Delta and Pine Land Company, a major cotton and soybean breeder, received 
the first patent in March 1998. This technology, entitled “Control of Plant Gene 
Expression”, was meant to prevent unwanted germination of the seeds produced 
by GM crops, thereby controlling the unwanted spread of GM crops into the 
environment. GM food critics, however, saw the technology as a threat to the 
livelihood of farmers, especially in the developing world, who depend on saving 
and replanting seed.47 It also was denounced as a tool devised entirely to increase 
corporations’ profits. What aroused worldwide attention, however, were 
Monsanto’s plans to commercialize this “terminator gene”. The public uproar, in 
                                                     
47 In the opinion of some US farmers supporting agricultural biotechnology, this is not a 
convincing argument, at least for farming in the industrialized world. As Hayden Milberg of the 
National Corn Growers Association explains for the case of corn, “with [non-GM] modern hybrid 
varieties, it is not possible to save corn seed and get the same yield the following harvest”; this 
means that farmers buy new seed every year, whether it is GM seed or not (interview with 
Hayden Milberg, National Corn Growers Association, 9 June 2004, Washington, DC). 
 45
the US and especially in Europe, was such that Monsanto renounced its plans in 
October 1999. 
The first event that alerted a wider circle of US Americans to possible 
negative consequences of GM food production was the publication, in May 1999, 
of a scientific article suggesting that the well-loved and beautiful monarch 
butterfly might be harmed by GM crops. More specifically, an entomologist at 
Cornell University published a paper in Nature reporting laboratory experiments 
that showed that 44% of monarch butterfly larvae had died four days after eating 
milkweed plants48 dusted with pollen from Bt corn, whereas larvae exposed to 
conventional corn pollen had not (Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology 
2002: 8). The monarch butterfly study met with immediate interest from 
advocacy groups, which alerted the media, leading to reports that captured public 
attention. In subsequent years, further research into the effects of Bt corn on the 
monarch butterfly was conducted, spurred by new data requirements issued by 
EPA, which had to consider whether to grant new authorizations for several Bt 
corn varieties. The test results showed that most Bt corn pollen was not harmful 
to the monarch butterfly, except for the pollen of Bt176, an insect resistant corn 
variety manufactured by Novartis (now Syngenta) and with a registration due to 
expire in April 2001. EPA let the registration for Bt176 expire, and, in October 
2001, renewed authorizations for the five other Bt corn varieties that were already 
on the market. Public interest in the issue died down. 
Over a year after the publication of the article on the monarch butterfly, 
another event occurred which had a somewhat more lasting impact. In September 
2000, the Washington Post, a major US newspaper, reported that Genetically 
Engineered Food Alert, a coalition of anti-GM activists, had ordered a series of 
tests on processed foods, which revealed traces of StarLink corn in taco shells 
manufactured by Kraft Foods. StarLink corn is the trademark for a Bt corn 
variety that produces its owns pesticide (Cry9C). StarLink corn, produced by 
Aventis CropScience (Bayer CropScience since 2002), had been approved in 
1998 by EPA for use in feed, but not for use in food because allergic reactions in 
humans were considered possible, although unlikely. 
                                                     
48 Milkweed is a source of nutrition for monarch butterfly larvae, and both milkweed and monarch 
butterflies are found in and around cornfields. 
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Kraft voluntarily recalled all its taco shells; Aventis halted grain sales and 
took StarLink corn off the market. After the September 2000 discovery, some 
consumers reported allergic reactions as a result of consuming taco shells, but 
none of these reactions were subsequently confirmed as resulting from StarLink 
corn. Aventis quickly agreed with the federal government to purchase all 
StarLink corn from farmers, ensuring that it would be used only in feed and for 
industrial purposes. This deal cost Aventis at least US$100 million according to 
some sources (Segarra/Rawson 2001: 4), if not more – the media widely reported 
a cost of US$1 billion. Other actors that suffered from the affair were grain 
processors and food producers, who were partly reimbursed by Aventis. EPA 
made the decision to avoid “split authorizations” in the future, defined as 
authorizations for only feed, but not for food. As in the case of the monarch 
butterfly, the public gradually lost interest in the StarLink case, satisfied that 
regulators and industry had dealt with the crisis adequately. 
In late 2002, another “StarLink-type” crisis was averted when APHIS 
discovered soybeans destined to be used in food and feed that had been mixed 
with GM corn designed to produce pharmaceuticals (plant-made pharmaceuticals 
or PMPs). APHIS had begun authorizing field trials with PMP-producing GM 
plants in 2001, and one of the provisions attached to this type of test was strict 
segregation from GM crops to be used in food and feed. In September and 
November 2002, during routine tests, APHIS found traces of a pharmaceutical-
producing corn in a soybean field in Iowa. The corn had previously been grown 
in a field trial in the same location as the soybeans. In a similar case in Nebraska, 
discovered in November 2002, the “contaminated” soybeans had already been 
harvested, transported to an elevator, and combined with other soybeans. In both 
cases, ProdiGene, a small Texan biotechnology company specialized in 
developing PMPs or “biopharming”, had failed to take adequate measures to 
destroy the PMP-producing corn following the 2001 field trials. ProdiGene was 
fined US$500,000 by APHIS for negligence and agreed to buy back the 500,000 
bushels of “contaminated” soybeans (valued at US$2.7 million) to be destroyed 
or diverted to feed or non-food usage such as the production of biofuel (fuel 
made from plants). In March 2003, APHIS announced proposed rules for PMP-
producing crops, which are stricter than rules for GM crops that do not produce 
PMPs (Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 2003). 
 47
In the spring of 2005, the latest incident involving agricultural 
biotechnology had transatlantic repercussions when US grain exporters 
inadvertently sent several hundred tons of an unauthorized GM crop (Bt10 corn) 
to the EU instead of the authorized Bt11 variety. Unlike Bt11, the Bt10 strain has 
a gene that is resistant to the animal antibiotic ampicillin. It turned out that its 
producer, Syngenta, had mistakenly sold Bt10 grain to US farmers between 2001 
and 2004 although this strain was not approved for distribution. As a response to 
the mixup, in April 2005, EU Member States adopted a measure requiring 
imports of Bt11 corn to be certified as Bt10 free, and the US Department of 
Agriculture required Syngenta to pay a US$US 375.000 fine. 
 
European Union 
1973-1990: From discussions on rDNA technology to Directive 90/220 
As in the case of the US, the debate on and regulation of GM foods and crops can 
be described in three phases. The first of these phases covers the time period from 
1973 to 1990, beginning with the news of rDNA technology as a new method and 
ending with the adoption of Council Directive (Dir.) 90/220 (Council of the 
European Union 1990b), the EU’s first piece of legislation on GMOs. Key events 
during this period were the 1973 announcement on rDNA technology in the US, 
the 1982 approval of Recommendation by the Council of the European Union 
(“Council of the EU”, “Council”) on rDNA research (Council of the European 
Union 1982), and the passage of the 1990 Council Directive on the deliberate 
release of GMOs into the environment (Council of the European Union 1990b). 
This event constituted a turning point from a relatively permissive EC policy on 
rDNA research to a relatively restrictive policy on its applications. 
The 1973 news that US scientists had developed new rDNA technologies 
impelled European scientists to catch up with US advances in science and 
technology. Convinced of this necessity by the scientific community, the 
European Community (EC) and individual European governments were therefore 
not particularly inclined towards stringent new rules hindering scientific research. 
Most European countries devised rules that were modeled on the guidelines 
developed in the US and in the United Kingdom (UK). In addition, the European 
Community drafted a directive on rDNA research as of 1978, only to withdraw it 
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and then pass it as non-binding recommendation in 1982 (Council of the 
European Union 1982). During this phase of searching for ways to regulate 
rDNA research, scientists were the main group to influence guidelines and 
regulation on scientific questions.  
The rise of environmentalism and growth of political parties and interest 
groups with environmental agendas as of the mid-1980s brought with it a more 
complex attitude towards biotechnology. An environmental or “green” outlook 
on biotechnology became more and more widespread, and genetic engineering 
began to be perceived as a potential threat to the environment. It was in this 
context and climate that the genetically modified organisms dossier came to be 
dealt with by the European Commission’s (“Commission”) Environment 
Directorate-General (DG) instead of DG Research, which had dealt with rDNA 
research in the 1970s and early 1980s. 
Accordingly, the EC’s first directives on GMOs, passed in 1990, had an 
environmental focus. Council Directive 90/219 (Council of the European Union 
1990a) on the contained use of GMOs and Council Directive 90/220 (Council of 
the European Union 1990b) on their deliberate release into the environment were 
based on a process-based logic, that is, the idea that GMOs should be regulated in 
a certain way because they were produced through a certain process. The 
biotechnology industry lobby in Brussels had reluctantly accepted the deliberate 
release directive in order to be able to more forward with new product approvals. 
There was a general feeling at this time that European harmonization on 
environmental issues was a necessary step towards further European integration. 
As soon as Directive 90/220 was passed, however, it was attacked by the 
biotechnology industry, which denounced its process-based logic as being 
unscientific, and accused it of being a potential hindrance to European research 
and development. 
1991–1999: from first authorizations to crisis A second phase in the 
regulation and development of GM foods and crops essentially covers the 1990s, 
during which the EU approved a series of agricultural biotechnology products, 
and ends in 1999 with the EU Council’s de facto moratorium on the approval of 
any new GMOs or GM products. Key events during this phase are numerous. 
They include the arrival of first GM corn and soybean shipments from the US in 
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European ports (1996), the eruption of the BSE scandal (1996), the putting in 
place of the Novel Foods Regulation (Reg.) (1997), the news of the birth of the 
cloned sheep Dolly (1997), and the declaration of the de facto moratorium by 
several EU Member States (1999). Of these, the arrival of GM crop shipments 
and the declaration of the moratorium can be seen as major turning points. The 
former of these events introduced the GM food era in Europe, while the latter 
event put a sudden halt to approvals only three years later. 
  During the first half of the 1990s, the only GMOs authorized under 
90/220 were vaccines and one variety of tobacco. In 1995, the UK Advisory 
Committee on Novel Foods and Processes (ACNFP) approved Zeneca’s tomato 
modified to delay ripening, referred to above. Since this tomato was grown only 
in California, it did not require approval under Directive 90/220, which did not 
cover foods produced from GMOs. In the UK, the tomato was sold as puree by 
Sainsbury’s as of February 1996, voluntarily labeled as a GM food. The GM food 
tomato puree sold well, perhaps helped along in the UK by the fact that it was 
sold at a price slightly more advantageous than that of puree made from 
conventional tomatoes. Zeneca even planned to market and grow the whole 
tomato in Europe. Indeed, in 1996, public rejection of GM foods was not yet as 
widespread a European sentiment as it would become a few years later, especially 
in the UK.49 
On 20 March 1996, about a month after the first GM tomato puree went 
on sale, the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)50 scandal took center 
stage when the UK Government announced a suspected link between BSE and 
variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD). Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease is 
the human equivalent of BSE, as fatal to humans as BSE is to cattle. Although 
BSE had nothing to do with genetic engineering, the ensuing food safety, public 
                                                     
49 Sainsbury withdrew its GM tomato puree from the market in 1999, when public opinion had 
become an obstacle for its successful sale. Bernard Graciet, who worked for Zeneca at this time, 
explains why the GM tomato puree was taken off the market from the company’s perspective: 
“[Zeneca] stopped production for two reasons. First, supermarkets (not consumers) no longer 
wanted the puree. Second, and most importantly, we could not get the approval to grow GM 
tomatoes in Europe, and importing them from California was too expensive. Those were our 
reasons for withdrawing our notification from the European Commission” (interview with 
Bernard Graciet, Syngenta, 15 September 2004, Brussels). 
50 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy is one of several diseases categorized as Transmissible 
Spongiform Encephalopathies (TSEs), and is a fatal animal disease affecting the cattle’s brains. 
Isolated cases of BSE probably existed long before 1986. 
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health and regulatory crisis, at both the UK and EU levels, profoundly influenced 
European consumers’ inclination to accept the GM crops that would be planted 
and harvested for the first time that very year in the United States and would 
arrive shortly after in Europe for the first time in the form of grain shipments. 
European Commission attempts to reassure the public, for example with the 2000 
White Paper on Food Safety, came too late to avert the crisis (European 
Commission 2000c). 
Backing up to the early years of this crisis, BSE, often referred to as “mad 
cow disease”, had first been diagnosed in 1986 in cattle in the United Kingdom. 
As a result, the UK government had then banned the use of cattle feed containing 
bone meal,51 and had ordered the slaughter of all cattle diagnosed with BSE. In 
the context of steadily increasing numbers of BSE cases, scientists were finding 
increasing evidence that BSE might be transmissible to humans. As late as the 
early 1990s, however, the UK government excluded the possibility of a human 
version of BSE, and declared that British beef was safe to eat. As a 
demonstration, in 1990, Agriculture Minister John Gummer and his daughter ate 
beef burgers in front of the British press as a gesture to calm rising panic over the 
safety of British beef. 
Even after Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) was diagnosed in three very 
young patients in 1995,52 UK government scientists continued to reject the 
possibility that BSE could be transferred to humans. Only on 8 March 1996 did 
the UK’s National CJD surveillance unit suggest that a new form of CJD, which 
would became known as vCJD, had been identified in a group of unusually 
young people. On 20 March 1996, the UK government announced that the most 
likely explanation for these cases was exposure to BSE. As a response, on 27 
March 1996, the European Commission imposed a worldwide export ban on 
British beef and beef products. 
                                                     
51 The UK epidemic is thought to have been caused by commercial cattle feed concentrates 
containing meat and bone meal derived from sheep and possibly cattle infected with scrapie, a 
type of TSE. 
52 Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) is a rare fatal brain disorder which usually affects about one in 
one million people per year worldwide, and which usually appears in later life. The fact that the 
patients were young was therefore a sign that the disease diagnosed was a new variant of CJD. 
This new human variant of CJD is also a rare and fatal neurodegenerative disease with symptoms 
similar to BSE in cattle. Regardless of their age, humans can contract vCJD by eating the beef of 
cattle that had mad cow disease. 
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From 1998 to 2000, an inquiry was made into the BSE affair in the UK. It 
concluded that about 4.5 million cattle had been slaughtered since 1996, and that 
about 80 people had died of vCJD. The report charged UK ministers and civil 
servants with having deliberately refused to consider the possibility of BSE 
spreading to humans in the early stages of the outbreak, trying instead to cover up 
the BSE fiasco to avoid disrupting the British beef export market. The European 
Commission was also strongly criticized, especially by the European Parliament 
(EP, “Parliament”), for having failed to act on the issue of BSE during the early 
1990s. Among other points, it was charged with having pursued a policy of 
disinformation between 1990 and 1994, and with having downplayed the problem 
for economic reasons. 
It is in this climate of public fear of BSE and distrust of national and EU 
institutions53 that first US shipments of GM corn and soybeans arrived in 
European ports starting in the fall of 1996. The EU had given the green light for 
the commercialization of Monsanto’s GTS40/3/2 herbicide tolerant soybean in 
April, and of Novartis’s (now Syngenta) Bt176 insect resistant corn in January 
1997. Environmental activist organizations such as Greenpeace responded by 
blocking the entry of individual ships, for the first time attracting public attention 
                                                     
53 During this period, two further scandals had a negative impact on citizens’ trust in government 
and regulatory institutions, and illustrated the spreading institutional crisis in Europe. The first is 
the so-called “tainted blood scandal” that took place in France during this time. In the early 1980s, 
some 1,300 hemophiliacs, many of them children, were infected with Acquired Immune 
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) through blood transfusions that French government medical 
authorities knew could be contaminated with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV). 
Although informed of the risk of not testing blood for transfusions, the French government did not 
start requiring blood testing for HIV until mid-1985, at least partially in order to wait to be able to 
use a test of French make instead of an American-produced test. By 1997, over 500 people had 
died through HIV-contaminated blood. The scandal, which broke in 1991, led to several court 
cases. Several doctors were convicted, but Laurent Fabius, French Prime Minister in the 1980s, 
was exonerated in March 1999. Like BSE, this event had nothing to do with genetic engineering, 
but it appeared to the public as another illustration of how European political elites made unwise 
decisions and then avoided taking responsibility. 
The second scandal was the May 1999 discovery of high levels of dioxin in chicken and egg 
products from Belgian farms. Dioxins are a group of chemicals that are formed by burning 
chlorine-based chemical compounds, and are highly persistent in the environment. Waste-burning 
incinerators are the main source of dioxin. Dioxins enter animal feed in a number of different 
ways, some of which are very difficult to avoid. Maximum levels of dioxin have been set and 
procedures put in place to monitor its presence. In the Belgian case, the source of the 
contamination was a fat-rendering company, which had incorporated dioxin and polychlorinated 
biphenyls (PCBs), another type of chemical, into fats used in animal feed. As a result, all 
potentially contaminated chicken and egg products in Belgium, as well as in other European 
countries, were destroyed.  
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to the risks of genetic engineering and prompting the beginning of what would 
become profound public rejection of GM foods and crops. 
On 27 January 1997, acting not as a response to nascent critical public 
opinion, but as a belated concession to industry’s lobbying for GM food 
regulation that was less stringent than Council Directive 90/220 on environmental 
release, the European Parliament and Council approved Regulation 258/97 
(European Parliament/Council of the European Union 1997). This so-called 
“Novel Foods Regulation” applied to foods and food ingredients containing, 
consisting of, or produced from genetically modified organisms. It was the first 
regulation to make labeling of GM foods mandatory, but did not introduce a 
threshold. 
 It also included the contested “substantial equivalence clause” applying 
to foods or food ingredients “substantially equivalent to existing foods or food 
ingredients as regards their composition, nutritional value, metabolism, intended 
use and the level of undesirable substance contained therein” (see EP/Council 
Reg. 258/97, articles [art.] 3 and 5). Substantially equivalent foods underwent a 
simplified procedure, consisting essentially of the applicant’s notification directly 
to the European Commission54 in order to ensure efficient regulation of processed 
foods containing GMOs.  
On 22 February 1997, the world was shaken by another news item from 
the UK: the birth, having taken place in July 1996, of a cloned sheep named 
Dolly. Created by the Roslin Institute in Edinburgh, Dolly was the world’s first 
clone of an adult mammal. While her birth was seen by scientists as a major 
breakthrough, large parts of the public, in Europe and elsewhere, felt that cloning, 
a type of genetic engineering allowing the duplication of existing organisms or 
genetic material, raised new and serious ethical questions. 
Around the time that the news of Dolly aired, some EU Member States 
were beginning to respond to growing public uncertainty and rejection of GM 
foods, and to call for a fundamental toughening of existing EU-level rules. A 
particular point of critique was the substantial equivalence clause contained in the 
                                                     
54 This is in contrast to an application made to a national competent authority, as was the case 
under Council Directive 90/220 and as remains the case under EP and Council Directive 2001/18 
and EP and Council Regulation 1829/2003. Regulation 258/97 foresaw the possibility of objection 
through Member States, but it is less developed than in the case of Council Directive 90/220. 
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Novel Foods Regulation, which seemed to some Member States to allow GM 
foods in “through the back door” without rigorous review.55 Other requests were 
for a generally more precautionary stance, and for more transparency and public 
involvement. EU Member States acted by beginning to use the “safeguard 
clause”56 contained in both Directive 90/220 and in the Novel Foods Regulation. 
In February and March 1997, Austria and Luxembourg both invoked the clause to 
ban Bt176 corn, the first Bt corn approved for commercialization in both the EU 
and the United States, from their national territories. 
A further practical blow was dealt to GM foods and crops in May 1998, 
when the UK supermarket Iceland became the first European supermarket to go 
“GM-free” in response to consumer demands. In the years to follow, many major 
food retailers around Europe followed Iceland’s example. 
Then, in August 1998, GM potatoes hit the news. Hungarian-born 
scientist Árpád Pusztai, a researcher at the Rowett Research Institute, the UK's 
leading food safety research lab, announced the results of experiments in which 
he had fed GM potatoes to rats on British television. He had observed that the 
rats suffered serious damage to their immune systems and showed stunted 
growth. A few days after Pusztai’s appearance, the Rowett Institute suspended 
him, the formal reason being that he had presented the results publicly before 
they had been peer-reviewed by other scientists as required by Rowett Research 
Institute procedures. The results of Pusztai’s experiments were discredited by 
GM food supporters, and touted by GM critics. Within this climate of mixed 
signals, the UK public, as well as EU citizens in general, were increasingly 
unsure as to the safety of GM foods, the impartiality of scientific information, 
and the competence of European governments to make sound policy decisions. 
                                                     
55 On this point, Levidow and Murphy (2002) give a useful account of what they call the “decline 
of substantial equivalence”. 
56 The safeguard clause is based on article 95 of the Treaty establishing the European Community 
(consolidated text, 2002). It was included in Council Directive 90/220 (art. 16) and remains part of 
EP and Council Directive 2001/18 (art. 23), as well as EP and Council Regulation 258/97 (art. 12). 
It provides the possibility for Member States to take “national safeguard measures” by 
provisionally restricting or prohibiting the use and/or sale of individual GM products on their 
national territory if they have grounds to believe that those products may be harmful to health or 
the environment. Between January 1998 and August 2005, the safeguard clause has been invoked 
ten times, three times by Austria, twice by France, and once each by Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Luxembourg, and the UK. Only the UK has withdrawn its ban. 
 54
Pusztai later published the results of his study in The Lancet, but his experiments 
remain controversial to this day. 
Despite these mounting signs of concern and criticism by the public and 
some Member States, between 1996 and 1998, the EU authorized a series of GM 
crops including oilseed rape, corn, and cotton under Council Directive 90/220 
and the Novel Foods Regulation. However, individual Member States were 
increasingly discontent with the EU’s regulatory regime on GMOs. 1998 and 
1999 brought further national invocations of the safeguard clause by Greece, 
France, and Austria. 
The discontentment was compounded by the resignation of the European 
Commission in 1999. Jacques Santer’s Commission, in office since 1995, was 
accused of fraud, mismanagement, and withholding information. It entered a deep 
crisis in 1998, when the European Parliament refused to discharge the proposed 
budget (i.e. to formally request the Commission to implement the budget). As a 
result, the Santer Commission resigned en bloc on 15 March 1999, leaving the 
European Commission politically weakened. 
This is the context within which the de facto Moratorium was 
pronounced. During the Council meeting of EU environmental ministers held on 
24 and 25 June 1999, prompted by explicit calls from Greece and France, (“EU 
Ministers ‘ban’ GMOs, delay scrap car law” 1999), the delegations from 
Denmark, Greece, France, Italy and Luxembourg stated that, pending the 
adoption of rules on labeling and traceability of GMOs and GMO-derived 
products, they would “take steps to have any new authorizations for growing and 
placing on the market suspended” (Council of the European Union 1999b: annex 
III). They were later joined by Belgium and Austria.57 The June 1999 statement 
                                                     
57 Together, the Member States listed were able to block GMO approvals within the Council of 
the EU. As will be explained in Chapter 4, particularly controversial authorization procedures can 
reach the level of the Council of the European Union. In this case, approvals must be made by 
“qualified majority”. Under this voting system, Member States have a certain number of votes, 
depending roughly on their size and population. At the time of the de facto moratorium, Germany, 
France, Italy and the United Kingdom had 10 votes; Spain had 8; Belgium, Greece, the 
Netherlands, and Portugal had 5; Austria and Sweden had 4; Denmark, Ireland and Finland had 3; 
and Luxembourg had 2 votes (for a total of 87). A qualified majority required 62 votes (71.3%), 
and 26 votes constituted a so-called blocking minority, that is, a number of votes sufficient to 
block approval. 
Since 2004, when 10 new Member States joined the EU, the threshold for a qualified majority is 
232 votes out of 321 (72.2%), with a blocking threshold of 90 votes. In addition, the proposal 
must be backed by a majority of Member States and the countries supporting the proposal must 
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marked the beginning of the EU’s so-called de facto moratorium58 on GMOs. 
Before this date, the last approvals of GM plants had been the authorization of 
two GM carnations in October 1998, and of three varieties of GM corn and one 
type of GM oilseed rape in April 1998. 
2000-2005: the EU moves toward stricter regulation The third phase 
describing GM food development and regulation in the EU began in 2000 and 
continues into the present. This phase is characterized by EU institutions’ effort 
to toughen EU regulations on GMOs. Key events are the 2001 passage of EP and 
Council Directive 2001/18 (revised Directive 90/220, European 
Parliament/Council of the European Union 2001), the 2003 passage of EP and 
Council Regulations on labeling and traceability of GM food and feed (European 
Parliament/Council of the European Union 2003a, 2003b), as well as the first 
approval, in 2004, of a GMO since 1999 and therefore the lifting of the 1999 de 
facto moratorium. 
This phase encountered one more public health crisis. Just as the shock of 
BSE was starting to fade, an epidemic of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) took 
hold of the UK in 2001. FMD is an infectious and highly contagious disease 
affecting cloven hoofed animals such as cattle, swine, goats and sheep. Between 
February and September 2001, over 2000 infected premises were registered in the 
UK, and it is estimated that about 6 million animals were slaughtered in order to 
gain control of the situation. Aside from the economic impact of the epidemic on 
the UK’s farming sector, the 2001 FMD epidemic once again raised questions in 
European citizens’ minds about the capacity of governments to avoid and, if 
necessary, address public health crises. 
Returning to the EU’s GM food and crop regulation, one of the first 
measures taken by the European Commission in response to the de facto 
moratorium was to adopt new regulations on labeling which would serve as an 
interim solution until new measures could be taken. While previous rules had 
                                                                                                                                                             
represent at least 62% of the total EU population. Votes are distributed as follows: France, 
Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom: 29 votes; Poland and Spain: 27 votes; Netherlands: 13 
votes; Belgium, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary and Portugal: 12 votes; Austria and Sweden: 
10 votes; Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Lithuania and Slovakia: 7 votes; Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, 
Luxembourg and Slovenia: 4 votes; Malta: 3 votes. 
58 This moratorium was “de facto” because it had no legal basis within EU law. For this reason, 
GM foods proponents called it illegal. 
 56
only specified that foods containing GMOs should be labeled, Regulation 
49/2000 (European Commission 2000a) settled the much-debated threshold issue, 
making labeling mandatory above a 1% adventitious (i.e. accidental) GM-content 
of individual food ingredients. It also extended requirements to foods delivered to 
final consumers and food caterers. Regulation 50/2000 addressed the labeling of 
GM food additives and flavorings (European Commission 2000b). 
The next task was to complete the review of Directive 90/220, which had 
been launched by the European Commission in 1998, and to address the issues of 
labeling and traceability not only for foods, but also for feed. In March 2001, 
Directive 2001/18 was passed (European Parliament/Council of the European 
Union 2001). This Directive, to be transposed by EU Member States by 17 
October 2002, was a considerably revised and more restrictive version of 
Directive 90/220. It explicitly named the precautionary principle and did not 
include a substantial equivalence clause like the Novel Foods Regulation. It also 
placed an increased emphasis on public and stakeholder consultation and 
participation in the decision-making process. Member States generally welcomed 
these developments, but insisted on new labeling and traceability regulations 
before lifting the de facto moratorium. 
Such regulations were finally adopted on 22 Sept. 2003, and came into 
force on 18 April 2004. EP and Council Regulations 1829/2003 on GM food and 
feed (European Parliament/Council of the European Union 2003a), and 
1830/2003 (European Parliament/Council of the European Union 2003b) on the 
traceability and labeling of GM food and feed set up a stricter authorization 
procedure which repealed the Novel Foods Regulation, toughened labeling rules, 
and for the first time addressed the issues of traceability and feed. A further 
important innovation was the creation of a new independent food agency, the 
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA). As detailed under the US chronology, 
these new regulations came too late to avert the US-led WTO complaint against 
the European Union in May 2003. 
Armed with new regulations on GM food and feed, the EU was ready to 
for a “de facto lifting” of its de facto moratorium. On 19 May 2004, this step was 
taken through the Commission’s approval of Syngenta’s Bt11 corn. The approval 
of Monsanto’s NK603 corn followed in October 2003. These recent 
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authorizations, however, do not mean that controversy on GM foods has 
subsided. Each new authorization is contentious. Since 2004, each time the 
European Commission has asked EU Member States to vote on authorizing a 
GMO food or feed product, agreement has not been possible. When Member 
State representatives within the Council of Ministers cannot agree59, EU 
comitology rules60 foresee that the Commission adopt the decision in question, 
which is why new approvals have been possible. In June 2005, a majority of EU 
environment ministers reaffirmed their voice in the GMO debate by voting to 
allow individual Member States to keep their national bans in place. As explained 
in Chapter 1, contentious issues on the current EU agenda are coexistence, 
liability, and the labeling threshold for GM seed. 
                                                     
59 Relatively constant opponents of GM food and crops over the past years have been Austria, 
Denmark, Greece and Luxembourg. Relatively steady supporters have included Finland, Sweden, 
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Changes in national governments have influenced 
voting patterns, for example in the case of Spain, which was a steady supporter of GM crops and 
foods until a new socialist government took office in the spring of 2004. It now routinely abstains 
from voting. The voting records of the Member States that joined the EU in 2004 are too brief to 
reveal clear patterns yet. 
60 Comitology refers to the rules foreseen when the Commission is assisted by a committee 
(advisory, management or regulatory) made up of Member State representatives. Council 
Decision 1999/468 lays down “comitology” rules and procedures. Both Dir. 2001/18 and Reg. 
1829/2003 make reference to this decision. Council Dir. 90/220 and EP and Council Reg. 258/97 
foresaw a similar procedure. 
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3. GM FOOD POLICY: A TRANSATLANTIC COMPARISON  
  
What is my focus when I ask why and how GM food policies are 
different? What, in short, is my dependent variable? In this chapter, I describe 
and analyze US and EU genetically modified food policies, and clarify the 
statement used previously that US policy regarding GM food is relatively 
permissive, while the EU’s policy is relatively restrictive.61 This dissertation uses 
the term “permissive” as a synonym of permitting or lenient, meaning a tendency 
to enable actions and grant liberties. “Restrictive” is used in the sense of stringent 
or limiting, and implies a boundary beyond which something or someone cannot 
or is not permitted to go. A policy is more restrictive (permissive) than another 
policy if it limits the actions of its target groups62 to a greater (lesser) extent. 
Levels of restrictiveness or permissiveness of a GM food policy can be 
determined by assessing the formal rules and restrictions it contains, as well as by 
observing its impact on the actors affected by them. 
Accordingly, in this chapter, I compare the levels of restrictiveness and 
permissiveness of GM food policies both in terms of what rules and regulations 
foresee, and in terms of the practical outcome of these policies. I first contrast US 
and EU regulatory frameworks for GM food and crops, focusing on explicit 
principles, on the institutions dealing with this policy area, and on relevant rules 
(laws, regulations, other policy documents). I then compare US and EU 
authorization procedures for field tests (or field trials) and commercialization (3.2 
and 3.3). Regarding formal rules, I am especially attentive to: 
• numbers of regulatory steps foreseen (e.g. receipt of application, 
consultation, formal authorization etc.), 
• maximum time foreseen until authorization, 
• length of validity of authorization, 
• monitoring and reporting provisions, 
• other restrictions and limitations. 
                                                     
61 This policy difference is also the focus of Bernauer 2003, Isaac 2002, and Meins 2003. 
62 Target groups are the actors whose behavior a policy attempts to influence in order to reach 
certain policy objectives. 
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 Regarding the practical results of GM food policies, I highlight:63 
• numbers of applications, 
• numbers of authorizations, 
• numbers of non-authorized GM foods and crops, 
• average number of days elapsed between application and authorization. 
 
3.1 Regulatory frameworks 
Explicit guiding principles: product versus process 
In the US, regulatory emphasis is on the end product. GM food policy is 
based on the premise that GMOs and foods derived from GMOs should be 
regulated like any other food, irrespective of their method of production. This is 
often referred to as a “product-based approach”. In contrast, EU policy takes a 
“process-oriented approach”, which posits that the process of production is what 
should trigger a specific regulatory process. It follows that GM foods and crops 
should be regulated as such because they are produced through genetic 
engineering, a specific production process.64 
                                                     
63 The data used in this chapter is up to date as of mid-2005. The graphs cover time periods as 
specified in each individual case. In order to make EU and US data comparable, for US-EU 
comparisons, the period covered is late 1991 to mid-2005: in the EU, first authorizations were 
made in October 1991, whereas the US began approving field tests in 1987. Sources used to 
compile data are the following: 
- Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Biotechnology Permits Database 
- Environmental Protection Agency Plant Incorporated Protectants 
- European Commission Biotechnology (Environment Directorate-General) 
- European Commission Deliberate releases and placing on the EU market of Genetically 
Modified Organisms (GMOs) (Joint Research Centre Directorate-General)  
- European Commission Genetically Modified (GM) Foods authorised in the European Union 
under the Novel Foods Regulation (EC) 258/97 (Health and Consumer Protection Directorate-
General) 
- European Commission GM Food & Feed – Authorisation 
- European Food Safety Authority Applications under Regulation (EC) 1829/2003 on Genetically 
Modified Food and Feed [GM Food Feed applications] 
- Food and Drug Administration List of Completed Consultations on Bioengineered Foods 
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development BioTrack Product Database 
- Virginia Tech Information Systems for Biotechnology Field Test Releases in the U.S. 
(searchable database of APHIS data) 
64 The distinction between “product” and “process” is central to understanding the differences 
between US and EU regulation in the area of agricultural biotechnology. As this chapter will 
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The “product versus process” distinction is connected with dissimilar 
perceptions of modern biotechnology. US documents convey the notion that 
genetic engineering is nothing radically new, but merely a natural extension of 
traditional agricultural breeding (Office of Science and Technology Policy 1984: 
50856). US policy documents frequently call attention to the fact that plant 
biotechnology has been used for a long time in less sophisticated ways than are 
possible with rDNA technology: 
“the recently developed methods [i.e. rDNA techniques] are an extension 
of traditional manipulations that can produce similar or identical products 
[and] enable more precise genetic modifications” (Office of Science and 
Technology Policy 1986: 23302). 
EPA’s online Introduction to Biotechnology Regulation for Pesticides instructs 
the reader that “[f]or centuries, humans have improved crop plants through 
selective breeding and hybridization […] (Environmental Protection Agency. 
Introduction to Biotechnology Regulation for Pesticides). Similarly, FDA points 
out that “[m]ost, if not all, cultivated food crops have been genetically modified” 
(Food and Drug Administration 1992: 22984, footnote 3). Accordingly, FDA 
defines “genetic modification” as “the alteration of the genotype of a plant using 
any technique, new or traditional” (ibid.).65 
The EU, on the other hand, views genetic engineering as a stark departure 
from conventional technologies. Its definition of GMO illustrates this point:  
GMO “means an organism […] in which the genetic material has been 
altered in a way that does not occur naturally by mating and/or natural 
                                                                                                                                                             
show, however, in some cases the practical application of the product-based approach is 
ambiguous. While APHIS and EPA claim to regulate the products of biotechnology irrespective 
of their process of production, they have in practice created new definitions, categories, and even 
regulations to address GM foods and crops. Noting the discrepancy between the theory and 
practice of product-based regulation, the Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology writes that 
“the bright line between process and product has become substantially more difficult to draw, and 
thus the distinction has become less useful.” The Pew Initiative suggests that this evolution has 
resulted from “the difficulty of fitting biotechnology products into pre-existing legal categories” 
(Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology 2004a: 24). 
65 Of the US agencies that regulate agricultural biotechnology, FDA has been the most vocal 
supporter and most straightforward implementer of the product-based principle. This staunch 
support might be connected to the fact that by the time a product is ready for FDA oversight, the 
process of production has already been reviewed. As put by an FDA official interviewed by 
Jones: “we were able to say product not process because we captured process anyway” (Jones 
1999: 261).  
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recombination” (EP and Council Dir. 2001/18, art. 2.1, European 
Parliament/Council of the European Union 2001). 
This definition contains the notion that genetic engineering is something 
fundamentally new and different. This is why, “unlike any other genetic 
improvement methods, the application of this technology is strictly regulated” 
(European Commission 2005a: 3).   
The consequence of these different assessments of GM food technology is 
that the United States does not have a regulatory regime specific to agricultural 
biotechnology or biotechnology in general, whereas the European Union does. 
When the US government began developing biotechnology regulation in the early 
1980s, it operated on the principle that existing laws and regulations were 
adequate to deal with the new policy area. The 1986 Coordinated Framework, the 
US’s central policy document on the regulation of biotechnology, explains that at 
that time, 
“[…] there did not appear to be an alternative, unitary, statutory approach 
since the very broad spectrum of products obtained with genetic 
engineering cut across many product uses regulated by different agencies” 
(Office of Science and Technology Policy 1986: 23302). 
This decision implicitly also meant that the establishment of fewer rules 
regarding the development and commercialization of GM foods and crops than 
would have been the case for a class of products regulated under a new law. In 
contrast, the European Union began in the late 1980s to develop a framework 
specifically designed to regulate GMOs and GM foods. This framework, revised 
and expanded throughout the 1990s, persists into the present decade. 
 
Responsible institutions, regulatory frameworks 
US executive branch institutions dealing with GM crop and food policy 
are the Office of Science and Technology Policy, answering directly to the 
President of the United States,66 the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) (part 
of the United States Department of Health and Human Services, HHS), the 
                                                     
66 The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) is part of the US executive branch. It was 
established in 1976 with a broad mandate to advise the President and White House on matters 
pertaining to science and technology. 
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Environmental Protection Agency (EPA, independent), the Animal and Plant 
Health Inspection Service (APHIS) (part of the United States Department of 
Agriculture’s, USDA). The US’s federal legislative branch is the United States 
Congress. The United States is made up of 50 US states, which in turn each have 
state governments and legislatures. 
The Constitution of the United States, originating in 1789, and the United 
States Code (US Code, USC), the codification by subject matter of US laws, 
together constitute the main legal basis for the regulation of GM food and crops. 
The Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) is next in terms of legal hierarchy, and is 
the codification of rules published by the executive departments and agencies of 
the federal government. In the absence of rules codified as part of the CFR, 
policy documents such as “announcements of policy” and “statements of policy” 
represent a legal basis for regulation. 
The United States Constitution gives the US Congress the “power to […] 
provide for the […] general welfare of the United States” and to “regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States […] (Constitution 
of the United States of America, art. I Section 8). These broad powers, in 
particular the power to regulate commerce,67 are what legitimate the US Congress 
to legislate and the executive branch to regulate in the areas of food and 
agriculture, the two areas under which agricultural biotechnology is addressed. 
Working within this broad mandate, by the end of 1984, the US Office of 
Science and Technology Policy had devised a “regulatory matrix” of existing 
federal agencies and laws to regulate biotechnology, which was confirmed by the 
Coordinated Framework in 1986 (Office of Science and Technology Policy 1984, 
1986) and reiterated in 1992 (Office of Science and Technology Policy 1992).68 
The legal basis for GM food and crop regulation in the US consists of three 
statutes, which are implemented by three federal agencies. 
                                                     
67 The so-called “Commerce Clause” (Constitution of the United States of America, art. I, section 
8.3) “has been cited as the constitutional basis for a significant portion of the laws passed by the 
Congress over the last fifty years, and it currently represents one of the broadest bases for the 
exercise of congressional powers” (Thomas 2001: 2). Indeed, the statutes applied to 
biotechnology, categorized under “agriculture” and “food and drugs” make reference to 
international and inter-state commerce involving food, plants and pesticides. 
68 Anderson et al. 2001 offer a detailed description of US biotechnology policy from a legal 
perspective. 
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First, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service is responsible for 
protecting US agriculture from pests and diseases under the Plant Protection Act 
(PPA) of 2000 (United States Code, Title 7, §301 et seq.).69 It is classified under 
the Agriculture Title of the United States Code (codification by subject matter of 
US laws). 
Second, the Food and Drug Administration ensures that food, feed, and 
food additives are properly labeled and safe to eat for humans and animals under 
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) of 1938 (United States 
Code, Title 21, §301 et seq.). The FFDCA is part if the US Code’s Title dealing 
with Foods and Drugs. 
Third, the Environmental Protection Agency ensures that pesticides used 
in plants are safe for the environment under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, 
and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) of 1947 (United States Code, Title 7, § 136 et 
seq.). EPA also defines pesticide residue tolerances in food under FFDCA (“safe 
for the environment/safe to eat”). The statutes applied by EPA are found both 
under the Agriculture and Food/Drugs Titles of the US Code. 
In order to regulate GM foods and crops, FDA, APHIS and EPA have 
implemented and interpreted the PPA, FIFRA, and FFDCA through various 
secondary legal tools, which all deal with specific areas of plant biotechnology. 
FDA’s 1992 “Statement of Policy: Foods Derived From New Plant Varieties” 
(Food and Drug Administration 1992) is the Agency’s central policy document 
on GM food. In the absence of a law or regulation, it outlines the FDA’s policy. 
This document establishes the principle of treating GM foods like non-GM foods. 
It does not request pre-market review of a GM food except if the food could be 
hazardous for a reason unconnected with the fact that it was produced through 
genetic engineering. APHIS in practice mandates systematic oversight of most 
GM crops under the Code of Federal Regulations (Title 7, Part 340), by defining 
them as potential plant pests. Finally, EPA fulfills its mandate by regulating the 
insecticidal substances produced by Bt plants as pesticides or “plant-incorporated 
protectants” (PIPs). 
 
                                                     
69 Rules on GM crops were developed under the PPA’s predecessor Federal Plant Pest Act 
(FPPA) of 1957. They will remain in force until new regulations are developed. So far, APHIS 
has not issued any new regulations. 
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Main institutions dealing with GM food and crops at the EU level 
regulation are the European Commission (“Commission”), the European 
Parliament (“Parliament”, EP), the Council of the European Union (“Council of 
the EU”, “Council”), and the European Food Safety Agency (EFSA). The EU 
Member States’ national authorities are responsible for implementing and 
enforcing the EU’s GM food and crop policy. The European Commission is 
instrumental in proposing legislation, which is then debated and passed by the 
European Parliament. Commission Directorate Generals dealing with the 
environment and with health and consumer protection have been particularly 
important in proposing legislation on GM foods and crops. They have worked 
together with the Directorate-Generals responsible for enterprise and industry, 
and for research and technology development (RTD). EU Member States, 
represented in the Council of the EU and in regulatory committees, ultimately 
have the power to adopt or reject proposed regulations. A relatively new actor 
within the EU’s food policy arena is the European Food Safety Agency (EFSA), 
created in 2002. It now plays an important role in the authorization of GM foods 
and crops. 
In the EU, the primary legal text for regulating GM foods and crops is the 
Treaty establishing the European Community70. Next come directives and 
regulations, which are types of “secondary legislation” in European Community 
law. Secondary legislation consists of “directives” (binding for Member States as 
to objectives to be achieved; implementation to be carried out by Member State 
national authorities), “regulations” (directly applicable and binding in all EU 
Member States), “decisions” (binding for addressees), “recommendations”, and 
“opinions” (not binding) (European Union. Key players in EU legislation – EU 
law – definitions). 
Article 95 of the Treaty establishing the European Community 
(consolidated text, 2002) includes the goal of harmonizing national laws in order 
to establish an internal market.71 Article 95.3 underlines that legislation pursuing 
                                                     
70 The “Treaty establishing the European Community” deals with all policies in the European 
Union’s first or “community pillar”, which includes environmental policy. A separate “Treaty on 
European Union” addresses the two other pillars of the European Union: “Common Foreign and 
Security Policy” (second pillar) and “Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal matters” 
(PJCC) (formerly “Justice and Home Affairs”, JHA). 
71 The goal of a European “internal market” dates back to the 1957 Treaty of Rome (Treaty 
establishing the European Economic Community 1957), which set the goal of the creation of a 
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this goal and pertaining to environmental and consumer protection “will take as a 
base a high level of protection”. Articles 95.4 to 95.10 provide the legal basis for 
the safeguard clauses included in the EU’s GMO policy that allow Member 
States to suspend individual GM products from their territory if they regard this 
as necessary to protect the environment. 
EU secondary legislation and regulation on GMOs can be divided into 
“horizontal” legislation, which deals with the environmental release of GMOs in 
a broad sense, and “vertical” or “sector-related” legislation or regulation, which 
covers specific products made with GMOs (e.g. food, feed, seed, medicine) and 
individual issues related to them (labeling, traceability). Accordingly, EU rules 
relevant to GM foods and crops cover two main types of authorization: deliberate 
release of GMOs into the environment and use in GM food and feed. EP and 
Council Directive 2001/18/EC of 2001 (European Parliament/Council of the 
European Union 2001) is the horizontal piece of legislation covering the 
deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified organisms, both 
for experimental purposes and for placing on the market. It came into force in 
October 2002, replacing its predecessor, Council Directive 90/220/EEC (Council 
of the European Union 1990). Main “vertical” instruments within the EU are EP 
and Council Regulation 1829/2003 (European Parliament/Council of the 
European Union 2003a) on genetically modified food and feed which replaced 
EP and Council Regulation 258/97 on Novel Foods (European Parliament / 
Council of the European Union 1997)72 in 2004, and EP and Council Regulation 
1830/2003 on traceability and labeling73 (European Parliament/Council of the 
European Union 2003b). Tables 4 and 5 summarize US and EU regulatory 
frameworks on GM foods and crops. 
                                                                                                                                                             
“common market” based on the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital. In 1986, 
the Single European Act gave this goal new impetus by inserting into the Treaty establishing the 
European Community an article on measures to complete the internal market (art. 100a, now art. 
95). The internal market was declared complete by 1992. 
72 EP and Council Regulation 258/97 is still in force since a few applications for authorization are 
still pending under its provisions. Important innovations of the new Regulation on GM Food and 
Feed include the introduction of the European Food Safety Agency as part of the decision-making 
process, and the removal of the simplified authorization procedure on the basis of a “substantial 
equivalence” finding, i.e. an observation that the product characteristics of a GM food do not 
depart significantly from its traditional counterpart. 
73 GM food labeling rules were previously covered by EP and Council regulation 258/97, Council 
Regulation 1139/98 (Council of the European Union 1998), Commission Regulation 49/2000 
(European Commission 2000a) and Commission Regulation 50/2000 (European Commission 
2000b). 
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Table 4: US regulatory framework for GM crops and foods 
US Constitution and Federal Statutes 
Constitution of the United States of Amercica 
Plant Protection Act (PPA), US Code, Title 7 (Agriculture), Chapter 104, §7701 et seq. 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), US Code, Title 21 (Food and Drugs), 
Chapter 9, §301 et seq. 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), US Code, Title 7 
(Agriculture), Chapter 6, §136 et seq. 
Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP)  
1986: Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology (Announcement of Policy 
and Notice for Public Comment) 
1992: Exercise of Federal Oversight within Scope of Statutory Authority: Planned 
Introductions of Biotechnology Products into the Environment (Announcement of Policy) 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
1992: Statement of Policy: Foods Derived From New Plant Varieties (Notice) 
1997: Guidance on Consultation Procedures: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties  
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
Code of Federal Regulations, Title 40 (Protection of the Environment), Part 152 (Pesticide 
Registration and Classification Procedures) (40 CFR 152) 
Code of Federal Regulations, Title 40 (Protection of the Environment), Part 174 (Procedures 
and Requirements for Plant-Incorporated Protectants) (40 CFR 174) 
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) 
Code of Federal Regulations, Title 7 (Agriculture), Part 340 (Introduction Of Organisms And 
Products Altered Or Produced Through Genetic Engineering Which Are Plant Pests Or 
Which There Is Reason To Believe Are Plant Pests) (7 CFR 340) 
 
 
Table 5: EU regulatory framework for GM crops and foods 
Treaty and horizontal legislation 
Treaty establishing the European Community (consolidated text) 
2001: Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 March 
2001 on the deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified organisms and 
repealing Council Directive 90/220/EEC 
Regulations 
1997: Regulation (EC) No 258/97 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 
January 1997 concerning novel foods and novel food ingredients (repealed by 1829/2003 
in but still in use during transitional phase) 
2003: Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 
September 2003 on genetically modified food and feed 
2003: Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 
September 2003 concerning the traceability and labelling of genetically modified 
organisms and the traceability of food and feed products produced from genetically 
modified organisms 
 
3.2 Regulating field tests 
In the US, the field testing of GM plants is subject to USDA (APHIS) 
oversight. When a field trial involves the planting of GM crops containing a Bt 
toxin on more than ten acres, an additional application to EPA for an 
 67
Experimental Use Permit (EUP) under the Code of Federal Regulations (Code of 
Federal Regulations, Title 40, Part 172, abbreviated 40 CFR 172) is necessary. 
The European Union regulates field testing under Directive 2001/18’s Part B 
entitled “Deliberate Release of GMOs for any other purpose than for placing on 
the market” (European Parliament/Council of the European Union 2001). 
 
APHIS: permits and notifications 
Under the Plant Protection Act (PPA) (United States Code, Chapter 7, 
§7701 et seq., abbreviated 7 USC 7701 et seq.), USDA has the responsibility to 
protect agriculture from plant pests (7 USC 701(3)) and to oversee pesticide 
authorizations (7 USC 7711). Part 340 of the Code of Federal Regulations (Code 
of Federal Regulations, Title 7, Part 340, abbreviated 7 CFR 340), applying 
specifically to genetically engineered organisms, defines GM crops as “regulated 
articles”, which are “any organism which has been altered or produced through 
genetic engineering, […] and meets the definition of plant pest […]” (7 CFR 
340.1). This definition includes plant pests used during the modification process, 
even if they are not in the final product. During most such production processes, 
substances are used that qualify as plant pests under 7 CFR 340. In practice, 
therefore, most GM foods and crops field tested are subject to USDA (APHIS) 
oversight. 
APHIS issues “permits” under 7 CFR 340.4 or acknowledges 
“notifications” under 7 CFR 340.3. Permits and notifications can be for release 
into the environment (field tests), import from abroad, and/or interstate 
movement. Getting a permit, a procedure introduced in 1987, is the more 
demanding of the two possible procedures. A notification is a streamlined version 
of the permit-granting procedure, and was introduced in 1993 for plant pests with 
a low risk potential. It was extended to most GM crops in 1997, and is now the 
most common way for applicants to obtain field test approval. Notification does 
not foresee a formal review. To fall under the notification procedure, plant pests 
must fulfill a series of criteria and performance standards (7 CFR 340.3.b and 7 
CFR 340.3.c).  Figures 7 and 8 give an overview of the more than 10,000 field 
tests authorized by APHIS (both permits and notifications) by type of crop and by 
trait. 
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Figure 7: APHIS field test approvals by crop, 1987-2005 
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Source: Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) - Biotechnology Permits 
Database (May 2005)  
 
 
Figure 8: APHIS field test approvals by trait, 1987-2005 
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EU: Part B notification 
The European Union regulates GM plant field testing under Directive 
2001/18’s Part B regarding the “deliberate release of GMOs for any other 
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purpose than for placing on the market” (European Parliament/Council of the 
European Union 2001). Under the “standard authorisation procedure” (art. 6), 
applicants (“notifiers”) wishing to perform a deliberate release submit a 
notification to the “competent authority” (usually a ministry) of the Member State 
where the release is planned. The competent authority forwards a summary of 
this notification to the Commission, which in turn forwards it to the other 
Member States for comments. The competent authority takes into account these 
observations where appropriate before responding to the notifier. When sufficient 
experience exists regarding the release of specific GMOs in specific ecosystems, 
a competent authority can request a “differentiated procedure” making it possible 
to submit a single dossier for more than one GMO release (art. 7). Directive 
2001/18 is noteworthy for its safeguard clause (art. 23), described above, which 
applies both to experimental releases (Part B) and to placing on the market (Part 
C, described below). Figure 9 gives an overview of Part B authorizations of GM 
plant field tests by type of crop. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: EU field test approvals by type of crop, 1991-2005 
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Comparing US and EU field trial regulations and their outputs 
 A comparative look at US and EU regulations of field tests involving GM 
foods reveals a somewhat more restrictive set of EU regulations as compared to 
US rules (Table 6).74 This is almost consistently the case in comparison with the 
simpler “notification” provisions, whereas the “permit” and Part B are 
comparable. 
 Numbers of regulatory steps are equal cases or smaller in the US, 
depending on the US procedure in question. In the US, authorization takes four 
steps for permits (notification, initial review, full review, authorization), but only 
three for the more widely used notification procedure (notification, routine 
review, acknowledgment). In the EU, standard authorizations are completed in 
four steps (notification, review by competent authority, Member State and 
Commission comment period, answer). 
 In terms of time planned for authorization, the US foresees more time 
than the EU for permits, but significantly less for notifications. US notifications 
can take a maximum of only 30 days, while permits can take up to 120 days plus 
any time needed to receive missing information from the applicant and to conduct 
environmental impact assessments. EU Part B procedures foresee 90 days, plus 
extra time for information collection. 
 APHIS permits and notifications are valid for one year, but the former are 
not renewable, whereas the latter are. The EU grants field trial authorizations for 
periods that vary from a few months to several years, depending on the 
application. Renewal applications may be submitted. 
 Both the US and the EU foresee reporting after the end of field tests. In 
addition, APHIS can monitor test fields with permits, and Directive 2001/18 
foresees public consultation and a public register of GMOs and GMO test sites. 
 
                                                     
74 The comparison is made between APHIS permit and notification rules and EU Directive 
2001/18’s Part B procedure as these are the two main procedures for field trial approvals in the 
US and the EU. 
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Table 6: US and EU field test regulations for GM plants (as of 1 Aug. 2005) 
 
 US regulation of field trials EU regulation of field trials 
 APHIS field test 
permits 
APHIS  field test 
notifications 
EP/Council Directive 2001/18 Part B 
Regulatory steps 
foreseen 
4 steps: 
1. notification 
2. initial review 
3. full review 
4. authorization 
3 steps: 
1. notification 
2. routine review 
3. acknowledgment 
4 steps: 
1. notification 
2. review by competent authority 
3. Member State and Commission 
comment period 
4. answer 
Time  foreseen  for 
authorization 
120 days 
(+ extra for 
information 
gathering) 
30 days 90 
(+ extra for information gathering) 
 
Expiration of 
authorization 
1 year 
non-renewable 
1 year  
renewable 
several months to several years 
renewal possible 
 
Reporting, monitoring, 
other restrictions 
- report within 6 
months of end 
- APHIS may 
always inspect 
report within 6 
months of end 
- regular reporting to European 
Commission and Parliament 
- public consultation 
- public register of GMOs and GMO test 
sites 
 
 
 What are the outputs of these regulations? As summarized in Table 7, the 
US boasts many more applications and authorizations than the EU, but rates of 
rejection and withdrawal are comparable. From 1991 to 2005, APHIS received 
11,422 field trial applications (1,022 for permits and 10,400 for notifications), of 
which it authorized 10,706 (865 permits and 9,841 notifications). About one half 
of these authorizations were for corn varieties. 716 or roughly 6% of these were 
not authorized (refused or withdrawn).75 The non-authorization rate is about 15% 
for permits and 6% for notifications. During the same period, the EU processed 
1,982 Part B notifications of field trials under directives 90/220 and 2001/18. 
Corn, oilseed rape, potatoes and sugar beets are the most widespread field trials 
in the EU. From the data available, it appears that approval rates are relatively 
high, with only about 3% of rejections and withdrawals.76 In terms of time 
elapsed between the time of application and authorization, the US is significantly 
faster with a weighted average of about 34 days (75 for permits, 30 for 
                                                     
75 These figures do not include pending applications. 
76 The results of only 789 out of 1,982 Part B notifications are publicly available. Of these, 767 
field trials were authorized (European Commission Deliberate Releases and placing on the EU 
market of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs)). 
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notifications), whereas EU approvals can on average take more than three times 
as long (average of 102 days). 
 
 
Table 7: US and EU field test authorizations for GM plants (1991-2005) 
 
 Number of 
applications 
Number of 
authorizations 
Number of non-
authorized 
applications* 
Average number of 
days elapsed 
between application 
and authorization 
US regulation of field trials (plants) 
APHIS field test 
permits 
(excluding pending) 
1,022 865 157 
(15%) 
75* 
APHIS field test 
notifications 
(excluding pending) 
10,400 9,841 559 
(6%) 
30* 
Total APHIS (field test 
permits plus 
notifications) 
11,422 10,706 716 
(6%) 
 34 
Weighted average 
30*0.92+75*0.08 
EU regulation of field trials (plants) 
Part B of Dir. 90/220 
(1991-2002) and Dir. 
2001/18 (2002-2005) 
 
1,982 97% 
(767 of 789 
known outcomes) 
3% 
(22 of 789 
 known outcomes) 
102 days* 
* average determined on the basis of a randomly selected sample of authorizations.  
 
 From this investigation, it appears that the regulation of GM plant field 
tests is more permissive in the US than it is in the EU in overall terms, but not for 
every individual aspect. Taken together, US permit applications and notifications 
are more numerous and faster than Part B notifications. Rejection rates, however, 
are similar, with EU rates somewhat lower according to the data available. It is 
worth noting that the US notification system is highly flexible, fast and almost 
“automated” in comparison with the EU’s Part B procedure. The US notification 
procedure is a response to, but also an encouragement for, continuing high 
numbers of applications to conduct field tests with GM plants. 
 
3.3 Regulating commercialization 
In the United States, FDA is the key agency for the commercialization 
phase of a GM product, but APHIS and EPA also have important roles to play. In 
the case of the EU, commercialization is governed by EP and Council Directive 
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2001/18’s Part C regulating the “placing on the market of GMOs” (European 
Parliament/Council of the European Union 2001) and by EP and Council 
Regulation 1829/2003 on food and feed (European Parliament/Council of the 
European Union 2003a). 
 
APHIS: nonregulated status 
After completing the appropriate field tests with APHIS permits or 
notifications, developers wishing to commercialize a GM food or crop generally 
submit a petition to APHIS to request a “determination of nonregulated status” (7 
CFR 340.6). A “nonregulated” GM food or crop no longer requires USDA 
oversight. About one quarter of nonregulated GM foods and crops are GM corn 
varieties, followed by tomatoes (about one fifth), and various other crops, in 
particular cotton, oilseed rape, soybeans, and potatoes (see Figure 10). The two 
traits most often present are herbicide tolerance and insect resistance. 
 
 
Figure 10: APHIS nonregulated GM crops, by type of crop (May 2005) 
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EPA: PIP registration and tolerance level exemption 
In addition to being approved by APHIS, insect resistant Bt varieties also 
undergo scrutiny by EPA, which regulates the genetic material inserted into these 
plants (“plant-incorporated protectant”, PIP). Under FIFRA, EPA focuses on the 
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distribution, sale and use of pesticides, and requires all pesticides to be registered 
under a procedure described under Code of Federal Regulations, Title 40, Part 
152 (40 CFR 152). In 1994, EPA proposed a regulation that defined the genetic 
material inserted into insect resistant GM plant varieties as “plant pesticides” to 
be registered under FIFRA. In 2001, after a lengthy comment period, EPA 
finalized the rule, creating a regulation explicitly for “plant-incorporated 
protectants” (PIPs), a new name for “plant pesticides” (Code of Federal 
Regulations, Title 40, Part 174 (40 CFR 174).77 This regulation defines a plant-
incorporated protectant as a “pesticidal substance that is intended to be produced 
and used in a living plant, or in the produce thereof, and the genetic material 
necessary for production of such a pesticidal substance” (40 CFR 174.3). As a 
result, EPA regulates the protein and genetic material inserted into Bacillus 
thuringiensis (Bt) GM plant varieties as a PIP, while APHIS regulates the plant as 
a plant pest.  
In addition, since its creation in 1970, EPA has had a mandate under 
section 408 of the FFDCA to determine tolerance levels for pesticide residues 
when the pesticide appears in food or feed78. The FFDCA establishes that “any 
pesticide chemical residue in or on a food shall be deemed unsafe […]”, and that 
tolerances may be set and exemptions granted for this type of residue (United 
States Code, Title 21, Chapter 9, paragraph 346a - 21 USC 346a). 
EPA can exempt a pesticide from the need to establish a residue tolerance 
when there is a reasonable certainty that it will cause no harm. To date, all 
registered PIPs have been granted an exemption from the requirement of residue 
tolerance on the grounds that they are not harmful to human or animal health. 
 
FDA: voluntary consultation and no labeling rules 
FDA’s role is to ensure the safety of foods and drugs that enter the 
marketplace. Its main regulatory tools for GM foods are the FFDCA (United 
                                                     
77 Because 40 CFR 174 contains confidential business information and/or because some of its 
sections are still being elaborated by EPA, only a few of its sections are accessible to the public 
(last verification: 30 January 2006). Therefore, the information used in this chapter to analyze 
EPA regulation is only partial, and the comparisons I make draw mainly on the cases of APHIS 
and FDA who offer more complete information and data. 
78 Before 1970, FDA performed this task. 
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States Code, Title 21, Chapter 9, §301 et seq.) and its 1992 policy statement on 
new plant varieties (Food and Drug Administration 1992). FDA treats GM food 
just like any other food, paying special attention to its product characteristics and 
intended use. History and experience have led US legislators to expect food to be 
safe as a general rule. Accordingly, the FFDCA does not give FDA authority to 
systematically review all foods, and consequently all GM foods, prior to their 
being placed on the market. Instead, it grants FDA a wide post-market 
enforcement mandate to intervene if a product is discovered to be “adulterated”79. 
In the case of food in general, including GM food, FDA places the main 
responsibility on the food producer to ensure that products on the market are safe. 
Karin Ricker and Edmundo Garcia of FDA explain the logic behind this 
principle: 
“FDA does not require specific methods or tests, because each product is 
different and different tests or methods may be required to assess product 
safety. This approach allows for more flexibility and assures that adequate 
methods are used in each case. By law, a company or manufacturer is 
responsible for the safety of products the company markets in the US” 
(interview with Karin Ricker and Edmundo Garcia, Jr., Food and Drug 
Administration, 10 June 2004, Washington, DC [District of Columbia]). 
  Food additives represent an exception to the rule that foods and therefore 
GM foods shall not be systematically reviewed before marketing. The FFDCA 
states that by default, “[a] food additive shall […] be deemed to be unsafe […]”, 
that is, the producer must prove that additives are not unsafe before they are 
marketed (21 USC 348(a)). FDA has tentatively classified insertions of genetic 
material through genetic engineering as potential food additives that would 
require review. Many of these food additives, however, fall under FDA’s 
Generally Recognized as Safe (GRAS) definition, and can therefore be exempted 
from pre-market review through a GRAS notice, consisting of a letter to FDA 
explaining why a specific additive should be classified as GRAS. As a reaction to 
growing public questions regarding GM foods, FDA published a proposed rule in 
1994 that would make premarket submission of product information mandatory 
                                                     
79 Under 21 USC 342.a.1, a food shall be deemed “adulterated” if it “bears or contains any 
poisonous or deleterious substance which may render it injurious to health”. 
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120 days prior to marketing. No corresponding final rule has been published 
(Food and Drug Administration 2001b). 
FDA has, however, made a concession to mounting public concerns by 
encouraging product developers to conduct voluntary consultations. Both its 1992 
Statement of Policy (Food and Drug Administration 1992) and 1997 “Guidance 
on Consultation Procedures” (Food and Drug Administration 1997) have set out 
guidelines for consultation. The 1992 document offers a decision tree on how to 
decide whether or not to consult with FDA, and the 1997 document provides an 
overview of the voluntary consultation process, which essentially consists of an 
initial and a final consultation. During an initial consultation, pertinent 
unresolved issues are identified, and a final consultation include the submission 
of data on these issues to FDA. At the end of the consultation process, FDA sends 
food developers a letter, usually stating that it has no further questions and 
reminding them of their continued responsibility to ensure that foods marketed 
are “safe, wholesome, and in compliance with all applicable legal and regulatory 
requirements” (Food and Drug Administration List of Completed Consultations 
on Bioengineered Foods). In practice, all food product developers intending to 
market a GM food or crop consult FDA in order to get an informal stamp of 
approval. Between 1994 and 2004, there have been 64 consultations, with 
exceptionally few from 1999 to 2003, perhaps in connection with the de facto EU 
moratorium (Figure 11). Figure 12 shows a breakdown by type of crop. 
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Figure 11: Completed FDA consultations on GM food, 1994-2004 
1994 – 2004
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total
8
7
12
6
64
22233
12
7
Source: Food and Drug Administration - List of Completed Consultations on 
Bioengineered Foods (May 2005)
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Completed FDA consultations by type of GM food, 1994-2005 
 
other, 12%
corn, 29%
squash, 3%
sugarbeet, 
5%
soybeans, 
4%
tomato, 9%
potato, 6%
cotton, 15%
oilseed rape, 
17%
Total: 66 completed consultations by May 2005
Source: Food and Drug Administration - List of Completed Consultations on 
Bioengineered Foods (May 2005)
 
 
 
  US regulation does not require GM foods and ingredients to be labeled or 
traced. Policy documents discuss the issue of labeling and why it should not be 
applicable to GM foods, and make no mention of traceability. The FFDCA gives 
FDA a mandate to prohibit the entry into interstate commerce of “misbranded” 
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foods, i.e. foods bearing false or misleading labels. Specifically, it requires that a 
food producer describe a product by its common name and reveal important facts 
associated with it (US Code, Title 21, §343). FDA interprets the FFDCA’s 
mandate as not giving it any authority to require the labeling of a GM food as 
long as the final product is considered safe.  
  If there is something tangibly different about a novel food, such that the 
common name could no longer be used, FDA requires the food label to bear a 
name other than the conventional name, informing the consumer of the altered 
composition of a food. For GM foods, this condition usually does not apply.80 
Under no circumstances would FDA mandate the labeling of a food as 
“genetically modified”, “genetically engineered” or a similar denomination. As 
put by Ricker and Garcia of FDA, 
 “FDA has no legal authority to require labeling because a production 
process is different. There is no need for biotech crops as a class to be 
labeled. Labeling is mandated only if a product is materially different or if 
it raises health issues. For example, the presence of an unexpected allergen 
would warrant labeling” (interview with Karin Ricker and Edmundo 
Garcia, Jr., Food and Drug Administration, 10 June 2004, Washington, 
DC). 
  In January 2001, FDA launched a procedure to explore the idea of 
introducing voluntary labeling as a reaction to consumers' growing concerns 
(Food and Drug Administration 2001a). This document, however, is a reiteration 
of the standpoint that labeling of GM food is not necessary because “the use of 
bioengineering is not a material fact” (Food and Drug Administration 2001a: 
4840). The document enumerates several cases which affect labeling: significant 
difference from the traditional counterpart, significantly different nutritional 
composition, or presence of a food allergen that a consumer would not expect 
(Food and Drug Administration 2001a: 4839). The document further suggests that 
manufacturers wishing to use voluntary labeling should avoid using terms such as 
“GM free” or “biotech free”; since it is impossible to exclude adventitious 
                                                     
80 One example where it did apply is the case of soybeans produced by DuPont to have an 
increased oleic acid content compared to conventional soybeans. FDA required soybean oil made 
from this GM soybean to be labeled as “High Oleic Soybean Oil” in order to inform consumers of 
its changed nutritional composition. 
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presence of GM material in food, such labeling would be misleading (Food and 
Drug Administration 2001a: 4840). So far, there has been no follow-up to the 
draft guidance document on voluntary labeling. 
 
EU: Part C notification and/or 1829/2003 procedure; strict labeling 
rules 
  In the European Union, applicants wishing to place a GM food on the 
market have the choice of submitting an application exclusively under EP and 
Council Regulation 1829/2003 on GM food and feed, or under Part C of 2001/18 
(for the deliberate environmental release part) and 1829/2003 (for the food part) 
(European Parliament/Council of the European Union 2003a, Preamble 33). 
  Part C of EP and Council Directive 2001/18 covers the “placing on the 
market” of GMOs, defined as “making available to third parties, whether in return 
for payment or free of charge” (European Parliament/Council of the European 
Union 2001, art. 2.4) and succeeds Council Directive 90/220. Commercial 
cultivation, import and selling to food processors are examples of “placing on the 
market”. A GMO or combination of GMOs to be placed on the market must be 
submitted to the national competent authority of the country where the GMO is to 
be first introduced. The competent authority forwards the full notification (not 
merely the summary, as for Part B notifications) to the Commission, which in 
turn sends it to all EU Member States. The competent authority prepares an 
assessment report, which is transmitted to the Commission and competent 
authorities of the other Member States. These actors may comment on the report. 
If there is no objection by Member States or the Commission, the authorization is 
granted by the national competent authority. 
  In the case of an objection by one or several Member States (via the 
competent authorities) or by the Commission, the comitology rules laid down in 
article 5 of Council Decision 1999/468 apply (Council of the European Union 
1999a). A regulatory committee, composed of Member State representatives, 
deliberates on a draft submitted by the Commission. If the Committee approves 
the draft by a qualified majority, the Commission adopts the measures proposed. 
If, however, the regulatory committee rejects the draft or does not express an 
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opinion, the Commission submits the proposal to the Council. If the Council 
opposes the proposal by a qualified majority, the Commission reexamines it and 
may submit an altered proposal. If the Council neither adopts nor opposes the 
proposal, then the European Commission adopts the proposed act.81 
GM food, food containing GMOs and food produced from or containing 
GMOs are subject to EP and Council Regulation 1829/2003 (European 
Parliament/Council of the European Union 2003a), which in 2004 succeeded EP 
and Council Regulation 258/97 (European Parliament/Council of the European 
Union 1997). Important changes were introduced by this new Regulation on GM 
food and feed. In particular, Regulation 1829/2003 foresees a single authorization 
procedure (“one door – one key”) for all food and feed containing GMOs, and 
gives the European Food Safety Agency (EFSA) a central role. Competent 
authorities send applications to EFSA, and EFSA has the duty of informing the 
Commission, other Member States, and the public. EFSA then prepares an 
opinion, using the environmental risk assessment criteria developed in Directive 
2001/18 (European Parliament/Council of the European Union 2001), and sends 
it on to the Commission, Member States and the applicant. On the basis of this 
opinion, the Commission submits a draft decision to the Standing Committee on 
the Food Chain and Animal Health (a regulatory committee created in 2002, 
consisting of Member State representatives). If the Committee agrees with the 
Commission's draft decision, it is adopted. If not, the Commission submits a 
proposal to the Council, to which the procedures laid down in 1999/468 apply, as 
described above for Directive 2001/18. 
The issue of GM food labeling stood at the center of the European GM 
food debate for several years in late 1990s and until 2003, when the issue was 
newly addressed under Regulations 1829/2003 and 1830/2003. In the EU, it is 
                                                     
81 This rule can easily lead to the impression that the European Commission takes decisions on 
GMO authorizations in an undemocratic manner, and that it is biased in favour of agricultural 
biotechnology since it has a track record of approving contested products. Friends of the Earth 
Europe notes that “the Commission has a lot of power in taking decisions on GMO authorizations 
because of comitology rules [and] this has contributed to undermining public support for GMOs” 
(interview with Geert Ritsema and Carmen Olmedo, Friends of the Earth Europe, 3 September 
2004, Brussels). 
In response to this type of criticism, Rene von Schomberg, a scholar on the GMO debate, instead 
affirms that faced with a situation of “paralysis in the EU decision-making process since mid-
1998 between Member States, the Commission [merely] takes its assigned role [… of taking 
decisions] in response to the absence of a qualified majority in the regulatory committee" 
(interview with Rene von Schomberg, European Commission, 2 September 2004, Brussels). 
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supposed that consumers should have the right to know whether a food product 
they purchase is genetically modified or contains genetically modified 
ingredients. Labeling of GM foods was first made mandatory under EP and 
Council Regulation 258/97 concerning Novel Foods and Novel Food Ingredients 
(European Parliament/Council of the European Union 1997). Since this 
regulation did not cover all GM foods, a further regulation was added to 
complement it. Council Regulation 1139/98 (Council of the European Union 
1998) required the labeling of foods containing herbicide tolerant GTS40/3/2 
soybeans and insect resistant and herbicide tolerant Bt176 corn, two GM crops 
approved under 90/220 before the Novel Foods Regulation was passed. 
Commission Regulation 49/2000 settled the much-debated threshold issue, 
making labeling mandatory above a 1% adventitious (i.e. accidental) GM-content 
of individual food ingredients (European Commission 2000a). 
Under the new regulations, these provisions have changed somewhat. 
Regulation 1829/2003 of 2003, in force since 18 April 2004, lowers the 
adventitious presence threshold to 0.9% for individual GM food ingredients. It 
also newly introduces the same labeling requirement for GM feed as for GM food 
(art. 12 and 24). Regulation 1829/2003 further applies to products consisting of 
or containing GMOs, as well as food and feed produced from GMOs (art. 2), for 
the first time including products that no longer contain detectable traces of GMOs 
(e.g. highly refined oils and syrups). Article 4 establishes the exact wording that 
should appear on the labels in these different cases, both for products deriving 
from within and imported from outside the European Union. 
Regulation 1830/2003 also addresses the issue of “traceability”, which is 
defined as “the ability to trace GMOs and products produced from GMOs at all 
stages of their being placed on the market through the production and distribution 
chains” (art. 3.3). Article 4 determines that products consisting of or containing 
GMOs must be transmitted to the receiving food chain operator with the 
information that they contain or consist of GMOs, and with a “unique identifier”, 
a “code which serves to identify a GMO […]”. This information must be 
transferred throughout the food chain. Operators must set up standardized 
procedures to implement traceability requirements, and must keep records of each 
transaction for five years. 
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Comparing US and EU regulations for commercialization and their 
outputs 
  Comparing US and EU commercialization regulations reveals a much 
more restrictive procedure in the EU than in the US, especially if EU Member 
States disagree (see Table 8).82 
  On average, the EU foresees more regulatory steps than the US. USDA’s 
petition for nonregulated status involves four steps, and the FDA’s voluntary 
consultation procedure foresees three informal steps. EU procedures include four 
to eight steps under Dir. 2001/18, and seven to nine under Reg. 1829/2003, 
depending on whether or not there is disagreement among Member States and 
whether or not the Commission has to resort to comitology. In recent approval 
processes, disagreements have routinely resulted in a maximum number of steps. 
  The time foreseen for authorizations is also greater in the EU than in the 
US. APHIS responds to the petition for nonregulated status within 180 days. The 
FDA has no stated time provisions since the process is informal and voluntary. 
An EU approval under Dir. 2001/18 should take a maximum of 225 days, and 270 
are possible for authorization under Reg. 1829/2003, but prolongation is possible 
if the Council becomes involved. As for expiration, USDA nonregulated status is 
“forever”, as is FDA’s “stamp of approval” in an unofficial way. EU consent 
under Part C and authorization under 1829/2003 are granted for ten years, and 
may be renewed (art. 17). Accordingly, EU approvals are subject to post-
commercialization monitoring and reporting, whereas in the US, commercialized 
products are no longer subject to regulatory oversight. Finally, labeling and 
traceability are important restrictions in the EU, which are nonexistent in the US. 
                                                     
82 USDA, FDA and EU rules and regulations form the basis for this comparison. 
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Table 8: US and EU regulation of GM product commercialization (as of 1 
Aug. 2005) 
 
 US regulation of commercialization EU regulation of commercialization 
 APHIS 
nonregulated 
status 
FDA 
voluntary 
consultation 
EP/Council Directive 
2001/18 Part C 
EP/Council Regulation 
1829/2003 
Regulatory 
steps foreseen 
4 steps: 
1. filing of 
petition 
2. preliminary 
review for 
completeness 
3. publishing of 
notice/ 
comment 
period 
4. response 
3 steps: 
1. initial 
consultation 
2. final 
consultation 
3. letter 
4-8 steps: 
1. notification to 
competent authority 
2. assessment report by 
competent authority 
3. comment period for 
Commission and 
Member States 
4. Answer 
Further possible steps: 
4. Commission 
submission to 
regulatory committee 
5. deliberation within 
regulatory committee 
and result 
6. proposed decision by 
Commission (if step 5 
is inconclusive) 
7. deliberation within 
Council and vote by 
qualified majority  
8. Commission decision 
(if no position 
adopted under 7) 
 
7-9 steps: 
1. application to 
competent authority 
2. competent authority 
acknowledges and 
forwards application to 
EFSA 
3. EFSA forwards 
application to Member 
States and publicizes it 
4. EFSA drafts opinion 
and forwards it to 
Commission and 
Member States 
5. Commission drafts 
decision and submits it 
to Standing Committee 
on the Food Chain and 
Animal Health 
6. deliberation within 
Standing Committee 
on the Food Chain and 
Animal Health and 
result 
7. answer 
Further possible steps: 
7. proposed decision by 
Commission (if step 6 
inconclusive) 
8. deliberation within 
Council and vote by 
qualified majority 
9. Commission adopts 
decision if no position 
adopted under 8 
Time  
foreseen  for 
authorization 
180 days not applicable 225 days 270 days 
Expiration of 
authorization 
none none 10 years 
(renewable) 
10 years 
(renewable) 
Reporting, 
monitoring, 
other 
restrictions 
none none - reporting 
- monitoring 
- information to the 
public 
- strict labeling rules 
- reporting 
- monitoring 
- information to the 
public 
- strict labeling rules 
- traceability 
requirements 
 
Data on actual GM food and crop commercialization confirms the 
impression given by rules and regulations: the US receives more applications, 
grants more authorizations, as boasts fewer non-authorized products than the 
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EU.83 In addition, on average, a GM product commercialization takes 
significantly longer in the EU than it does in the US (Table 9). 
Since 1992, when the first nonregulated status was granted to Calgene’s 
Flavr Savr tomato, APHIS has received 103 petitions for nonregulated status 
(including pending ones), of which it has granted 65. 38 petitions or about 37% 
have not led to nonregulated status or, in the case of pending petitions, have not 
yet led to it yet. Many of these are withdrawals. At FDA, 98 initial consultations 
have taken place, and 66 products have been given the FDA’s “stamp of 
approval” after a final consultation, whereas 32 (33%) have been withdrawn. 
Together, APHIS and FDA have overseen 201 authorization/consultation 
procedures, 131 of which (65%) have been approved, and 70 (35%) of which 
have not. About 65 different GM products have been authorized for 
commercialization in the US.  
In the EU, 18 GMOs out of 33 were approved under 90/220, of which 10 
are food and feed crops. Under EP and Council Directive 2001/18, 16 
notifications so far have led to two approvals (NK603 and MON 863, both GM 
corn varieties). Under EP and Council Regulation 258/97, 13 out of 18 novel 
foods were approved, and 18 are awaiting approval under the new EP and 
Council Regulation 1982/2003 (including some transferred from Reg. 258/97. In 
summary, in the EU, out of 85 applications, 25 (or 29%) have been approved, 
while 60 (or 71%) are pending or have been withdrawn. About 18 different 
products are currently approved in the EU, most of which are corn, oilseed rape, 
soybean, and cotton varieties. 
A notable difference can be found between the average number of days 
that elapse between application and authorization in the EU and the US. APHIS 
petitions are dealt with within an average of 221 days, and FDA consultations 
take an average of 252 days. This makes for a combined average of 237 days. In 
contrast, EU approvals for commercialization take an average of 794 days or 2.2 
years. 
 
                                                     
83 In the case of the EU, applicants anticipating potential rejection may be more reluctant than 
their US counterparts to submit products for approval. 
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Table 9: US and EU GM food and crop commercialization (1991-2005) 
 
 Number of 
applications 
Number of 
authorizations 
Number of non-
authorized 
applications* 
Average number 
of days elapsed 
between 
application and 
authorization 
US regulation of commercialization 
APHIS nonregulated status 103 
 
65 
(63%) 
38 
(37%)  
 
221 
(7.4 months) 
FDA voluntary consultation 
(none pending) 
98 66 
(67%) 
32 
(33%) 
252 
(8.4 months) 
Total US 201 131 
(65%) 
70 
(35%) 
237 
(7.9 months) 
EU regulation of commercialization 
Council Dir. 90/220       
Part C 
33 10 
(30%) 
23 
(70%) 
629 days 
(20.7 months 
1.7 years) 
EP/Council 2001/18       
Part C 
 
16 2 
(13%) 
14 
(87%) 
1052 days 
(35.1 months 
2.9 years) 
EP/Council Reg. 258/97 18 13 
(72%) 
5 
(28%) 
1923 days** 
(64 months 
5.2 years) 
EP/Council Reg. 1829/2003  18 0 
(0%) 
18 
(100%) 
not applicable 
 EU Total 85 25 
(29%) 
60 
(71%) 
794 days 
(26.5 months 
2.2 years) 
*   includes pending and withdrawn applications 
** figure based on data for 1 out of 13 authorizations (data for others not available) 
 
 
As for labeling, in accordance with US regulations, US GM food is not 
labeled.84 Organic food, on the other hand, is often labeled as not containing 
GMOs since the 2002 US National Organic Program Standards include genetic 
engineering as one of the methods not classified as “organic”. 85 
                                                     
84 On the topic of labeling in the US and the EU, Beate Kettlitz of the European Consumers’ 
Organisation remarks that “In Europe, labeling is meant to inform consumers. In the US, labels 
usually warn against something. That is a big difference in labeling strategy” (interview with 
Beate Kettlitz and Patrick Sutton, European Consumers’ Organisation, 14 September 2004, 
Brussels). 
85 The Organic Foods Production Act (OFPA) of 1990 required the US Department of Agriculture 
to develop national standards for organically produced agricultural products. These standards 
came into force in 2002. A food labeled “organic” in the US must be produced without 
conventional pesticides, fertilizers made with synthetic ingredients, genetic engineering or 
ionizing radiation. Observers of the GM food debate recount that the decision to add genetic 
engineering to the national organic standards was controversial. Proponents of genetic 
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In the EU, as a result of strict EU labeling rules, labeled GM foods are 
almost as scarce as in the US, and a comprehensive list of labeled products does 
not exist. As mentioned earlier, several national and international organizations 
have nevertheless attempted to establish what labeled GM products are in 
circulation through specific initiatives. For example, Greenpeace International’s 
“Trolley Watch”, referred to in Chapter 2, has turned up around 70 labeled GM 
foods. These include oils and margarines, soy products such as tofu and soy 
sauce, and processed foods including cake mixes and snack foods. The GM 
ingredients contained in these foods are mostly GM soy (in over half of the 
products) and some GM corn. The citizens reporting to “Trolley Watch” are 
mainly based in Germany (around 30%), the Netherlands, France (around 20% 
each), the Czech Republic (ca. 15%), Slovakia, Belgium and the U.K. 
(Greenpeace International Trolley Watch. GE Food in Europe).  
 
3.4 Conclusion 
As this chapter has shown, US and EU regulations in the field of GM food 
are based on very different regulatory frameworks and rules. Table 10 provides a 
summary of main differences. A systematic comparative look at GM food and 
crop rules and regulations, as well as the actual outcomes of these rules confirm a 
relatively permissive regulatory situation in the US, and a relatively restrictive 
EU regulatory system. 
In the US, three federal agencies regulate agricultural biotechnology under 
a series of existing statutes that do not regulate biotechnology explicitly. In 
contrast, in the EU, laws and regulations were devised specifically for GMOs. 
The US approach results in a relatively flexible and adaptable authorization 
                                                                                                                                                             
engineering felt that it would make GM foods seems “un-organic”, i.e. bad for the environment, 
which they argued was misleading since one of the possible benefits of genetic engineering is the 
reduction of pesticide use. GM food critics, on the other hand, saw the standards as a chance for 
GM foods to be excluded from a category of produce that they perceived as superior. Some 
observers of the debate suggest that the decision to include genetic engineering in the standards 
was partly a move to justify the US’s policy of not labeling GM foods: consumers who wanted to 
buy GM free food could now buy organic food. 
The European Union also links the non-use of genetic engineering and organic production 
methods. In 1999, Council Regulation 2092/91 of 1991 (Council of the European Union 1991) on 
organic production of agricultural products was amended to exclude the use of genetically 
modified organisms “in order to maintain consumer confidence” in such production (Cardwell 
2004: 285-6). 
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process, whereas the EU displays more clear-cut rules that are consistently 
binding for all GMOs.  
The US and the EU display varying authorization procedures at both the 
development and commercialization stages. In the US, a GM crop that passes the 
field testing phase naturally flows on into the commercialization process. In the 
European Union, a GMO to be placed on the market after a field test must go 
through a second similar but more demanding authorization process. Labeling 
and traceability are not foreseen in the US regulatory framework while they are 
mandatory in the EU.  
 
Table 10: US and EU regulatory differences 
 
 
  United States European Union 
Type of regulatory 
framework 
Not specific to GM foods/crops Specific to GM foods/crops 
 
Institutions White House/Office of Science and 
Technology Policy (OSTP) 
US Department of Agriculture’s Animal and 
Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
US states 
European Commission 
European Parliament 
Council of the European Union / Member 
States 
European Food Safety Agency (EFSA) 
Member States (crucial for implementation) 
Legal basis Constitution of the United States (art. I.8) 
Plant Protection Act (PPA) 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
(FFDCA) 
Code of Federal Regulations, Title 7, Part 340  
Code of Federal Regulations, Title 40, Parts 
152, 174 
Other policy documents (OSTP, FDA) 
Treaty establishing the European Community 
(consolidated text, art. 95) 
EP/Council Directive 2001/18 
EP/Council Regulation 1829/2003 
EP/Council Regulation 1830/2003 
Field testing APHIS permits and notifications 
EPA permits for Bt crops 
Notification procedure under Part B of 
EP/Council Directive 2001/18 
Commer-
cialization 
APHIS nonregulated status 
EPA regulation of  “plant-incorporated 
protectants” (PIPs) 
EPA tolerance level exemption 
FDA voluntary consultation 
Notification procedure under Part C of 
- EP/Council Directive 2001/18 
and/or 
- EP/Council Regulation 1829/2003 
Labeling No requirements Requirements under EP/Council Regulation 
1830/2003 
Traceability No requirements Requirements under EP/Council Regulation 
1830/2003 
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US and EU regulatory systems seem to have drifted further apart over the 
past decade. In the United States, core elements of GM food policy have 
remained largely unchanged. During the 1990s, these elements were reinforced 
by the introduction of streamlined procedures and opportunities for exemption 
from oversight. In contrast, the European Union has done away with most 
possibilities for expedited authorization of GM foods in its new 1829/2003 
Regulation on Food and Feed, and requests a more extensive environmental risk 
assessment under Directive 2001/18 than was the case under Directive 220/90. 
Having established how GM food policies are different in the US and the 
EU, I now turn to the why part of my research question. The next chapter presents 
the theory and method underlying this dissertation, and develops an analytical 
framework with which to explain GM food policy differences.  
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4. THEORY AND METHOD: STUDYING GM FOOD POLICY  
 
I draw on three theoretical approaches to craft a framework86 to explain 
US and EU policy differences in the area of genetically modified food: policy 
process theory, comparative historical analysis, and science and technology 
studies (STS). Each of these approaches encompasses a large family of individual 
theories and methods. From within this wide array of possibilities, I select and 
assemble different theories, which build on common assumptions and methods, 
and which together form a coherent and comprehensive analytical tool to explain 
GM food policy outcomes. This chapter is dedicated to explaining how, together, 
these theoretical approached have the potential to explain GM food policy 
differences in all their complexity. I first introduce each approach in terms of its 
main objects of study and historical development (4.1). I then present the 
postulates that I draw from them and on which I base my study (4.2). I further 
discuss relevant methodological questions (4.3) for this dissertation before 
presenting my analytical framework (4.3). 
 
4.1 Theory 
Policy process theory, comparative historical analysis, and STS have 
important similarities which make it possible to combine them in a coherent 
fashion. At the same time, they focus on different research goals and questions, 
and thus offer added value to one other. Each family of theories I select 
contributes an important element to the explanatory framework of this study. 
Policy process theory deals specifically with explaining policy outcomes, which 
is precisely this dissertation’s focus. Comparative historical analysis is designed 
to elucidate broad social phenomena through comparison. Comparing regulation, 
                                                     
86 I use the term framework to mean a “[mode] of organizing problems, giving them a form and a 
coherence” (Parsons 1995: 32). Like policy process theorist Ostrom, I view a framework’s role as 
helping to “identify the elements and relationships among […] elements” and providing “the most 
general list of variables that should be used” for analysis. Ostrom distinguishes “frameworks” 
from “theories” and “models”. Theories “focus on a framework and make specific assumptions 
that are necessary for an analyst to diagnose a phenomenon, explain its processes, and predict 
outcomes”. Models, on the other hand, “make precise assumptions about a limited set of 
parameters and variables” (Ostrom 1999: 39-40). 
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especially in a controversial area, falls exactly into this category. STS is a broad 
approach that aims to understand science and technology issues and 
developments within their social contexts. GM food policy is a product of science 
and technology interacting with society, and is therefore the type of empirical 
field addressed by STS. 
While policy process theory and comparative historical analysis constitute 
the basic toolkit I rely on in order to explain why GM food policies differ, STS 
serves as a constant reminder of the complexity of GM food policy. It underlines 
the fact that no framework can deal with a multifaceted issue fully and 
exhaustively, that it is no more than a tool that helps us understand a complicated 
world. While my approach is fundamentally positivist87 and in search of causal 
relations, STS helps me to further investigate cognitive88 issues and incorporate 
them into my analysis.89 
 
Policy process theory 
 The first family of theories that I use is policy process theory90. Policy 
process theory offers theories and methods that are specifically devised to explain 
policy outcomes. This approach’s main interest lies in explaining policy 
processes and why policies are the way they are. It is positivist and explanatory, 
assumes causal relationships, and is frequently used to compare policy outcomes. 
Comparative studies within policy process theory usually seek to explain policy 
similarities or differences across countries, policy fields, and/or time.  
                                                     
87 Positivism suggests that phenomena are observable and explainable. Within a positivist 
approach, reality consists of a world of objectively defined facts, which can be scientifically 
measured. 
88 The term “cognitive” denotes “mental processes connected with understanding, formulation of 
beliefs, and acquisition of knowledge, and thus distinct from volitional processes, such as wanting 
or intending” (definition from Flew 1999). 
89 As will become clear in this chapter, some theories within comparative historical analysis and 
policy process theory also make prominent use of cognitive elements. Moreover, STS is 
conscious of causality. The fundamental difference between comparative historical analysis and 
policy process theory on the one hand, and STS on the other, is that the former analyzes 
causalities as a method to explain an outcomes, while the latter rejects causality as a way of 
describing, understanding and explaining the world. 
90 For an overview of policy process theory, see, for example, Héritier 1993, Sabatier 1999a or 
Parsons 1995. 
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Policy process theory developed as a reaction to “public policy studies”, a 
discipline that was widespread in the 1950s and 1960s.91 Public policy studies’ 
main aim was to make policy for current decision-making processes, i.e. to 
construct policy recommendations, in isolation from politics, to be implemented 
by policy-makers. It developed out of a belief that “the political process was 
unable to deal creatively with pressing policy problems and that it was 
inordinately influenced by special interests” (White 1994: 857). Public policy 
studies were therefore concerned with improving policy-making through rational 
analysis. Public policy studies were also strongly positivist and devoted to 
empirical methods. Researchers within this area of study preferred the use of 
quantitative, quasi-experimental methods mimicking the natural sciences as much 
as possible, as well as economic tools such as cost-benefit analysis. Their goal 
and ideal was to develop objective, rational and neutral policy recommendations. 
Starting in the 1970s, the area of policy process theory developed out of a 
new preoccupation with the importance of explanatory analysis of policy as a 
process. A field dedicated to studying how policy is shaped, policy process 
theory rejects the idea that policy-making can be objective and neutral, and that 
policy recommendations can simply be provided by experts and then 
implemented by policy-makers. A core assumption of many individual policy 
process theories is that rational analysis, empirical study and economic cost-
benefit analysis – the traditional ingredients found in policy analysis for decision-
making – alone do not suffice to understand and explain policy. As expressed by 
Sabatier, a prominent representative of the field of policy process theory, “the 
process of public policymaking includes the manner in which problems get 
conceptualized and brought to government for solution” (Sabatier 1999b: 3). 
 One of the first policy process models to be developed is the policy cycle 
or stages heuristic model, which divides the policy-making process into phases, 
typically agenda-setting, policy formulation, policy decision-making, 
implementation, and evaluation (see for example Laswell 1956, deLeon 1999). 
This approach was inspired by Easton and C.O. Jones’s input-output-oriented 
models (Easton 1965, Jones, C.O. 1970). The stages heuristic approach has been 
                                                     
91 For an overview of public policy studies, a field also referred to as “policy studies”, “policy 
analysis”, “public policy analysis”, or “policy science”, see, for example, Howlett/Ramesh 1995, 
Lester/Stewart 1996 or Parsons 1995. Laswell (1951) is one of the first and most central figures to 
describe what he called “policy science”. 
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widely criticized (e.g. Sabatier 1999b), in particular because it is not a causal 
model and because it idealizes the policy process by drawing artificial 
distinctions between individual policy-making phases. This model, however, 
continues to be used as a valuable tool for describing policy (Parsons 1995: 77-
8), and as a way for “viewing and categorizing actors and actions in ways that 
help unravel and elucidate given policies …” (deLeon 1999: 26).92 
 More recent theories of the policy process put greater emphasis on 
describing policy as a dynamic process over time involving multiple actors and 
events which cannot be neatly divided into policy stages. Aside from the stages 
heuristic approach, a series of prominent approaches within the large family of 
policy process theories include (list loosely based on Parsons 1995: 39-40): 
- pluralist-elite approaches, which focus on the power distributions among 
groups and elites; 
- rational choice-inspired approaches, based on the assumption that 
individuals’ actions are motivated by specific policy preferences; 
- approaches focusing on how policy change occurs: for example, during 
“windows of opportunity” used by “policy entrepreneurs” or “veto 
players”, or when a policy equilibrium is “punctuated”; 
- subsystem approaches, which analyze policy activity in specific policy 
domains with the help of concepts such as “network” or “advocacy 
coalition”; 
- post-positivist/constructivist approaches, which examine policy processes 
in terms of discourse, language and communication; 
- institutionalist approaches, which privilege the role of institutions in 
explaining policy outcomes. 
 This dissertation uses the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), a 
subsystem approach which also addresses policy change, developed by Sabatier 
and Jenkins-Smith (1993, 1999).93 
                                                     
92 The stages heuristic model is not used as an analytical theory in this dissertation. It is a helpful 
tool, however, to characterize the research focus of this study. Within a classic policy cycle going 
from agenda-setting to implementation, this dissertation focuses mainly on the policy formulation 
and decision-making phases. It therefore puts special emphasis on the questions “how is GM food 
policy shaped?” and “how are policy decisions regarding GM foods taken?”. The question of how 
GM food became a policy issue is also considered to a certain extent (agenda-setting). In the case 
of the EU, GM food policy implementation (how GM food policy is carried out) takes place to a 
large extent at the Member State level. Implementation and evaluation (what effect GM food 
policy has) are important topics that are not the focus of this study. 
93 As this chapter goes on to explain, I also draw on historical institutionalism (for example Hall 
1986, Thelen 2004), which within the list presented could be categorized as institutionalism, and 
on the argumentative approach (Hajer 1995), which could be classified as a post-positivist 
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Comparative historical analysis 
The second theoretical approach I use is comparative historical analysis.94 It 
relates to my research in that it offers tools and theoretical approaches to devise a 
comparative investigation of factors explaining different policy outcomes. 
Comparative historical analysis has a tradition of addressing macro-social or “big 
questions”95, as well as a tendency to “focus on comprehensive structures and 
large-scale processes that provide powerful clues to the patterning of social life” 
(Mahoney/Rueschemeyer 2003b: 7). 
Comparative historical analysis can be characterized as “a research 
approach rather than a single overarching theory” (Skocpol 2003: 419). It is a 
family of theories and methods that analyze macro-social phenomena, including 
public policy outcomes, through the comparative and historical study of 
institutions, which are broadly defined to include “both formal organizations and 
informal rules and procedures that structure conduct” (Thelen/Steinmo 1992: 2).96 
My research question – why is there a transatlantic rift in GM food policy? – is 
precisely this type of broad, comparative, outcome-oriented question, and it 
embraces this informal, loose meaning of institutions. Moreover, comparative 
historical analysis advocates the type of inductive framework-building that I 
engage in. 
Comparative historical analysis has its roots in a long tradition of social 
thought going back several centuries. For example, nineteenth century founders of 
social science Alexis de Tocqueville and Karl Marx, and early twentieth century 
scholars such as Max Weber wrote about society from a comparative and historical 
perspective. 
                                                                                                                                                             
approach. In this study, I choose to discuss historical institutionalism under comparative historical 
analysis since I would argue that historical institutionalism, the strand of institutionalism I work 
with, fits better into comparative historical analysis, which has clarified and strengthened its 
research agenda during the past decade. As for Hajer’s argumentative approach, it is a cross 
between policy process theory and science and technology studies, but clearly builds on the 
constructivist assumption found in STS. 
94 For an overview of comparative historical analysis, see Mahoney/Rueschemeyer 2003a.  
95 Macro-social research questions or “big questions” address broad, systemic issues and 
phenomena, taking into account their social, political, institutional and historical context. 
96 Historical institutionalist Peter Hall defines institutions as “the formal rules, compliance 
procedures, and standard operating practices that structure the relationship between individuals in 
various units of the polity and economy” (Hall 1986: 19).  
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Researchers that view themselves as comparative historical analysts today 
are also bound together by their rejection of behavioralism, a US-developed 
research tradition that dominated the social sciences during the 1950s and 1960s. 
While social thought had focused on politics through the study of institutions and 
history, behavioralism was characterized by a focus on the importance of 
individual behavior. In terms of methodology, much like policy analysis in the 
1950s and 1960s, behavioralism emphasized empirical techniques and privileged 
the search for universal and testable hypotheses through deduction. 
In the late 1960s and 1970s, research approaches that can today be 
classified as comparative historical analysis once again began to take root, this 
time as a counter-movement to behavioralism. Specifically, researchers working 
within a comparative historical analysis tradition criticized the assumption that 
individual political behavior reveals preferences and that individual preferences 
can be aggregated into collective phenomena (Immergut 1998: 7). Instead, these 
researchers newly emphasized the importance of studying institutions in their 
historical context in order to explain broad social phenomena. 
As mentioned above, comparative historical analysis today focuses on 
“first-order questions”, or “big questions”, that attract and fascinate people inside 
and outside of academic circles alike (Skocpol 2003: 409). These first-order 
questions involve topics of great social magnitude such as war and peace, 
revolutions, institutional change, social movements, and important public policy 
outcomes. Like policy process theory, comparative historical analysis is a 
positivist approach and is open to a plurality of theories and methods. According 
to Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, the three main elements characterizing 
comparative historical analysis are “causal analysis, an emphasis on processes 
over time, and the use of systematic and contextualized comparison” 
(Mahoney/Rueschemeyer 2003b: 6). 
From within the field of comparative historical analysis, I use historical 
institutionalism (Hall 1986, Thelen 2004). As will be explained in more detail 
below, historical institutionalism is used in this dissertation to discuss the 
importance of policy in the area of recombinant DNA (rDNA) in the 1970s and 
1980s to understand current GM food policies. 
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Science and technology studies 
 The third body of theory that I draw upon is an area of studies called 
“science and technology studies”, “science, technology and society”, or “science 
studies” (STS or S&TS)97. This field of scholarship's primary interest lies in 
understanding science and technology within their social contexts. It is concerned 
with analyzing issues relevant to science, technology and society, often 
controversies, through a constructivist lens in order to be able to raise questions 
about more positivist ways of understanding their relationship with society. As 
formulated by Jasanoff, one of the field’s foremost representatives, its 
“foundational concern” is “the investigation of knowledge societies in all their 
complexity” (Jasanoff 2004: 2). 
This study makes use of science and technology studies as a body of 
theories that makes it possible to explore more deeply the importance of 
cognitive elements in science and technology policy-making. Policy process 
theory and comparative historical analysis acknowledge the importance of beliefs 
and perceptions, but STS, through its constructivist lens, is able to push further in 
that direction. My work is essentially positivist, explanatory, and oriented 
towards a search for causality. However, my analysis is also very sensitive to the 
ways in which GM foods and related policy issues are constructed by individual 
actors in the US and the EU. In addition, empirically speaking, STS is highly 
valuable to my research in that it deals specifically with issues within the realm 
of science and technology. While policy process theory treats GM food as a 
policy area like any other, STS deals with the specificities of science and 
technology policy and politics. STS has yielded a series of interesting works on 
biotechnology policy, and on GM foods specifically, which I use as sources of 
information and inspiration throughout my study. 
The study of science as a social phenomenon goes back to the rise of 
industrialization during the 19th century. At this time, sociologists such as 
Auguste Comte and Emile Durkheim held a traditional view of science and 
technology, dominant in Western industrialized societies to this day, as being 
objective, independent and neutral forms of knowledge used for the betterment of 
                                                     
97 In their Handbook of Science and Technology Studies, Jasanoff et al. (1995) give an overview 
of the wide terrain covered by STS. Sismondo (2004) offers a useful introduction to STS. 
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society. In this understanding, scientists enjoy high levels of authority and are 
viewed as apolitical and uncontroversial experts. 
As early as the 16th and 17th century, Francis Bacon had suggested that 
human beings cannot possess objective pictures of the truth in their minds. 19th 
century thinkers on the nature of science include Karl Marx, John Desmond 
Bernal and Max Weber, who viewed scientific “truths” as expressions of class 
interests. In the 1920s and 1930s, scholars such as Ludwik Fleck wrote about the 
link between science and society, making the assumption that knowledge is 
linked to cognitive beliefs. 
In the 1940s, 50s and 60s, against the backdrop of the rise and fall of 
totalitarianism, the aftermath of World War II and the first decades of the Cold 
War, attention turned to the normative question of how scientific inquiry can 
operate uncontaminated by politics. Both Merton (1973 [1942]) and Polanyi 
(1962) viewed science in its ideal form as existing in a community of its own, 
separate from and untouched by society. While Merton became famous for his 
concept of the “ethos of science” describing a series of principles for the conduct 
of science, Polanyi developed the notion of a “republic of science”, a community 
of scientists working according to economic principles and resembling a body 
politic.  
STS as a field of scholarship developed in the 1970s as a reaction to these 
traditional views of science and technology, and drew on earlier work done in the 
history, sociology and philosophy of science. The nascent field of STS has gained 
in importance and recognition in the light of current events. A series of important 
technological advances, especially nuclear technology and genetic engineering, 
and increasing private and public sector expenditure for science and technology 
led not only to advances and successes, but also to failures, controversies, and to 
an increasingly critical and questioning public. These developments legitimized 
STS’s research agenda by pointing towards the fact that science and technology 
could no longer be contemplated out of context. 
One of the subareas that STS deals with is science and technology policy. 
Traditionally, the role of science in policy-making was and still is understood as 
furnishing policy-makers with scientifically accurate information and in 
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“speaking truth to power” (Price 1965, Wildavsky 1987 [1979]98). Following this 
logic, scientific knowledge feeds into policy, and science and technology policy 
is taken for granted as having been informed by the best available scientific and 
expert information. The underlying perception is that governments basing their 
decisions on this type of ideal process can achieve regulatory safety and be fully 
accountable to the public (Webster 1991). In the 1970s, at about the same time 
that policy analysts began to question the supremacy of rational cost-benefit 
analysis, STS scholars interested in science and technology policy began 
questioning the assumption that science policy-making is a linear process of 
scientific truths being fed into politics, with science policy as an output. Instead, 
assumes that science policy is the result of complex and non-linear interactions 
among science, politics and society. 
STS pursues its interest in understanding these complex relationships 
through an agenda of raising questions concerning their perceived meanings and 
interactions. STS challenges the idea that science is neutral and objective whereas 
society is not, and questions the concept that science, technology and society are 
divided by clear boundaries. As will be described in detail below, from within the 
wide field of STS and the concepts and ideas leading up to it, I turn to scholars 
such as Fleck, Kuhn, Levidow, and Jasanoff to help me explain the transatlantic 
rift in GM food policy. 
 
4.2 Postulates 
Causality 
The theoretical approaches I choose point toward two fundamental 
postulates. First, I posit that a workable and rewarding way to explain public 
policies is to address them as research puzzles (“why-questions”), and to explain 
them by searching for causal explanations. Policy process theory and comparative 
historical analysis both posit causal links between social outcomes (e.g. policy) 
and their explanation(s), in other words they see certain variables and variable 
                                                     
98 Wildavsky shares the basic view that policy analysis should and can furnish policy-makers 
(“power”) with accurate and useful information (“truth”). However, his is a nuanced account that 
recognizes that the “truth [that] analysts claim today is not always the same truth they will claim 
tomorrow” and that, therefore, the “truth” that policy analysis speaks to “power” is not immutable 
(Wildavsky 1979: 402). 
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combinations as leading to certain outcomes. Policy process theorists often take 
causality for granted and do not discuss this postulate in detail. An exception is 
Scharpf, a policy process theorist representing a game theoretical/rational choice 
approach, who makes the assumption of causality explicit: 
“we must go beyond descriptive case studies and narrative explanations 
[…]: We need to have hypotheses that specify a causal model showing 
why and how a given constellation of factors could bring about the effect 
in question […]” (Scharpf 1997: 28). 
Comparative historical analysts are relatively explicit about causality 
being one of their unifying and guiding elements: “comparative historical inquiry 
is fundamentally concerned with the explanation and identification of causal 
configurations that produce major outcomes of interest” 
(Mahoney/Rueschemeyer 2003b: 11). Furthermore, “most comparative historical 
analysts believe that it is difficult to conduct any kind of social science analysis 
without at least implicitly making causal claims” Mahoney/Rueschemeyer 2003b: 
23).  
In contrast, while STS is conscious of causality, it disagrees with variable-
based explanatory models, maintaining that causality and directionality are not 
worth looking for since they posit artificial and reductionist views of the 
interactions among science, society and politics. Instead, STS has developed 
frameworks of its own to describe and explain complex phenomena resulting 
from causal interactions. One of these is the concept of co-production (Jasanoff 
2004) or co-evolution (Nowotny et al. 2001). STS assumes that science, politics, 
polity, the market, etc. are engaged in complex and multidirectional causal 
exchanges and interrelationships, and that these interactions mutually condition 
and determine one another. Therefore, no linear causality is posited, and no 
directionality is allowed: “the production of order in nature and society has to be 
discussed in an idiom that does not, even accidentally and without intent, give 
primacy to either” (Jasanoff 2004: 20). 
One aspect of causality that is especially important to this dissertation is 
the supposition that explanations of complex phenomena such as policy outcomes 
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are context-sensitive and multifaceted.99 All of the theoretical approaches I make 
use of are based on this assumption. One of policy process theory’s central 
features is that it often takes into consideration and assembles a complex set of 
elements such as beliefs, institutional arrangements, actors’ resources, and 
context. Policy process theory models such as Kingdon’s multiple streams (1984) 
or Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s Advocacy Coalition Framework (1993, 1999) 
rely on the interaction of a multitude of explanatory elements to be viewed within 
a larger societal context. In Kingdon’s multiple streams model, three policy 
streams – “problems”, “policy primeval soup”, and “political stream” – 
occasionally come together to create “policy windows” during which policy 
solutions are shaped.  These streams contain a multitude of interacting factors and 
actors such as “problem definition” (problems stream), “policy communities” or 
specialists in a given policy area (policy stream), “organized political forces” and 
“the national mood” (political stream). The Advocacy Coalition Framework, 
discussed in more detail below, uses concepts such as “beliefs”, “advocacy 
coalitions”, and “external events” to explain policy outputs. In both of these 
examples, the interaction of multiple elements is crucial to explaining policy 
outcomes. 
Comparative historical analysis declares the use of “contextualized” 
comparison to be one of its main tenets (Mahoney/Rueschemeyer 2003b: 6). 
Historical institutionalism, one important theoretical approach within 
comparative historical analysis, stresses that its “emphasis on institutions […] 
does not replace attention to other variables – the players, their interests and 
strategies, and the distribution of power among them. On the contrary, it puts 
these factors in context, showing how they are related to one another […]” 
(Thelen/Steinmo 1992: 12). Indeed, within this approach, causality is viewed as 
being contextual (Immergut 1998: 19) and analysis focuses on “illuminating how 
                                                     
99 One of the ways in which multivariate qualitative analysis and the problem of “conjectural 
causation” (causation not proven or based on evidence) has been approached is through 
qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), an analytic technique developed by Ragin (1987, 2000) 
that uses Boolean algebra to study macro-social phenomena in a comparative manner, thus 
bringing together aspects of qualitative and quantitative analysis. Typically, studies using 
qualitative comparative analysis conduct a systematic comparison of dichotomously categorized 
data across more than two or three cases, investigating under which conditions a certain social or 
political outcome is realized. For example, Varone et al. (forthcoming) apply the method of 
qualitative comparative analysis to the policy field of assisted reproductive technology. 
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different variables are linked” (Thelen/Steinmo 1992: 13). Ideally, a “balance 
between necessary complexity and desirable parsimony” is struck (ibid.). 
Although STS does not proceed by seeking causal explanations to 
research, “why-puzzles”, it shares with policy process theory and comparative 
historical analysis the assumption that controversial issues like the regulation of 
GM food must be understood within a complex social context composed of 
multiple actors and issues. For example, actor-network theory (Callon 1986, 
Latour 1987), a prominent theory within STS, suggests that the actors involved in 
a scientific discovery or technological advance can be individuals, organizations, 
or objects (e.g. the technological discovery itself, or an element which makes it 
possible). These actors create networks surrounding scientific advances or 
technological developments. Jasanoff’s framework of co-production, referred to 
above, is also a case in point. In describing her framework, she emphasizes that 
“What happens in science and technology today is interwoven with issues of 
meaning, values and power in ways that demand sustained critical inquiry” 
(Jasanoff 2004: 25). This standpoint would undoubtedly be shared by policy 
process theorists and comparative historical analysts, and underlines the fact that 
STS, as well as the other approaches used, is a discipline based heavily on 
interactions and multifaceted analysis. 
 
Beliefs matter 
Second, I postulate that the beliefs and perceptions of individual and 
collective actors play an important role in explaining policy outcomes. This 
assumption is contained in all of the theoretical approaches I draw on. In 
postulating that beliefs matter, I clearly distance myself from theories that posit 
that individual actors act rationally, according to specific preferences, in order to 
achieve certain goals and maximize their benefits (e.g. rational choice 
institutionalism). It is my conviction that individual and collective ways of 
describing, conceptualizing and placing GM food on the political agenda are 
crucial for understanding differences in policy outcomes. 
Some theories within policy process theory emphasize the importance of 
beliefs as a reaction to the tradition of policy analysis, which relies on the concept 
of rationality. Many policy process theorists disagree with the view that policy-
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making is a purely rational process by emphasizing that “cognitive limits on 
individuals make analysis [in the traditional rational cost-benefit sense] difficult” 
and that “politics governs nearly every political decision” (White 1994: 860). 
Many policy process theories such as Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s Advocacy 
Coalition Framework (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993, 1999) and Jobert and 
Muller’s concept of the “referential” (référentiel) (Jobert / Muller 1987) grant 
beliefs a central position. 
Similarly, comparative historical analysis “typically [gives] subjective 
beliefs a more central place, together with ‘objectively’ changing contexts [than 
rational choice approaches] (Mahoney/Rueschemeyer 2003b: 21). Comparative 
historical analyst and historical institutionalist Hall, for example, develops the 
belief-based concept of “policy paradigms”. Historical institutionalists in general 
emphasize “socially and politically constructed preferences” (Thelen/Steinmo 
1992: 8). 
As a constructivist theoretical approach, STS is based on the premise that 
socially constructed beliefs are crucial for understanding how controversies 
around science and technology policy arise. STS scholars see science and 
technology as being defined by social norms. The basis of an STS analysis is a 
constructivist understanding of social phenomena, which, in opposition to realist 
perspectives, states that knowledge is subjective and that it develops as a 
subjective construction of ideas and concepts. For example, in his comparative 
analysis of the regulation of genetic engineering, Gottweis, a scholar situated 
between policy process theory and STS, argues that “actors and institutions must 
always be analyzed in close association with the discourses in which they are 
constituted and with the policy stories that define the logic, the actors, and the 
institutions that matter in a policy field” (Gottweis 1998: 3). He rightly 
emphasizes that “comparative political studies […] have remained relatively 
untouched by this new approach and continue to look at politics through a lens 
narrowed by realist epistemology and positivist methodology” (ibid.).  
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4.3 Method  
 
Developing a “medium-range” framework 
In order to explain GM food policy differences, I seek to create an 
analytical framework which will form a basis for considering empirical data on 
GM food policy processes in the US and the EU. The framework I develop may 
help researchers investigate other controversial policy areas, but it is designed 
specifically for the case of GM food policy in the US and the EU. It does not aim 
or claim to be universally applicable to the public policy process.  
This limited focus is widespread in comparative historical analysis and 
policy process theory. Research within these traditions agree that in order to 
explain broad social and political phenomena, a search for universally applicable 
principles and rules (as conducted in many areas of social science) is not 
necessarily desirable (Mahoney/Rueschemeyer 2003b: 8). Indeed, in pursuing 
these types of research questions, comparative historical analysts are not 
concerned with “grand theorizing” (Thelen/Steinmo 1992: 5), but rather with 
finding “bits of sometimes true knowledge” (Rueschemeyer 2003: 328). The idea 
is that an in-depth understanding of individual case studies will yield specific 
knowledge that may lead to generalizations, but not to universal rules. 
Comparative historical analysis and policy process theory therefore agree that 
answers to research questions of this type can and perhaps should be very case 
and data-specific. Moreover, Scharpf suggests that “lawlike generalizations” may 
be desirable, but that they are “nearly impossible” to achieve in “interaction-
oriented policy research” (Scharpf 1997: 19). 
In order to conduct in-depth case study research, policy process theory and 
comparative historical analysis suggest using “focused theoretical frameworks” 
or “meta-theories”, which often “are not directly testable but seek to establish the 
most fruitful intellectual framework for the investigation” (Rueschemeyer 2003: 
329). Such frameworks aim to explain the specific research question at hand. 
Rueschemeyer describes such frameworks as “focused theoretical frameworks for 
the study of particular substantive problem areas […]”, which lead to “subject- 
and problem-specific meta-theories” (2003: 329). Hall calls this type of 
theoretical framework “middle range” and describes it as focusing “on 
intermediate variables in order to integrate an understanding of general patterns 
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of political history with an explanation of the contingent nature of political and 
economic development” (Hall 2003: 27-8). 
Out of what elements and how is a medium-range analytical framework 
built? Policy process theory and comparative historical analysis agree that it 
should be based on theoretical and methodological pluralism. Scharpf writes that 
complete explanations “can only be modular constructs, combining and linking 
several theoretical ‘modules’” (Scharpf 1997: 30). As put by Mahoney and 
Rueschemeyer, “comparative historical analysts need not embrace any single 
approach to causal analysis” (2003b: 12). Instead, a medium-range theory should 
use “methodological and theoretical eclecticism” (Skocpol 2003: 411), and is 
“thus splendidly open to synergy and innovation” (Skocpol 2003: 420). I follow 
these bits of advice by adopting theoretical heterogeneity in order to strive for a 
comprehensive and multi-approach explanation of why GM food policies are 
different in the US and the EU. 
Equally important for the process of creating a medium-range framework 
is the dialogue-like process by which it is developed. In writing this dissertation, I 
started out with certain theories and assumptions, from which I extracted 
concepts and guiding propositions to approach the empirical part of my project. 
In the process of my research, I have constantly gone back and forth between my 
empirical data and my analytical framework, until the framework “made sense” 
and offered a sound approach to explaining GM food policy differences. While 
virtually all of social science requires working in this way, it is seldom explicitly 
spoken of as a necessary and useful part of the research process. It is at most 
described as having a “corrective” function. Comparative historical analysis, 
however, makes specific reference to this type of research process, describing it 
as “a dialogue between theory and evidence of an intensity that is rare in 
quantitative social science” (Mahoney/Rueschemeyer 2003b: 13). As foreseen by 
comparative historical analysis, I have been able to “comfortably move back and 
forth between theory and history [in my case theory and empirical findings] in 
many iterations of analysis” (ibid.).  
In accordance with the goal of developing a medium-range framework, I 
formulate research propositions instead of hypotheses. While hypotheses are 
statements derived exclusively from theory for the purpose of testing whether or 
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not specific relationships exist between certain variables, propositions can be 
formulated taking into account preliminary empirical findings. Moreover, 
propositions do not necessarily suggest precise relationships between variables, 
but can be of a more open nature.  
 
Focused and systematic comparison of two cases 
In order to explain US and EU policy differences, I conduct a focused and 
systematic public policy comparison. While comparison as a method is an 
obvious choice considering my research question, it is worth underlining the 
research benefits of comparison in general terms. In essence, comparison is a 
procedure that enables us to develop theory and generate hypotheses about 
society. As underlined by Mackie and Marsh (1995: 175-6), one of the main 
reasons for comparison is “to generate, test, and subsequently reformulate 
theories […] about the relationship between political phenomena.” STS scholar 
Jasanoff agrees: “Comparative policy studies offer a promising vehicle for 
clarifying how knowledge interacts with politics and culture […].” (Jasanoff 
1991: 62). In her recent work, she even states that “[c]omparative studies of 
science and technology policy should be seen today as a powerful means of 
developing social theory” (Jasanoff 2005: 12). 
 This dissertation can be characterized as a “focused comparison” (Hague 
et al. 1998) of two in-depth qualitative case studies or “process studies” (Peters 
1998). This type of comparison is common in policy process theory, comparative 
historical analysis, and science and technology studies alike. This approach puts 
as much emphasis on comparison as it does on the cases themselves. It pursues 
the goal of remaining “sensitive to the details of particular countries and policies 
while also forcing the intellectual discipline which inheres in the comparative 
enterprise” (Hague et al. 1998: 280). Therefore, I do not present my work as two 
separate, consecutive case studies. Rather, my comparison of GM food policy in 
the US and the EU is guided by comparable themes, issues and elements. 
In comparing GM food policy in the EU and the US, I juxtapose two cases 
and must therefore consider “small-N” (small number of cases) research design 
issues. The trouble most frequently associated with this type of study is the 
danger that “extraneous variance”, i.e. extra independent variables not targeted as 
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objects of study, might interfere with the dependent variable (Peters 1998, 
Mackie/Marsh 1995). Przeworski and Teune (1970) and other comparativists 
such as Lijphart (1975) have argued that case selection should therefore follow 
either a “most similar systems design” or a “most different systems design”. The 
most similar systems design strategy consists of selecting cases in which as many 
extra independent variables as possible are similar. By thus excluding other 
possible explanatory variables, this type of design ensures that the independent 
variables singled out for testing can constitute actual explanations. The opposite 
strategy, the “most different systems design”, selects units for comparison that 
differ in many respects (Przeworski/Teune 1970, Peters 1998). The goal of this 
strategy is “to show a robust relationship by demonstrating its validity in a range 
of contrasting settings” (Hague et al. 1998: 281). 
While the rules devised by Przeworski and Teune are well-suited for 
“large N” or “medium-N” research designs seeking generalization and universal 
principles, they are less useful for the focused comparison that I conduct. Indeed, 
to the question “How should countries be selected for a focused comparison?”, 
Hague et al. reply that “[…] considerations of substance […] should trump 
methodological factors. Accordingly, in much “small-N” research, countries are 
selected not as ‘cases’ but for their intrinsic interest” (Hague et al. 1998: 280, my 
emphasis). 
In the case of GM food policy, it would be a mistake to bypass the 
“considerations of substance” underlined by Hague et al. In this sense, I suggest 
that a transatlantic comparison of GM food policy must compare EU and US 
regulations because, at the transatlantic level, agricultural biotechnology is 
regulated first and foremost by the US federal government and by the European 
Union. In the US, Congress and the federal government have the power to 
regulate the areas of agriculture and food safety. In the European Union, GM 
food and crop policy falls within the area of the internal market and is thus 
shaped at the EU level, by the European Commission, European Parliament, and 
Council of the EU100. By comparing GM food policy in the EU and the US, I thus 
compare what is appropriate to compare. “Intrinsic interest”, a further criterion 
suggested by Hague, is equally present for my case study selection: the EU and 
                                                     
100 The Council of the EU is composed of Member State representatives and therefore represents 
their interests. Member States are also significant for the implementation of EU-level policy. 
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the US are the two main GM food regulators worldwide, and their differing 
policies have led to a major transatlantic trade clash within the WTO. 
For these reasons, I maintain that a comparative study of the EU and the 
US is a valuable enterprise despite the inherent limitations resulting from its 
imperfect conformity with a most similar systems design. Since I am interested in 
explaining policy differences, my study roughly follows a most similar systems 
design. Potentially important explanatory variables that are similar in both the US 
and the EU include the level of industrial and technological development (high in 
both cases)101, the type of economy (both market economies), and center-
periphery structure (both are federal systems). 
Regarding the center-periphery structure, to be sure, EU Member States 
are nation-states while US states are not; the US is one nation-state, whereas the 
EU is a union of nations-states. This systemic difference has been used to explain 
the differences between GM food policies. For example, Bernauer does this from 
a rational choice perspective. He dedicates a chapter of Genes, Trade and 
Regulation to what he calls “regulatory federalism”, in which he “concentrates on 
whether political subunits within the federal system can, by unilaterally installing 
stricter or laxer regulation of agricultural biotechnology, push the stringency of 
system-wide regulation up or down” (Bernauer 2003: 102).102 Whether it is made 
from a rational choice perspective or not, I recognize the importance of this 
institutional argument, but choose not to treat federalism as a separate 
explanatory variable. Instead, I take it into account by discussing the role of EU 
Member States and US states as actors who influence policy outcomes through 
their activities are beliefs. 
On a more general level, I do not focus on institutions and institutional 
arrangements to explain policy differences, but conceptualize them as the glue 
                                                     
101 It should be noted, however, that the US is further developed than the EU in terms of 
biotechnology applications. 
102 Bernauer concludes that in the EU, “we observe a substantial ‘ratcheting-up’ effect, whereas 
such an effect is absent in the United States” (Bernauer 2003: 102). He constructs his argument on 
a series of rational choice-based assumptions. He supposes that if subunits (EU Member States or 
US states) pursued opposite policies, considerable economic damage would follow. He further 
suggests that in the case of regulatory disagreement, a harmonized solution based on strict 
regulation is the most desirable situation possible for all. 
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that holds explanatory variables together.103 Like Ostrom, I understand 
institutions to be no more than the set of formal and informal rules that are used, 
so-called “rules-in-use” that depend on the shared beliefs of those actors that 
formulate them (Ostrom 1990). As Scharpf notes, 
“[…] we must remain aware of the fact that although institutions 
constitute composite actors, create and constrain options, and shape 
perceptions and preferences, they cannot influence choices and outcomes 
in a deterministic sense. Institutionalized rules, even if they are completely 
effective, will rarely prescribe one and only one course of action. Instead, 
by proscribing some and permitting other actions, they will define 
repertoires of more or less acceptable courses of action that will leave 
considerable scope for the strategic and tactical choices of purposeful 
actors” (Scharpf 1997: 42). 
In summary, I take into account institutions and institutional arrangements and 
the role they play as part of the analysis of actors and events within the field of 
GM food policy. 
A further methodological problem is that the two case studies I select are 
not independent from each other. As the chronologies of the US and the EU cases 
in Chapter 2 show, the US and the EU often react to each other’s policies and 
actions. International actors such as the WTO and multinational biotechnology 
companies, neither of which can be classified as belonging completely to either 
case, exemplify the interdependence of the two selected case studies selected. It is 
therefore plausible to consider each case study as a factor influencing policy 
outcomes in the other. The difficulty that case studies may not constitute 
independent observations is known as “Galton’s problem”, and is common in 
social science studies conducted across countries (see, for example, 
Przeworski/Teune 1970: 52-53, Gerring 2001: 178-181). Some scholars study 
precisely this phenomenon, instead of treating it solely as a methodological 
obstacle. For example, the policy diffusion approach specifically investigates in 
what way policy choices are interdependent and influence one another 
(Berry/Berry 1999, Braun/Gilardi 2005). For the in-depth case study research as 
                                                     
103 This assumption is connected with the postulate discussed above that beliefs matter. My work 
is guided by the supposition that institutions are important primarily through actors and actors’ 
beliefs. 
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undertaken in this dissertation, Galton’s problem cannot be solved. The only 
possible strategy is to be aware of it in order to gauge its possible effects while 
analyzing empirical evidence. 
 
Data sources 
 The methods of data collection and analysis used in this dissertation are 
qualitative. This is in accordance with its research goal, assumptions and 
theoretical approach, as qualitative methods tend to aim at understanding 
processes and explaining outcomes. Qualitative methods “capture meaning, 
process and context” (Devine 1995: 138) and can thus get as close as necessary to 
the object of study (Flick et al. 2000: 17).104 Within this process of “getting 
close”, I find the description of the “qualitative researcher as bricoleur and 
quiltmaker” to be very fitting (Denzin/Lincoln 2000: 4). The topic of GM food 
policy lends itself to qualitative analysis particularly well. Indeed, the highly 
political nature of this policy area, as well as the ethical questions, emotions and 
controversy it has generated over the past decade beckon for qualitative inquiry 
(Schubert 1991, House/Shull 1991). 
 From within the wide field of possible qualitative methods, I use semi-
directive interviews (following the methods described, for example by 
Meuser/Nagel 1991 or Weiss 1994) and documentary analysis. Thus, my first 
source of data are thirty-five semi-directive interviews conducted with US and 
EU policy-makers, stakeholder representatives (e.g. environmental NGOs, 
consumer associations, industry) and academics active and/or knowledgeable in 
the area of GM food policy.105 I selected my interview partners to represent a 
broad range of viewpoints and positions within the GM food debate. The 
interviews lasted from one to two hours each. Working with audio recordings and 
notes, I then summarized the content of all the interviews in order to gain a 
complete overview of the themes addressed. The data gained in this manner was 
crucial in terms of ordering and understanding the information to be found in 
primary documents and secondary literature. Throughout this dissertation, I have 
                                                     
104 In contrast, in quantitative analyses, research usually tries to predict outcomes and test 
hypotheses; findings are precise and numerical (Merriam 1998: 9). 
105 A complete list of interviewees’ names and affiliations is provided at the end of this 
dissertation. 
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made use of direct quotations from my interviews when interviewees were in 
agreement. Second, I analyze a vast selection of primary documents including 
legislation, regulations, opinions, recommendations, speeches, interest group 
position papers, and many other sources. Third, I make use of the abundant 
secondary literature available on the GM food debate in general, and the growing 
literature on GM food policy in particular.  
 
4.4 Analytical framework 
In order to compare GM food policies in the EU and the US and explain 
their differences, I extract three explanatory variables from individual theories 
within the fields of policy process theory, comparative historical analysis, and 
science and technology studies: “preceding policies”, “paradigms”, and “actors 
and actor coalitions”. Each variable is not necessarily derived from only one 
family of theories, and not every family of theories is used to investigate each 
variable. Two out of the three variables are based on theories from more than one 
theoretical approach (see Table 11). Based on these three variables, I formulate 
three propositions about why GM food policy is relatively permissive in the 
United States and relatively restrictive in the European Union. 
 
Table 11: Theoretical basis for explanatory variables 
 
 
Explanatory variables Theoretical approaches 
“preceding policies” comparative historical analysis 
“paradigms” policy process theory 
science and technology studies 
“actors and actor coalitions” policy process theory 
science and technology studies 
 
 
Explanatory variable 1: preceding policies 
This dissertation’s first explanatory variable is based on the notion that 
history is one of the elements that can help explain different policy outcomes. 
This explanatory variable is named “preceding policies” for short, and is 
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understood in this dissertation as earlier policy or policies relevant for and/or 
leading to a current policy area. 
The policy area relevant for and leading to GM food policy for the 
purposes of this explanatory variable is recombinant DNA research policy. 
Recombinant DNA research – and not agriculture or the environment – is 
selected as the “preceding policy area” to be investigated for two reasons. First, 
rDNA research forms the scientific and technological basis for agricultural 
biotechnology. Second, the rDNA technology underlying GM foods is what 
makes GM foods and crops controversial and therefore rewarding to study as a 
policy area. 
This concept of preceding policy draws on historical institutionalism, a 
theory that can be categorized as belonging to the field of comparative historical 
analysis. Important contributions to and discussions of the field of historical 
institutionalism include Immergut 1992, Immergut 1998, Hall 1986, Hall 1993, 
Hall/Taylor 1996, Mahoney 2001, Peters 1999, Pierson 1994, Pierson 2004, 
Rose/Davies 1994, Skocpol 1995, Steinmo/Thelen/Longstreth 1992, and Thelen 
2004. Hall’s work is of particular relevance to my project because it uses the 
historical institutionalism framework to explain public policy outcomes across 
nations (Hall 1986). Thelen and Steinmo comment that Hall is “the most explicit 
on the question of how institutions fit into the analysis of policy making and 
politics within historical institutionalism” (Thelen/Steinmo 1992: 2). 
Historical institutionalism’s first and most basic premise is that “history 
matters”. Its interests include the genesis, change and impact of organizations, 
institutions and public policies (Skocpol 1995). Historical institutionalists often 
strive to explain institutional variance across nations or institutional change over 
time. They find that the “problems (and solutions) that emerged historically are 
what lie behind some of the striking contemporary national differences in […] 
regimes […]” (Thelen 2004: 20). Historical institutionalism is based on the idea 
that “[…] early developments get deeply embedded in a particular environment, 
altering the resources, incentive structures, and hence behaviors of social actors 
[…]” (Pierson 2004: 64). Applied to public policy, this means that “the policy 
choices made […] when a policy is initiated will have continuing and largely 
determinate influence over the policy far into the future” (Peters 1999: 63). 
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A second central assertion found in the work of many historical 
institutionalists is that institutional and policy outcomes can be explained through 
the concepts of “path dependence”, “positive feedback”, “lock-in effects”, and 
“critical junctures”.106 “Path dependence” refers to “self-reinforcing processes” in 
which initial institutional choices are maintained, repeated and perpetuated 
through “positive feedbacks” in order to avoid the costs of reversal (Mahoney 
2001, Pierson 1994, Pierson 2004). This concept of “path dependence” may 
result in a tendency for policies to remain unchanged or to change only 
incrementally for long periods of time. “Lock-in effects” refer to the idea that 
institutions or policies remain locked on one trajectory as a result. “Critical 
junctures” are the historical points in time when institutional choices are made 
and are “the origins of cross-national variation in important institutional 
arrangements” (Thelen 2004: 27). 
Finally, historical institutionalists’ analyses emphasize actors, coalitions, 
power and resources. Thelen writes that her “characterization of institutional 
genesis […] emphasizes a strong power-distributional component [and that it] 
focuses heavily on political coalitions and political conflicts” (Thelen 2004: 32). 
Skocpol agrees that historical institutionalism is about studying political 
processes and outcomes, and therefore about actors agreeing and disagreeing 
(Skocpol 1995).  
Drawing on these main assumptions of historical institutionalism, I 
conceptualize previous relevant policy as an explanatory variable. I suggest that 
“history matters” to explain US and EU GM food policies. The content and 
development of policies in the area of rDNA research are part of the explanation 
for why GM food policies are more or less restrictive. My first proposition reads 
as follows: 
                                                     
106 A similar concept, found within policy process theory, is “punctuated equilibrium theory” 
which sees policy-making as being characterized by long periods of near stasis and only 
incremental change (the equilibrium), and by brief periods of major policy change (the 
punctuation of the equilibrium) (Baumgartner/Jones 1993). 
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Proposition 1: preceding policies matter 
The US’s relatively permissive GM food policy builds on and can be explained 
by relatively permissive preceding policy in the field of rDNA research. 
The EU’s relatively restrictive GM food policy builds on and can be explained by 
relatively restrictive preceding policy in the field of rDNA research. 
 
Explanatory variable 2: paradigms 
The second explanatory variable is based on the assumption that policy-
makers' collective ideas and beliefs influence policy outcomes. I call it 
“paradigms” and define a paradigm as an overarching framework of fundamental 
beliefs about a policy area, which often reaches into other policy domains. The 
theoretical foundation for this concept of “paradigm” is inspired by all three 
theoretical approaches used – policy process theory, comparative historical 
analysis, and science and technology studies. 
In this dissertation, paradigms are explanatory. They are not understood as 
part of GM food policy, the dependent variable to be explained. Unlike policy 
guiding principles contained in policy documents, paradigms are often not 
explicit or apparent. They influence policy at a deeper and more all-
encompassing level than, for example, the “product” versus “process” distinction 
explained in Chapter 3. What is more, paradigms often reach beyond a specific 
policy field and influence others. While the product versus process distinction is 
part of the policy differences to be explained, the paradigms I discuss in this 
dissertation form an independent variable. 
The notion that cognitive and normative elements play an important role 
in establishing what is considered to be true and what is not can be traced back to 
Ludwik Fleck, a historian, philosopher of science and a physician. In Genesis and 
Development of a Scientific Fact, Fleck conducts in-depth case studies on how 
so-called scientific facts come to be viewed as such (Fleck 1979 [1935]). In his 
view, science and scientists are organized into “thought collectives” or 
communities of “persons mutually exchanging ideas or maintaining intellectual 
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interaction” (Fleck 1979 [1935]: 39). A “thought collective” shares a “thought 
style”, which Fleck defines as “directed perception, with corresponding mental 
and objective assimilation of what has been perceived”, that determines “what 
can be thought in no other way” (Fleck 1979 [1935]: 99). Fleck thus introduces 
the idea that certain groups of people perceive designated areas of knowledge in 
particular ways.  
Fleck’s thought style concept has much in common with what physicist 
and historian of science Thomas Kuhn has termed “paradigm”. Kuhn introduced 
the notion of “paradigm” in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1996 
[1962]). He argues that science is not a gradual, cumulative acquisition of 
knowledge, but rather a succession of peaceful periods interrupted by “scientific 
revolutions” that result in one conceptual world being overturned and replaced by 
another. These conceptual worlds are what Kuhn refers to as “paradigms”. He 
describes a paradigm as an “implicit body of intertwined theoretical and 
methodological belief that permits selection, evaluation, and criticism” (Kuhn 
1996 [1962]: 16-17). For Kuhn, a paradigm is an overall framework that enables 
an understanding of scientific phenomena and guides scientific research. 
Science, technology and society studies scholars such as Jamison (1987, 
1991), and Jasanoff (1995, 2000, 2005) have applied concepts similar to 
“paradigm” to policy-making, showing that science and technology policies 
correspond to certain national styles of regulations, and that they are 
constructions based on distinct ways of framing and on individual sets of ideas 
and beliefs. Special domains of inquiry addressed by these authors are the role of 
language, expertise, science, and differing understandings of risk and acceptable 
evidence - all areas that are highly relevant to the case of GM food policy. 
Similar concepts can be found within the fields of comparative historical 
analysis and policy process theory. As a review article on policy process theory 
literature, Surel notes that  there “has been an increasingly important shift in the 
analysis of public policy […] with the development of an approach which 
emphasizes the influence of ideas, general precepts and representations” (Surel 
2000: 495). For example, historical institutionalist Hall, a representative of the 
field of comparative historical analysis, uses the concept of “policy paradigm”, 
making direct reference to Kuhn and adopting his vocabulary. In his paper on 
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macroeconomic policy-making in Britain, Hall defines a “policy paradigm” as 
follows: 
“[…] policymakers customarily work within a framework of ideas and 
standards that specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of 
instruments that can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the 
problems they are meant to be addressing. […] This framework is 
embedded in the very terminology through which policymakers 
communicate about their work, and it is influential precisely because so 
much of it is taken for granted and unamenable to scrutiny as a whole. I 
am going to call this interpretative framework a policy paradigm” (1993: 
279). 
In this definition, Hall mentions that policy paradigms contain the “very 
nature of the problems addressed” and thereby implies that issues are seen in a 
certain light, that they are connected with certain ideas and perceptions. 
An example of the use of the concept of “paradigm” in policy process 
theory is found in the work of Jobert and Muller. In their book L’État en action 
(1987), they coin the concept of “referential” (“reférentiel”107, containing, or 
constituting a reference) as part of their endeavor to develop a theory of “the 
social genesis of policies”. Referentials present “dominant images” of a society 
(“global referential”) or of a specific policy (“sector-related referential”). The two 
types of referential are inextricably linked in that a global referential creates the 
context for sector-related referentials. The existence of these referentials leads to 
a series of “norms [...]: laws, ordinances, procedures, etc.” (Jobert/Muller 1987: 
70).  
Similarly, in their “framework for reflection on intractable policy 
controversies”, Schön and Rein introduce the concept of “frames”, which they 
define as “underlying structures of belief, perception, and appreciation” 
(Schön/Rein 1994: 24). Accordingly, they see policy controversies “as disputes in 
which the contending parties hold conflicting frames” which “determine what 
counts as a fact and what arguments are taken to be relevant and compelling” 
(ibid.). Significantly, “the frames that shape policy positions and underlie 
                                                     
107 Translations from Jobert/Muller 1987 are by the author. 
 115
controversy are usually tacit, which means that they are exempt from conscious 
attention and reasoning” (ibid.). 
A further use of the notion of ideas and cognitive elements in public 
policy studies is found in Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s Advocacy Coalition 
Framework (ACF) (Sabatier/Jenkins-Smith 1993, 1999, Sabatier 1998). The ACF 
contends that the policy process consists of competition among “advocacy 
coalitions” or groups rallying around particular policy preferences within specific 
“policy subsystems”, defined as “the group of people and/or organizations 
interacting regularly over periods of time of a decade or more to influence policy 
formulation and implementation within a given policy area/domain” 
(Sabatier/Jenkins-Smith 1999: 135). 
The ACF supposes that “preexisting beliefs [of individuals within 
advocacy coalitions] constitute a lens through which [individual and collective] 
actors perceive the world” and that “actors in different coalitions will perceive the 
world through different lenses and thus will often interpret a given piece of 
evidence in different ways” (1999: 131). Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith suggest that 
advocacy coalitions are held together by a “belief system” consisting of three 
types of beliefs: a) “deep core” beliefs are “basic ontological and normative 
beliefs”; b) “policy core” beliefs “represent a coalition’s […] normative 
commitments and causal perceptions across an entire policy domain or 
subsystem”; c) beliefs regarding “secondary aspects” are “a large set of narrower 
[…] beliefs”, for example, concerning the seriousness of a policy problem, 
specific desirable regulatory measures, budgetary allocations etc. (1999: 121 et 
seq.). Deep core beliefs are stronger and more resistant to change than policy core 
beliefs, which in turn override beliefs concerning secondary aspects.  
In order to apply the concept of paradigms to explaining GM food policy 
outcomes, Chapter 6 searches for and investigated the paradigms underlying GM 
food policy in the EU and the US. Accordingly, proposition 2 states the 
following: 
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Proposition 2: paradigms matter 
US and EU policies regarding GM food differ as to their level of 
restrictiveness/permissiveness because they are guided by different underlying 
paradigms. 
 
 
Explanatory variable 3: actors and actor coalitions 
The third and final explanatory variable suggests that US and EU actors 
and actor coalitions have achieved different levels of success in supporting and 
rejecting GM food, and that these differences have helped render policies more or 
less restrictive. My analysis of actors’ success levels draws on two different 
approaches containing two conceptions of coalitions:  Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith’s Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) offers the concept of “advocacy 
coalition”, and Hajer’s argumentative approach suggests the idea of a “discourse 
coalition”. I choose these approaches because each contains a different important 
aspect of coalitions. While the ACF addresses the importance of common goals 
and coordinated activity, the argumentative approach emphasizes that successful 
coalitions are bound together by common language and discourse.108 
The Advocacy Coalition Framework (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993, 
1999, Sabatier 1998) portrays the policy process as a competition among two or 
more “advocacy coalitions”, i.e. groups of actors supporting specific policy 
preferences within specific policy subsystems. Advocacy coalitions are held 
together by the system of beliefs described under the second explanatory variable 
(paradigms).109 For Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, advocacy coalitions must 
                                                     
108 I do not suggest that the Advocacy Coalition Framework does not also contain cognitive 
elements, and that the argumentative approach does not consider goals and coordinated activity. I 
simply select from each approach the concepts which are most convincing and useful for my 
analysis. 
109 For my discussion of coalitions, instead of using the Advocacy Coalition Framework’s “belief 
system” concept, I favor Hajer’s somewhat different notion of “story-line”, which adds a more 
cognitive dimension to my assessment of the nature and success of actors and actor coalitions. In 
the ACF, beliefs are clearly defined and a function of rationally formulated interests and goals. In 
the argumentative approach, the causality is reversed: beliefs change and evolve through 
discourse and determine interests and goals. 
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“engage in a non-trivial degree of coordinated activity over time” (Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith 1999: 120). They can include representatives of interest groups, 
regulatory agencies, legislative institutions, as well as researchers and journalists. 
Moreover, The ACF is built on the assumption that actors in advocacy coalitions 
share the same interests, that they are “instrumentally rational – that is, that they 
seek to use information and other resources to achieve their goals” (Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith 1999: 130). In the ACF, actors’ interests and intentions can change 
as a result of “policy-oriented learning”, defined as “relatively enduring 
alterations of thought or behavioral intentions that result from experience and/or 
new information and that are concerned with the attainment of policy objectives” 
(Sabatier/Jenkins-Smith 1999: 123). 
The second approach used is Hajer’s “argumentative approach”, situated 
at the intersection of STS and policy process theory (Hajer 1995, see also 
Fischer/Forrester 1993)110. This approach supposes that issues are constructed 
through the “argumentation” of interest groups. Argumentation consists of 
different discourses, which in turn constitute different groups’ interests, positions 
and cognitive beliefs. Interests can never be assumed as given since the rise of a 
new policy discourse can alter beliefs and interests, and therefore lead to policy 
change. 
The argumentative approach introduces the concept of a “discourse 
coalition”, a coalition based on common language and story-lines (Hajer 1995). 
“Discourse” is defined as 
“a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations that it 
produced, reproduced, and transformed in a particular set of practices and 
through which meaning is given to physical and social realities” (Hajer 
1995: 59-60). 
“Story-lines” are “narratives on social reality through which elements 
from many different domains are combined, and which provide actors with a set 
of symbolic references that suggest common understanding” (Hajer 1995: 62). 
They create discourse coalitions by establishing causalities and ideals of social 
and moral order, by attributing blame and responsibility, and by determining 
                                                     
110 The argumentative approach’s constructivist assumptions point towards an STS approach; its 
focus on explaining public policy and its outcomes is typical of policy process theory. 
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what type of behavior is necessary in the face of a specific problem (Hajer 1995: 
65). Three elements determine which coalition achieves the most influence on 
policy in a given moment: “credibility”, which makes actors believe in the 
implications of a certain story-line, “acceptability”, i.e. attractiveness and 
necessity attached to a particular discourse, and “trust”, which refers to the level 
of confidence that story-lines can secure. When a high level of these elements is 
achieved, a certain story-line can reach “discursive dominance or hegemony”. 
This in turn can influence policy outcomes and lead to “discourse 
institutionalization”, i.e. translation into institutional arrangements and 
policies.111 
The following table summarizes the differences between advocacy 
coalitions and discourse coalitions in terms of their driving forces and methods, 
conscious or unconscious, to achieve their policy goals. 
 
Table 12: Differences between advocacy and discourse coalitions 
 
 Advocacy coalitions Discourse coalitions 
Driving forces • rationally formulated  interests 
• belief systems –  three types of beliefs: 
1. deep core beliefs: ontological/normative, 
2. policy core beliefs: normative  
commitments/causal perceptions within 
policy subsystems 
3. beliefs on secondary aspects: concerns on 
specific aspects of policy issues 
• interests formulated through discourse 
• story-lines: 
“Narratives on social reality through which 
elements from many different domains are 
combined and that provide actors with a set 
of symbolic references that suggest common 
understanding” 
Methods 
 
• goal-oriented use of resources 
• coordinated activity over time 
• aim for credibility, acceptability and trust. 
• if successful, discourse coalitions' story-lines 
may reach discursive dominance and 
discourse institutionalization 
 
In Chapter 7 of this dissertation, I draw on the two described concepts of 
coalitions to determine whether and with what level of success different actors 
supportive and critical of GM foods formed coalitions that have influenced 
policy-making. I use the ACF and argumentative approach in complimentary 
fashion, focusing on the elements from each approach described above. I 
investigate what types of coalitions exist in the US and EU regarding GM food, 
                                                     
111 Jobert and Muller describe a similar process, which takes place with the help of “mediators” 
who connect a “referential” (or paradigm) to a specific policy area by making it intelligible to 
actors within that arena (Jobert/Muller 1987: 71 et seq.). 
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and how successful they are. In line with the elements I choose to focus on, I 
evaluate actors and actor coalitions in terms of their positions and interest, their 
story-lines, and their activities. I formulate the following proposition on actor 
coalitions: 
Proposition 3: actors and actor coalitions matter 
In the US, actors and actor coalitions supporting GM foods are stronger than 
those opposing GM foods, and have successfully pushed for permissive 
regulation of GM foods and crops.  
In the EU, actors and actor coalitions opposing GM foods are stronger than those 
supporting GM food, and have successfully pushed for restrictive GM food and 
crop policies. 
 
Putting the variables in context 
  Several frameworks within the field of policy process theory make 
reference to the importance of explanatory elements that might be termed 
“context” factors. For example, according to Sabatier and Jenkins-Smiths’s 
Advocacy Coalition Framework, the policy-making process in a particular policy 
subsystem can be influenced by factors external to that subsystem. These factors 
can be “external events” (e.g. changes in public opinion, changes in government, 
impacts from events within other policy subsystems) or “relatively stable 
parameters” (e.g. basic constitutional or institutional structure) (Sabatier/Jenkins-
Smith 1999). Similarly, the funnel-of-causality approach used by Hofferbert 
identifies a series of causal variables such as socio-economic factors, institutions, 
and the decision-making process as an intertwined pattern of mutual interactions 
(Hofferbert 1974). A further interesting approach in this context is that developed 
by Birkland, who investigates the importance of “focusing events”, defined as 
sudden, relatively uncommon, potentially harmful, concentrated in a particular 
area or community, and known to policy-makers and the public simultaneously 
(Birkland 1998). 
  For the case of GM food policy in the EU and the US, certain factors not 
addressed explicitly thus far may have a more or less important impact on each of 
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the three independent variables introduced above. These factors, which may have 
an impact on GM food policy, are 
- political system attributes and change (e.g. institutional rules, electoral 
outcomes), and  
- shock events and public opinion: “shock events” are important, unexpected 
occurrences that may have a significant impact on policy and/or public 
opinion and public trust in institutions (e.g. regulatory failures, release of new 
scientific information). 
  Some of the authors reviewed above consider public opinion, in 
connection with shock events, to be central for explaining the transatlantic rift in 
GM food policy. For example, Meins (2003) and Bernauer (2003) lay particular 
emphasis on the role of public opinion or “public outrage” in explaining levels of 
policy stringency. Public opinion is also at the centre of the research undertaken 
by Bauer/Gaskell (2002), Durant/Bauer/Gaskell (1998), and Gaskell/Bauer 
(2001), who treat it as the dependent variable to be explained. Toke (2004) is an 
example of an author who emphasizes the role of a shock event (the BSE crisis) 
to explain US, UK, and EU policy differences.  
  In this dissertation, context factors are not conceptualized as primary 
explanatory elements. They are not necessarily directly related to GM foods and 
therefore not always part of the GM food policy subsystem. Their role lies in 
contributing, sometimes in important ways, to the explanations offered by the 
three explanatory variables introduced – “preceding policies”, “paradigms”, and 
“actors and actor coalitions”. 
  Figure 13 provides a summary of the framework developed in this section 
to explain the transatlantic rift in genetically modified food policy. The 
independent explanatory variables suggested by the three propositions coexist 
within the GM food policy subsystem.112 The context factors described above are 
located outside the policy subsystem. The only causal link that exists within this 
graphic representation of this dissertation’s explanatory framework flows from 
the policy subsystem to GM food policy, the dependent variable to be explained 
                                                     
112 Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith distinguish “nascent” subsystems which are in the process of 
forming from “mature” subsystems that have existed for a decade or more (Sabatier/Jenkins-
Smith 1999: 135). The GM food policy subsystem began forming in the mid-1990s, and can 
therefore be characterized as relatively new mature policy subsystem.  
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in this dissertation. Although this dissertation’s goal is not to explain the 
causalities that link the individual elements, I am attentive to links between 
individual explanatory variables throughout this study, and draw some 
conclusions on this subject in the final chapter. 
 
 
Figure 13: GM food policy differences: analytical framework 
 
 
GM food policy 
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5. PRECEDING POLICIES: FROM RDNA RESEARCH TO ITS 
APPLICATIONS 
 
This chapter presents the empirical results relating to proposition 1, 
suggesting that current GM food policies are a result of similarly oriented 
“preceding policies”. Underlying this proposition is the historical institutionalist 
view that history matters for policy outcomes. As defined in Chapter 4, preceding 
policies refer to earlier policy or policies relevant for and/or leading to a given 
present policy area. In this section of the study, the focus is on the regulation of 
rDNA as the policy area preceding GM food. The time period from the mid-
1990s onwards will be treated in the next chapters. 
The empirical findings presented in this chapter contradict the proposition 
that the US’s relatively permissive GM food policy is a result of relatively 
permissive preceding policy, whereas the EU’s relatively restrictive GM food 
policy is a result of relatively restrictive preceding policy. Instead, empirical 
enquiry leads to the finding that policies preceding GM food policy in the US and 
the EU both laid the ground for a “policy switch” or “policy reversal”, a 
phenomenon that occurred in the early 1980s in the US, and in the late 1980s in 
Europe, and which led to current GM food policies. The US regulated rDNA 
research in a relatively restrictive manner in the 1970s, moving on to a relatively 
permissive GM food policy as of the mid-1980s. The EU, on the other hand, 
started out with relatively permissive rDNA research regulation in the 1970s and 
early 1980s, and adopted a relatively restrictive GM food policy as of the late 
1980s. These policy switches interrupted a “linear” progression from rDNA to 
GM food policy in both the US and the EU. It is now necessary to see how rDNA 
policy brought about these policy switches and if “history matters” in a broader 
sense in the explanation of current GM food policy. 
Gaining an understanding of the paths that led from rDNA research policy 
to the regulation of its applications is to gain a historical appreciation of the 
background to present GM food policies, a goal that studies focusing solely on 
the GM food debate beginning in the 1990s do not pursue. This chapter is 
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particularly attentive to three elements: the role of the scientific community, 
sociopolitical trends, and the content of regulations. 
 
5.1 United States: from caution to confidence 
In the US, the regulatory period in the 1970s that preceded modern 
biotechnology applications, including GM foods and crops, was characterized by 
caution and a relatively restrictive regulation of rDNA research. By the early 
1980s, this approach had subsided, giving way to a more permissive regulatory 
approach, which would remain the basis for GM food regulation in the 1990s and 
into the new millennium. These trends and the switch from restrictive rDNA 
research policy to permissive GM food policy were supported and promoted by 
scientists, society and political actors alike. 
 
From the discovery of the double helix to Asilomar 
In 1953, US scientist James Watson and UK scientist Francis Crick 
discovered the double helix structure of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) at the 
University of Cambridge, UK. Watson and Crick believed that they had done no 
less than discover “the secret of life” by shedding light on DNA, the carrier of the 
code that passes on hereditary characteristics (Watson 1968: 126). In a famous 
sentence in their article published in Nature, Watson and Crick prophetically 
noted: “it has not escaped our notice that the specific pairing we have postulated 
immediately suggests a possible copying mechanism for the genetic material.” 
(Watson/Crick 1953: 738). This sentence implied that the discovery of the 
structure of DNA might potentially revolutionize research in the fields of 
molecular biology and, in particular, genetics. 
1973 brought the next major milestone on the road towards genetic 
engineering. In early 1973, US scientists Herbert Boyer from the University of 
California at San Francisco and Stanley Cohen from Stanford University 
succeeded in inserting genetic information into a bacterium, which was then 
copied when the bacterium reproduced. The success of these experiments opened 
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up the possibility of conducting research with recombinant DNA (rDNA), a 
technique which for the first time made the manipulation of DNA possible.113 
US scientists were thrilled by their new research possibilities, but also 
apprehensive as they began to reflect on the possible negative consequences of 
rDNA experiments. As Watson and Tooze put it, “we began to ask whether in the 
process of possibly discovering the power of ‘unlimited good’ we might 
simultaneously be setting the stage for discovering the power of ‘unlimited bad’” 
(Watson/Tooze 1981: viii). The hazards discussed were conjectural, that is, not 
based on actual evidence. Still, US scientists took it upon themselves to ask a 
series of questions about rDNA techniques, thus breaking with the past scientific 
practice of forging ahead and only “pulling back if we [found] the savages not of 
normal size but of the King Kong variety” (ibid.). Questions raised in 1973 
included not only possible risks with respect to health and the environment, but 
also social and ethical issues. 
Sheldon Krimsky, a scholar and long-time observer of US biotechnology 
policy, underlines that “the path towards setting up guidelines on rDNA research 
was not a linear one. Many events contributed to the process” (interview with 
Sheldon Krimsky, Tufts University, 25 June 2004, Medford, MA). In hindsight, 
certain events particularly stand out. One of these was the June 1973 Gordon 
Research Conference on Nucleic Acids, which “produced the first collective 
response by scientists on the issue of rDNA experiments” (ibid). Participants at 
the conference felt strongly enough about the issue to vote for a proposal 
authorizing conference chairmen Maxine Singer and Dieter Söll to communicate 
their concerns to the National Academy of Sciences (NAS, a consultative body 
composed of eminent scientists) in July 1973. This resulted in the setting up of a 
Committee on Recombinant DNA Molecules, chaired by biochemist Paul Berg. 
In July 1974, this committee published the famous “Berg letter”, expressing 
“serious concern that some […] artificial recombinant DNA molecules could 
prove biologically hazardous” and therefore recommending a moratorium on 
certain types of rDNA experiments until “attempts [had] been made to evaluate 
the hazards and some resolution of the outstanding questions [had] been reached” 
(Berg et al. 1974). As exemplified by the Berg letter, an initiative launched by the 
                                                     
113 For a succinct and useful chronology of scientific discoveries leading up to the rDNA debate, 
as well as their significance see Rogers 1973: 13-40. 
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scientific community, many US scientists reacted with great caution and 
emphasized possible risks of rDNA research. 
Paul Berg’s 1974 letter had called for an international conference to take 
place on the topic of the potential hazards of rDNA research. This led to the 
famous Asilomar conference held between 24 and 27 February 1975 at the 
Asilomar Conference Center in Pacific Grove, California. The objective of this 
invitation-only international conference of about 150 molecular biologists was to 
enable the lifting of the above-mentioned moratorium by agreeing on a statement 
that could serve as provisional guidelines for conducting experiments involving 
rDNA. Krimsky notes that the conference was “an illustration of the application 
of precautionary thinking with respect to laboratory hazards. There were no 
empirically verified risks at that time. It was all hypothetical” (interview with 
Sheldon Krimsky, Tufts University, 25 June 2004, Medford, MA). 
The last day of the conference, described in detail by a handful authors 
(Fredrickson 2001, Krimsky 1982, Rogers 1973, Rogers 1975, Wright 1994) 
produced a document that was adopted to serve as a provisional set of rules by 
the Recombinant DNA Molecule Program Advisory Committee of the US 
National Institutes of Health (NIH), newly created in October 1974, and later 
renamed Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (RAC or NIH RAC) 
(Fredrickson 2001: 26). Krimsky aptly summarizes the significance of the 1975 
Asilomar conference: the “recommendations that resulted from this conference 
established the philosophical and practical basis for the guidelines that were 
issued by the NIH sixteen months later” (Krimsky 1982: 100). 
 
National Institutes of Health Guidelines  
The Recombinant DNA Molecule Program Advisory Committee quickly 
set about drafting guidelines regulating rDNA research on the basis of the 
Asilomar conference’s conclusions. Its first guidelines, issued on 23 June 1976 
and entitled “Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA 
Molecules”114 (National Institutes of Health 1976, “NIH Guidelines” for 
“Guidelines” for short), applied only to federally funded research. In practice, the 
                                                     
114 For a useful summary of these highly technical guidelines, see Norman 1976. 
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Guidelines were adhered to by most privately funded researchers as well, and 
were adopted by a number of US states (Wagner Pfeifer 1997: 148). 
The Guidelines prohibited the deliberate release of rDNA molecules into 
the environment except for small controlled field trials. They defined four levels 
of physical containment115 (P1 to P4, P4 being the most stringent level, and 
requiring research facilities equipped like biological warfare laboratories) and 
three levels of biological containment116 (EK1 to EK3, EK3 being the most 
stringent). Experiments involving rDNA techniques were assigned levels of 
physical and biological containment depending on the types of DNA they used. A 
further element to note about these first NIH Guidelines is their “encyclopaedic 
approach” which involved “trying to envisage every possible category of 
recombinant DNA experiment and laying down for each of them appropriate 
combinations of physical and biological containment” (Tooze 1978). According 
to Watson and Tooze, the criteria used for assigning levels of containment were 
developed arbitrarily and were not based on scientific evidence. They write that 
underlying the Guidelines was the “scientifically unsubstantiated conclusion that 
the closer the evolutionary relationship between humans and the species whose 
DNA was being used, the greater the conjectural hazards” (Watson/Tooze 1981: 
64). Moreover, the NIH Guidelines required certain types of experiments that 
were taking place at the time of the Guidelines’ announcement to be halted and 
destroyed. Mark Cantley, an expert on the transatlantic debate on genetic 
engineering, comments that  
“the creation of the NIH RAC and of its Guidelines was a classic example 
of applying what we now call the precautionary principle in Europe, 
although that language was not used in the 1970s. After a few years, as a 
result, [US regulators] were ready to say: there is no need for new 
legislation. We can handle the technology with existing statutes and 
agencies.” (interview with Mark Cantley, European Commission, 7 
September 2004, Brussels).  
                                                     
115 Physical containment refers to the use of special facilities, equipment and procedures to 
prevent the escape of organisms into the environment. 
116 Biological containment involves the use of organisms that have been genetically altered so that 
they have little chance of surviving a release into the environment. 
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Many US and European scientists judged the NIH Guidelines to be very 
stringent, more so than the rules agreed at Asilomar had been (Norman 1976, 
Watson/Tooze 1981: 65). As a result, US scientists felt at a disadvantage when 
competing internationally. In 1978, Stanley Falkow, a professor of microbiology 
at the University of Washington, vividly expressed this sentiment among US 
scientists in a letter to NIH Director Donald Fredrickson: “It is painfully obvious 
that because of the very restrictive nature of the NIH guidelines, […] American 
biologists can no longer expect to keep pace either with Western European or 
East European science. […] the guidelines adopted by the European community 
and the USSR [the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics] retain a flexibility and a 
scientific reality that is absent from our own” (Falkow 1978). With hindsight, 
however, observers like Mark Cantley praise the NIH Guidelines because they 
“preserved freedom of scientific inquiry while allaying public fears of genetic 
manipulation” (interview with Mark Cantley, European Commission, 7 
September 2004, Brussels).  
 
Sociopolitical context: anti-establishment and environmentalist 
US scientists’ and regulators’ cautious reaction to rDNA research must be 
understood within the US social and political context of the 1970s. When US 
scientists first developed rDNA techniques in 1973, US society was in a period of 
profound social and political upheaval. Among other changes, this period brought 
with it greater distrust of science and the beginning of the US environmental 
movement. 
In the post-World War II era and until the 1960s, the United States was a 
very hospitable environment for science and technology investment and 
innovation. The 1950 establishment of the National Science Foundation (NSF), 
the US’s research funding agency, underlined the importance of science and, 
specifically, provided federal funding for projects in scientific fields. US 
government support for science had increased steadily from 1945 to the late 
1960s (Wright 1994: 21 et seq.). This was in large part a result of the US’s Cold 
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War objective of outdoing the Soviet Union in terms of science and 
technology.117 
The use of the atomic bomb in Hiroshima and Nagasaki to end World War 
II in the Pacific was followed by the race by the US and the USSR to develop 
ever more powerful nuclear weapons. Despite the doubts and fears that 
accompanied these developments, during the 1950s and early 1960s, science was 
largely perceived as “inherently virtuous and as the engine of human progress” 
(Krimsky 1991: 15). Scientists tended to be regarded by government, the public 
and academics alike as impartial, disinterested and non-partisan. Merton’s 
famous “ethos of science” concept, first developed in 1949, illustrates this view 
(Merton 1968 [1949]). Merton described science as a profession different from 
all others by its “ethos of science”118, defined as the “complex of values and 
norms which is held to be binding on the man of science” (Merton 1968 [1949]: 
605). Polanyi’s “Republic of Science” (Polanyi 1962) is a further example 
emphasizing that “the whole outlook of man on the universe is conditioned by an 
implicit recognition of the authority of scientific opinion” (Polanyi 1962: 60). 
Science was also seen as “speaking truth to power”, i.e. as giving policy-makers 
the best possible information to make good policy (Price 1965). 
The late 1960s and the 1970s brought an important change in the status of 
science in the US. These years were an era of great social unrest, a public 
reaction to various social inequalities, especially in connection with race or 
gender, and to government policies (Vietnam War) and scandals (Watergate). In 
the mind of a large segment of the public, scientists, who had enjoyed more or 
less unquestioned authority in the 1940s and 1950s, now became part of the 
objectionable “establishment”, conspirers in war and injustice. 
Scientists themselves participated in this critical stance and questioned the 
authority they enjoyed. As Krimsky notes, “[b]y the 1970s, many scientists were 
influenced by the moral indignations of the Vietnam War and the arms race. The 
                                                     
117 In this context, an event that shook the US and galvanized it to increase its efforts was the 
1957 so-called “Sputnik shock”, when the Soviet Union succeeded, before the US, in sending the 
first satellite ever (named Sputnik) into space.  
118 Merton’s “ethos of science” is made up of “universalism” (impersonal criteria for the judgment 
of science, accessibility to all), “communism” (common ownership of science), 
“disinterestedness” (search for ‘truth’, not guided by financial of other special interests), and 
“organized skepticism” (habit of questioning) (Merton 1968 [1949], Merton 1973). 
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moral responsibility of science became a prominent theme […]” (Krimsky 1991: 
15). US scientist Watson confirms that in the early 1970s, when rDNA 
techniques became accessible, scientists themselves felt the need to control their 
activities more closely: “many academics thought that science was already out of 
control”, a feeling “widely shared” by the public and government (Watson/Tooze 
1981: viii). The result, as summarized by M.E. Jones in her dissertation on the 
early years of US agricultural biotechnology policy, was that, in contrast to the 
1940s and 1950s, in “the case of rDNA, some public interest groups began to 
look to the federal government not only for funding of science, but for protection 
from science” (Jones, M.E. 1999: 39). As a result of increasing public distrust of 
government, the postwar supremacy of science was increasingly questioned. 
Jones described this trend as an “erosion of Public Trust in Science” (Jones, M.E. 
1999: 32). 
At the same time and interrelated with these trends, another powerful 
movement was gaining force: environmentalism, a social and political movement 
directed towards the preservation and restoration of the natural environment (de 
Steiguer 1997, Dunlap/Mertig 1992, Sale 1993). In 1962, Rachel Carson’s “Silent 
Spring” alerted a wide readership, especially in the US, to the impact on the 
environment of chemicals used as pesticides. Carson asked how “intelligent 
beings [could] seek to control a few unwanted species by a method that 
contaminated the entire environment and brought about the threat of death even 
to their own kind” (Carson 2002 [1962]: 8). She also criticized science’s 
“arrogant” goal of controlling nature, and concluded that it 
“is our alarming misfortune that so primitive a science has armed itself 
with the most modern and terrible weapons, and that in turning them 
against the insects it has also turned them against the earth” (Carson 2002 
[1962]: 297). 
By the end of the 1960s and early 1970s, government and public concern for 
environmental problems had grown considerably, and the institutionalization of 
environmentalism was under way. This new consciousness culminated in the 
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National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)119 of 1969 and the creation of the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1970. 
Influenced by this sociopolitical context, the US debate on rDNA research 
consisted of an intense dialogue and search for consensus among scientists, 
political institutions, and civil society on how science and scientific discovery 
should be dealt with in a democracy. This debate was lively during the years 
leading up to Asilomar, and exploded with the announcement of the 1976 NIH 
Guidelines (Wright 1996: 254). Actors involved included not only scientists and 
regulatory agencies, but also the media, the public and many organizations and 
individuals promoting or criticizing rDNA research. Critics and actors taking a 
cautious approach included prominent scientists such as Robert Sinsheimer, 
Erwin Chargaff, and George Wald (all academics), Jeremy Rifkin (leftist 
environmentalist and spokesman for the critical organization People’s Business 
Commission). Other critical actors were Friends of the Earth, Environmental 
Defense Fund (environmental groups), Science for the People (a leftist group 
including scientists), the Coalition for Responsible Genetic Research (scientists), 
groups within the US Congress, and some US state legislatures. Groups and 
individuals emphasizing the potential of rDNA research and therefore trying to 
prevent unduly strict rules included many university departments and scientists, 
for example James Watson and Joshua Lederberg, the National Institutes of 
Health and the National Academy of Sciences. The US media, including 
prominent national newspapers such as the New York Times and the Washington 
Post, as well as popular magazines such as Rolling Stone strongly publicized the 
rDNA debate question, thus calling the public’s attention to the issue.  
The tone of the debate heated up considerably as a result of an episode 
that took place in Cambridge, Massachusetts (MA) during the second half of 
1976, after the first NIH Guidelines had been announced (accounts in 
Watson/Tooze 1981 and Krimsky 1982). Harvard University’s Molecular 
Biology Department was proposing to convert some of its laboratories into “P3 
laboratories”, designed for rDNA experiments considered to be relatively high-
risk by the NIH Guidelines. This plan was ardently debated within Harvard 
                                                     
119 NEPA established a national policy to protect the environment, created a Council on 
Environmental Quality (CEQ), and required Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) for major 
federal actions affecting the environment. 
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University itself, and quickly made it onto the agenda of Cambridge’s City 
Council, which, after a passionate debate in the summer of 1976, declared a 
three-month moratorium on all rDNA experiments. The City Council also set up 
a review board, which determined that all future rDNA experiments would need 
to comply not only with NIH Guidelines, but also with additional rules to be set 
up by the City of Cambridge. The Cambridge events signaled that US states and 
cities would be the ones to regulate if the federal government did not. As 
Krimsky notes: “More than anywhere else, the events in Cambridge dramatized 
the role of public involvement in the debate […] it was the body politic against 
the intelligentsia, the ordinary folk against the elites. There was far more at stake 
than rDNA research. A decision-making apparatus was on trial” (Krimsky 1982: 
298). 
 
Transition into the 1980s 
By the late 1970s, a growing scientific consensus had been reached on 
rDNA. Scientists in the US and abroad had by now had several years to test the 
use of rDNA techniques and had become increasingly convinced that US 
scientists’ initial caution had been overdone. Starting in 1978, the rules for rDNA 
research were progressively relaxed in terms of the levels of physical and 
biological containment imposed. Watson and Tooze remember that the 1978 
revision “marked a significant change in attitude” (Watson/Tooze 1981: 338). 
The Proposed Revised Guidelines of 28 July 1978 stated that “factual bases for 
the greater stringency of U.S. NIH Guidelines [in comparison with other 
countries’ guidelines]” could not be shown and that there was “growing 
sentiment that the burden of proof [was] shifting toward those who would restrict 
rDNA research” (National Institutes of Health 1978). These guidelines contained 
a series of possible exemptions from provisions contained in the original 
Guidelines, and reclassified many experiments within lower containment levels. 
In the early 1980s, these scientific developments gave the US federal 
government the necessary basis to declare genetic engineering to be safe, and to 
announce that comprehensive regulation on rDNA applications would not be 
necessary. The 1984 Proposal for a Coordinated Framework recalled that 
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“In 1974 the National Institutes of Health (NIH) chartered the 
recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (RAC) to provide scientific 
advice and in 1976 developed the NIH Guidelines for Research Involving 
Recombinant DNA Molecules. It was reasoned that a cautious approach to 
this research was essential to assure safety while still fostering the 
advancement of this new technology. […] Experience gained in rDNA 
laboratory research has mitigated many concerns about risk, thus allowing 
modification of the original guidelines and oversight mechanisms” (Office 
of Science and Technology Policy 1984: 50857) 
This new announced policy was part and parcel of a larger political vision 
introduced by Ronald Reagan, who had been elected US President in 1980 and 
who remained in office until 1988. Reagan’s primary goals for the United States 
were strengthening its defense and improving its economy by increasing its 
international competitiveness. One of his methods to achieve this goal was 
supply-side economics, a macro-economic theory and strategy emphasizing tax 
cuts and business incentives in order to encourage international competitiveness, 
and to increase productivity and employment.120 
One of the sectors that benefited from these policies was the 
biotechnology industry. The Reagan administration was particularly supportive of 
this emerging sector for which it saw great potential. M.E. Jones confirms that the 
Reagan administration’s goal was to “develop rDNA into a strong, competitive 
American technology” (Jones, M.E. 1999: 261). Krimsky notes that, supported by 
these policies, “[t]he increase in the number of new biotechnology enterprises 
[…] between 1973 and 1987 was something of a phenomenon” (Krimsky 1991: 
30). He further notes that for the federal government, 
“[e]arly investments were in the techniques and the scientists who had 
control over them, not in the products per se. Viewing the emergence of 
the industry from this point of view, it was irrelevant which products 
succeeded, failed, or met a social need. This was truly a technological 
revolution. The failure of biotechnology was out of the question whether 
                                                     
120 Reagan’s policies were a manifestation of a shift of a large part of the US Republican Party 
towards conservativism. The origins of the post-war resurgence of this ideology, based on 
conservative economic and social policies and values, and later termed “neoconservativism”, are 
usually traced back to Barry Goldwater, a US Senator from Arizona who ran for president in 1964 
on an extreme anticommunist and fiscally conservative Republican platform. 
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or not there were existing needs or favorable markets” (Krimsky 1991: 
31). 
Part of Reagan’s economically conservative vision was that economic 
competitiveness was best enhanced if the market was left to regulate itself as 
much as possible. Deregulation, small government and a “no new law” 
philosophy became guiding principles of US policy in the 1980s. Scholar and 
commentator on the GM food debate Calestous Juma explains that 
"during the Reagan era, there was a clear decision to use existing laws to 
regulate biotechnology instead of creating new ones. New laws would 
have sent the message that biotechnology was creating new products, and 
the Reagan Administration wanted to avoid that impression in order to 
support the biotech industry" (interview with Calestous Juma, Harvard 
University, 25 June 2005, Cambridge, MA). 
For the area of agricultural biotechnology specifically, M.E. Jones writes that 
Reagan “had an intense interest in […] increasing the autonomy and capability of 
the private sector” (Jones, M.E. 1999: 227). In 1984, OSTP stated that its 
regulatory objective was to enable a “coherent and sensible regulatory process, 
[…] intended to minimize […] delays, overlaps and inconsistencies” (Office of 
Science and Technology Policy 1984: 50857). In accordance with these goals and 
preferences, although the late 1970s had 
“yielded over a dozen bills in Congress [on the regulation of 
biotechnology …], no legislation was passed. The White House was very 
active in avoiding that it ever came to a vote” (interview with Sheldon 
Krimsky, Tufts University, 25 June 2004, Medford, MA). 
The early 1980s also brought with them a sociopolitical change. Social 
and environmental protest receded into the background and to the margins of US 
society. After a short but sharp recession in 1981-1982, resulting from combating 
the “stagflation” (high inflation combined with a stagnant economy) of the late 
1970s through an increase in interest rates, the Federal Reserve slashed interest 
rates in 1982 and the US economy picked up in 1983. After years of stagflation, 
US citizens were ready to prosper instead of protest. What is more, the 1970s had 
been a period of intense debate and consensus-building with respect to genetic 
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engineering. US civil society had fought its “DNA wars” and had seen scientists 
and regulators come the conclusion that the risks of rDNA research had been 
overestimated. It was ready to accept the product-based policies that the US 
announced with the 1986 Coordinated Framework, and which will be discussed 
in the next chapters.121 
 
5.2 Europe and the EC: from guarded support to precaution 
A reverse policy switch took place in Europe as compared to the US case. 
In the 1970s and early 1980s, although some European countries adopted 
relatively strict rules on rDNA research, the European Community (the EU’s 
predecessor until 1993) avoided restrictive rules on rDNA research technologies. 
By the end of the 1980s, this guarded and somewhat passive supportive of rDNA 
research had changed into a more active and far more precautionary approach to 
the regulation of GMOs. 
 
European scientists and rDNA research 
The 1973 news that recombinant DNA techniques were possible triggered 
the same mixture of excitement and apprehension in Europe as it did in the US. 
In part because it had not taken place in Europe, however, concerns with rDNA 
methods were less widespread and feelings of responsibility less pronounced. 
Overall, European scientists were less cautious and more reassuring about rDNA 
than their colleagues in the US. The voluntary moratorium recommended by the 
1974 Berg letter drew mixed reactions by European scientists. While some 
welcomed the approach, others felt that it was too restrictive, especially since 
there was no actual evidence of risks connected with rDNA research. Many 
prominent European scientists favored some form of control of the new 
                                                     
121 As documented by several authors (Jones 1999, Sheingate 2004, Cantley 1995), today’s 
permissive, product-based US policy on agricultural biotechnology was not put in place without 
an institutional battle between APHIS and EPA. In essence, the more cautious and process-
oriented EPA, which had the sympathies of many members of the US Congress, lost this 
institutional battle against APHIS, which was more product-oriented and fully backed by the 
White House. As Sheingate underlines, “an alternative outcome [to this battle] would have placed 
U.S. policy on a path that resembles the more precautionary approach in Europe today” 
(Sheingate 2004: 3). According to Jones, the USDA won the battle because “the Reagan 
Administration feared that if EPA were allowed to regulate rDNA, the technology might be 
strangled in its infancy” (Jones, M.E. 1999: 168). 
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technology, but viewed a moratorium as a hindrance for scientific progress 
(“Europeans Divided on E. Coli Manipulation” 1974: 3). Rather than focusing on 
rDNA’s conjectural risks like many US scientists, they underlined the huge 
potential of this new research method. 
The European Molecular Biology Organisation (EMBO), founded in 1963 
in Ravello, Italy, was an especially important voice on the issue of rDNA 
research. At a reaction to 1973 announcement of rDNA techniques and 
possibilities, EMBO took a permissive approach, driven by the conviction that 
since World War II, European countries “suffered from a ‘historical 
backwardness’, a supposed delay compared with the ‘normal’ historical 
development of the life sciences” (Strasser 2002: 546). In particular,  EMBO 
portrayed molecular biology as being “well developed in the United States, but 
not in Europe” (Strasser 2002: 548), and therefore promoted Europe’s 
competitiveness in this field on every possible occasion. As a result, EMBO 
“took a liberal position on the regulation of this scientific practice and 
downplayed the risks of recombinant DNA experiments” (Strasser 2003: 543). 
For example, in February 1976, EMBO stated that it believed the conjectural 
risks discussed in connection with rDNA to be highly unlikely (European 
Molecular Biology Organization 1976). 
The European Science Foundation (ESF), set up in 1974, took a similar 
position. Bringing together European scientists involved in rDNA research, it 
recommended following the more flexible UK guidelines (see below) instead of 
US guidelines, and expected rapid evolution of the field. By 1981, ESF 
concluded that “recombinant DNA work per se entails no significant novel 
biohazards” and that “there is no scientific justification whatsoever for new 
legislation specific for recombinant DNA research” (quoted in Cantley 1995: 524 
et seq.). 
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UK Code of Practice and EC Recommendation 
The “Berg letter” triggered an immediate reaction by the United Kingdom 
government, a pioneer of rDNA regulation within Europe.122 It set up an expert 
committee on rDNA technology in the summer of 1974. This committee issued a 
report on rDNA in January 1975. According to Wright, its “overall tone report 
was one of optimism and reassurance” (Wright 1974: 143). The so-called Ashby 
Report (named after its chair Eric Ashby) emphasized that the moratorium 
triggered by the Berg letter could “be no more than a pause, because the 
techniques open[ed] up exciting prospects for both science and for its 
applications to society” (Ashby Working Party Report 1975: 6.8). It suggested 
that potential risks “would probably be comparable to those presented by 
ordinary pathogens” (Wright 1994: 143). The Ashby report advocated voluntary 
controls of rDNA experiments, but not regulation. The control mechanisms 
suggested included biological and physical containment. 
As a follow-up to the Ashby report, a working party was set up under Sir 
Robert Williams to write a code of practice, which was finalized in August 1976, 
shortly after the NIH’s first guidelines. In this first Code of Practice, the UK took 
a very stringent approach. The Williams Working Party defined four physical 
containment levels, the highest of which was more demanding than the NIH-
RAC’s P4 level. However, the Williams Report was less comprehensive and 
more flexible in the sense that it did not attempt to cover every possible 
experiment in the way that the NIH-RAC Guidelines did. It also recommended 
that an advisory and surveillance body be set up. This resulted in the Genetic 
Manipulation Advisory Group (GMAG), inaugurated in January 1977. 
By 1979, the GMAG had introduced a new risk assessment scheme which 
re-categorized experiments and generally made rules less stringent than the NIH-
RAC guidelines. As Cantley puts it, the GMAG’s revised Code of Practice 
“diminished scientific concerns about overzealous safety committees, 
unnecessary delays, and excess disclosure of ideas to competitors” (Cantley 
1995: 517). During the second half of the 1970s, many European countries 
                                                     
122 The case of the UK is described by Cantley 1995, Gottweis 1998, Watson/Tooze 1981, and in 
great depth by Wright 1994. 
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followed this trend and set up national ethics committees to discuss the question 
of guidelines for rDNA research. Most of them adopted rules based on either the 
UK Code of Practice or on the NIH Guidelines (Watson/Tooze 1981: 305 et 
seq.).  
In contrast, oversight activity at the European Community level was 
relatively modest and took shape late in comparison with the United States and 
individual European countries. This was primarily because the idea of 
harmonizing European national research policies and pooling of resources to 
finance research at the European level was still in its infancy during the 1970s. 
Research policy was viewed mainly as a national policy area. Until the Single 
European Act of 1986, there was no legal basis under the 1957 Treaties of Rome 
to establish a European Research and Development (R&D) policy. Even in the 
late 1970s, “European Community R&D was a very modest affair indeed”, which 
focused mainly on nuclear research (Ford/Lake 1991: 38 et seq.). 
Nevertheless, the European Commission took notice of the issue of rDNA 
research. Its Directorate-General (DG) for Science, Research and Development, 
then called DG XII (now DG Research), took on the issue although it had not yet 
built up systematic expertise in biotechnology. In December 1978, when 
individual countries were already revising their first rules on rDNA research, DG 
XII drafted a “Proposal for a Council Directive establishing safety measures 
against the conjectural risks associated with recombinant DNA work” (Cantley 
1995, Fredrickson 2001). This proposal emphasized the potential benefits of 
rDNA research, as well as the fact that possible risks were conjectural. It 
proposed rDNA experiment notification to and authorization by national 
authorities that would be obliged to develop national categorization systems. 
In the meantime, US experiences with rDNA research had accumulated 
and slowly led to the conclusion that the new technology harbored fewer 
unknown hazards than previously feared. In 1979, US NIH Director Donald 
Frederickson visited Günter Schuster, the Director-General of DG XII in 1979, to 
recount the US experience with the NIH Guidelines. In his memoir, Fredrickson 
remembers having told Schuster that “[in] sum, [he] preferred a simple rule and 
chose volunteerism rather than inflexible regulation” (Fredrickson 2001: 248). 
Fredrickson further recalls that: 
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“[a]t the end of our conversation, I had a distinct impression that the 
Director-General’s convictions about his plan [of a Directive on rDNA 
research] were less certain – perhaps leaning toward seeking something 
less than a directive, perhaps, rather, a recommendation of the Council” 
(ibid.). 
In parallel, within DG XII, a “consensus was developing that some of the initial 
expressions of scientific (and other) concern had been exaggerated” (Cantley 
1995: 519). In 1980, the suggested directive was substituted with a non-binding 
recommendation, approved in 1982. Council Recommendation 82/472/EEC 
suggested notification to national authorities but removed provisions discussing 
authorization by Member States (Council of the European Union 1982). 
 
Bridging the transatlantic science and technology gap 
It was not only the lack of a strong institutional mandate that determined 
the low level of EC activity in the area of rDNA research. The 1970s and early 
1980s were characterized by a focus on “catching up” with the US in terms of 
science and technology. As a result of the effort of post-World War II 
reconstruction, Western European governments could not afford to invest as large 
amounts of resources in science as the United States. Wright (1994) illustrates 
this point for the case of the United Kingdom, and Strasser points out that early 
postwar transatlantic networks on molecular biology were very important for 
European researchers: in circulating “people, organisms, materials and ideas”, 
these networks “made a crucial difference in Europe, where resources were still 
scarce in the years immediately after the war” (Strasser 2003: 541). 
As a result, in the 1970s in Europe were dominated by the idea that 
biotechnology needed to be promoted in order for Europe to bridge the 
transatlantic science and technology gap with the United States. The “starting 
point of a European biotechnology policy was the Commission’s insight […] that 
the Community displayed a technological backwardness with respect to the USA 
and Japan […]” (Nollert 2000: 210). EC-level policy activities regarding 
biotechnology, such as the Commission’s Biomolecular Engineering Programme 
of 1975, were consistently supportive of developing genetic engineering (Nollert 
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2000, Schweizer 1996). For example, the 1983 report “Biotechnology: The Task 
of the Community” focused on reinforcing the biotechnology industry rather than 
controlling it by underlining its problems of fragmentation, shortage of engineers 
and scientists, and lack of funding (Nollert 2000: 212). As a result of this 
sociopolitical orientation, putting in place a restrictive research policy was not at 
the top of the European policy agenda, and public scrutiny did not focus on the 
authority of science.123  
In comparison to the US situation, the European debate on rDNA research 
was therefore limited both in tone and in terms of actors involved. Individuals 
and groups actively involved in the debate were scientists directly concerned by 
the developments in the field of rDNA research, and scientists’ professional 
associations. The European media was less attentive to the issue of rDNA 
research than the US media, and the European public was therefore less informed 
and involved. Watson and Tooze recall that “[b]y and large, […] the debate in 
Europe was more leisurely […]” (Watson/Tooze 1981: 305). From their 
scientists’ perspective, they write that the European rDNA debate moved “not 
only more slowly, but more dispassionately” and judge that it was “easier for 
Europeans to avoid confusing the limited issue with more diffuse and emotional 
ones concerning the uncomfortably current relationship between science and 
society” (Watson/Tooze 1981: 205). 
In contrast to the United States, therefore, a full-blown debate on the role 
and control of science within a democratic society did not take place in Europe. A 
debate was launched in the European Parliament when the Commission submitted 
its proposal for a directive on rDNA research in 1978, but failed to fully develop 
when the proposal was withdrawn. As it turned out, however, the debate was only 
being postponed to the late 1980s.  
 
Environmentalism and the rise of anti-GMO sentiment 
By the mid-1980s, when the EC faced the need to regulate first 
applications of rDNA technology, the environmental movement had already 
                                                     
123 The 1970s in Europe were also a period of social and political upheaval, which, however, did 
not focus on science and technology. The environmental movement was in its beginning stages, 
and would become seriously influential only in the 1980s.  
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become quite influential. In Europe, the beginnings of modern environmentalism 
date back to the late 1960s and 1970s124 (Dalton 1994, Rootes 2003), but public 
awareness regarding environmental issues did not peak until the late 1980s, after 
the nuclear disaster of Chernobyl in 1986. According to Dalton, “Chernobyl and 
its by-products convinced many Europeans that the environmentalists’ claims 
were not mere political rhetoric, and this forced political leaders to respond to 
public demands for environmental reform” (Dalton 1994: 44). 
Since the late 1970s, the environmental movement had spurred the 
creation of “green” parties, which, by the mid to late 1980s were on the rise in 
several European countries. The first green party in Europe emerged in 1973 in 
the UK. In 1979, what was later to become the Swiss green party became the first 
green party in Europe to gain representation in is national parliament. Other 
European green parties followed, with parliamentary representation gaining 
impact and momentum by the late 1980s. Important examples are the Belgian 
green parties ECOLOS and Agalev (now Groen!) and Die Grünen of Germany, 
first elected to their national parliaments in 1981 and 1983 respectively (Bomberg 
1998, Müller-Rommel 1989, Rihoux 1999). 
Several European green parties began to cooperate as early as 1984, when 
the European Coordination of Green Parties was founded. In 1993, it was 
transformed into the European Federation of Green Parties or European Greens. 
Together with the European Free Alliance, consisting of green parties from 
European regions, they make up the European Parliament’s “European Greens – 
European Free Alliance”. European green parties were first represented in the 
European Parliament in 1984. 
The growing voice of green movements and parties meant that the 
environment gained the status of a policy area in its own right. At the European 
Community level, environmental policy began to take shape with the launch of 
the first Environmental Action Programme in 1972. A further important turning 
point came in 1987 with the Single European Act, which added a title specifically 
                                                     
124 For example, issues such as acid rain and nuclear energy were discussed by newly formed 
environmental groups starting in the 1970s. 
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on the environment to the Treaty establishing the European Community 
(consolidated text, 2002).125 
The connection between the rise of environmentalism and both rDNA 
research and GM food policy as political issues was that European 
environmentalists and green parties strongly questioned the need for research 
using rDNA, and for its use in applications. Non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) and green parties forcefully turned against genetic engineering. For 
example, “green” Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) campaigned 
against biotechnology “as an irreversible, ominous way forward” (Levidow et al. 
1996: 137). In short, “environmentalists succeeded in stigmatizing GMOs as an 
abnormal danger” (Levidow et al. 1997: 478, see also Gottweis 1995) and “[b]y 
the late 1980s, the new biotechnology faced a legitimacy problem” (Levidow et 
al. 1996: 136). Mark Cantley convincingly summarizes this phenomenon as 
follows: 
“[Environmentalists] were strategically imaginative. They had vision. 
They saw an opportunity. They saw that they could put forward a proposal 
for legislation [on GMOs], which would oblige the Member States to 
reinforce their environment ministries, which in turn would give those 
ministries the budget and the authority to implement rules nationally. They 
said: if you come to Brussels and vote this through, we all get more power 
and authority ” (interview with Mark Cantley, European Commission, 7 
September 2004, Brussels). 
Member States and the European Parliament as a whole were also 
questioning the need for genetic engineering. In 1986, Denmark passed a law 
banning GMO releases (Danish Ministry of the Environment. Environmental 
Protection Agency 1986). A further example was the German government’s 
commissioning of an in-depth report on genetic engineering completed by the 
German Parliament between 1984 and 1987, which raised many ethical and 
societal questions and polarized the German debate on GMOs (Enquete-
                                                     
125 This title (Title XIX of the consolidated Treaty establishing the European Community) defines 
environmental principles and goals (e.g. preserving and protecting the environment, protecting 
human health, prudent and rational utilization of natural resources), as well as methods to achieve 
them. 
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Kommission 1987).126 A further important signal was given by the European 
Parliament’s Viehoff Report, named after its rapporteur, resulting in a resolution 
demanding a complete ban on GMO field releases until Community Directives 
were in place (European Parliament 1987, Cantley 1995: 543).  
 
Putting in place Directive 90/220 
It was within this increasingly environmentally conscious and GMO-
hostile context that the issue of rDNA research and its pending applications came 
to be regarded and dealt with by policy-makers as an environmental issue to be 
addressed in a precautionary manner. This development stood in contrast with the 
international discussion on the safety of rDNA in food which had reached a 
consensus in 1986 in the form of a report by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) entitled “Recombinant DNA Safety 
Considerations”, and also known as the “1986 Blue Book” (Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development 1986: 42). This report stated explicitly 
that “[t]here is no scientific basis for specific legislation for the implementation 
of rDNA techniques and applications” (ibid.). 
Until the mid-1980s, the question of regulating rDNA and its applications 
had been dealt with primarily by the Commission’s Directorate General for 
Science, Research and Development (DG XII). As the question of regulating 
biotechnology applications became more and more pressing, however, and 
“[p]erhaps anticipating further public controversy”, the Commission designated 
DG Environment (DG XI) to become “chef de file” for GMO regulation from DG 
XII, including the task of drafting a directive on the deliberate release of GMOs 
into the environment (Levidow et al. 1997: 478).127 As a DG that traditionally did 
                                                     
126 On the German case, Margaret Mellon suggests that “deeply rooted opposition […] from 
Germany […] objected to this technology at its core. Germans […] proceeded from the standpoint 
that what had been abused in the past (eugenics during Nazism) was likely to be abused in the 
future” (interview with Margaret Mellon, Union of Concerned Scientists, 9 June 2004, 
Washington, DC). 
127 Within the bureaucratic language of the European Commission, “chef de file” status refers to a 
particular Directorate-General being in charge of a certain policy area, legislative initiative, etc. 
Mark Cantley clarifies that for Directives 90/219 on the contained use of GMOs, DGs III 
(enterprise and industry) and XI (environment) were joint chefs de file, but that DG III in practice 
left DG XI largely in charge of both Directive 90/219 and 90/220 (interview with Mark Cantley, 
European Commission, 7 September 2004, Brussels). 
 143
not focus on policy-making, but rather on the promotion and funding of research, 
DG XII did not contest the removal of its chef de file status regarding GMOs: 
“The culture of DG XII, especially in its earlier decades, was scientific in 
its sympathies and roots. They [DG XII civil servants] were reluctant 
legislators in 1978, glad to retire from such matters in the mid-1980s” 
(Cantley 1995: 669). 
GMO policy observer and scholar Rene von Schomberg128 further notes that 
"it was logical for DG Environment to become chef de file for the GMO 
directive on deliberate release in the late 1980s since the issues to be 
addressed were perceived as being mainly environmental at this stage. 
This development was not contested" (interview with Rene von 
Schomberg, European Commission, 2 September 2004, Brussels). 
Observers of and participants in the development of the EC’s GMO policy 
in the late 1980s argue that the result of this shift in administrative 
responsibilities was very important for the EC’s ensuing move towards a 
precautionary and process-based GM food policy. While DG XII had dealt with 
rDNA experiments as an RTD and competition issue, DG XI saw rDNA 
experiments and applications through an environmental protection lens. 
As a result, in 1990, the Council approved Directive 90/219 on contained 
use, and Directive 90/220 on the deliberate environmental release of GMOs. Von 
Schomberg comments that 
"the passage of Directives 90/219 and 90/220 in 1990 meant the 
introduction of horizontal129 regulation of GMOs. This was an important 
novelty for European GMO regulation, and is one of the main elements 
that distinguishes EU and US policy on GMOs” (interview with Rene von 
Schomberg, European Commission, 2 September 2004, Brussels).  
                                                     
128 In the interview he granted me on 2 September 2004 in Brussels, Rene von Schomberg spoke 
as a scholar and long-time observer of GMO politics, and did not in any way represent the 
positions of the European Commission. 
129 As mentioned in Chapter 3, in this case “horizontal” means referring to GMOs generally, 
instead of relating to a vertical or sector/product-specific area like food, plants, or 
pharmaceuticals. 
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Directive 90/220 was relatively restrictive in that it was process-based and 
foresaw a complex authorization process for field trials and for the 
commercialization of GMOs. These basic principles of EU GMO policy are still 
in place today. 
 
5.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has described the policy phase during which the United 
States and the European Community were faced with the task of regulating rDNA 
research and therefore of creating the policies that preceded GM food regulation. 
It has been shown that today’s US and EU GM food policies build on very 
different regulatory and sociopolitical experiences, and that therefore “history 
matters” in a broad historical institutionalist sense. Proposition 1, however, is not 
confirmed: current relatively permissive GM food policy in the US does not build 
on or derive from permissive rDNA research policy, just as today’s restrictive EU 
policy is not a continuation of previous restrictive EC policy on rDNA 
experiments. 
As this chapter has shown, the opposite is the case. A policy switch has 
taken place, in which the US started out with restrictive policies that became 
permissive, whereas the EU began with a permissive situation that became 
restrictive. On the basis of this finding, it can be argued that the US government 
built on previous regulatory experience with restrictive rDNA policy in 
developing the 1986 Coordinated Framework, which laid down a permissive 
regulatory oversight of its rDNA applications. In contrast, a comparable 
experience did not exist at the European level, and this in turn can be seen as 
having provided the necessary space for the development of restrictive regulation 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
As this chapter shows, the empirical evidence on this “policy switch” is 
complex. Table 13 attempts to summarize its most salient points. The US 
developed restrictive guidelines on rDNA research in the 1970s in midst of an 
intense and wide-ranging public and media debate on the risks and benefits of 
genetic engineering. With the passage of time and increasing confidence that 
rDNA research was not an unacceptable hazard, these rules were relaxed, and the 
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public debate subsided. By the early 1980s, a scientific and societal consensus 
had emerged, which paved the way for later developments. This new era was 
dominated by neoconservative economic and research policies favoring relatively 
permissive regulation of biotechnology applications such as GM foods. 
EU regulation of GMOs builds on very different experiences. When 
rDNA research became possible in the 1970s, the EC was struggling to catch up 
with the US in terms of science and technology excellence and progress, and 
therefore avoided strict oversight of rDNA research, a stance that can also be 
explained by the fact that some EC Member States were themselves regulating 
rDNA research. An incipient European-level debate launched in the European 
Parliament in early 1980 was thwarted when the Commission substituted its 
proposal for a Directive on rDNA research with a non-binding Recommendation. 
In the mid to late 1980s, however, regulating GMOs had become necessary 
because first applications of modern biotechnology were in the pipeline. In 
Europe, this process coincided with the rise of the environmental movement and 
green parties, which in turn galvanized anti-GMO sentiment in Europe. This 
constellation resulted in the process-based and relatively restrictive policies 
which have remained the basis of the EU’s GM food policies into the present. 
 
Table 13: Preceding policies in the United States and the European 
Community 
 
 United States European Community 
1970s anti-establishment sentiment, rise of 
environmentalism 
relatively restrictive NIH Guidelines on 
rDNA research, progressively relaxed 
concern with transatlantic science and 
technology gap 
planned regulation of rDNA research 
withdrawn; Recommendation 82/472 
instead 
1980s supply-side economics, “no new laws”, 
support of the biotechnology industry 
1984 Coordinated Framework: 
applying existing laws to rDNA 
applications 
Influence of green politics and policy; 
skepticism about genetic engineering 
1990 Directives 90/219 and 90/220 on 
GMOs: horizontal legislation and 
precautionary stance 
Summary from restrictive guidelines on rDNA 
research to permissive regulation of its 
applications 
from sparse rules on rDNA research to 
precautionary regulation of GMOs 
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6. PARADIGMS: UNCOVERING UNDERLYING BELIEFS 
 
This chapter discusses and evaluates the role of paradigms, a concept 
introduced in Chapter 4.130 It presents empirical elements that confirm 
proposition 2, which suggests that US and EU GM food policies differ in terms of 
their level of restrictiveness because they are guided by different underlying 
paradigms. 
One of the characteristics of explanatory paradigms is that they are often, 
although not always, invisible to those who are influenced or guided by them. 
They are therefore seldom explicitly articulated. Consequently, my choice of 
paradigms in this chapter has been the fruit of a process, the culmination of 
collecting and analyzing primary and secondary sources, including policy 
documents, secondary literature, and interviews. My aim in analyzing empirical 
data was the identification of paradigms that were comprehensive enough to be 
inclusive, and still specific enough to provide useful explanations for GM food 
policy. 
In the course of my research, I came to the conclusion that two pairs of 
paradigms are fundamental to explaining GM food policies in the US and the EU: 
US GM food policy is relatively permissive because it is guided by the 
“economic competitiveness” and “sound science” paradigms. EU policy, on the 
other hand, is relatively restrictive because its policies are based on 
“environmental and health protection” and “precautionary principle” paradigms.  
The paradigms in question can also be seen as components of more 
general paradigms or worldviews. The dominant worldview in technologically 
advanced societies is often referred to as the “industrial” worldview, which is 
often contrasted with an alternative “post-industrial”, “environmental” or 
“ecological” worldview. In the field of GM foods, the dominant paradigms in the 
US may be seen as components of the industrial worldview while the dominant 
paradigms in the EU can be understood as part of the post-industrial, 
                                                     
130 Chapter 6 builds on an article on the role of paradigms in the GM food policy debate (Ramjoué 
2003). 
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environmental worldview. To the extent that the adoption of the dominant 
paradigms in the EU has been more recent than in the US and subsequent to the 
rDNA debate, it can be argued that the EU has experienced a significant 
paradigm shift where genetic engineering is concerned, whereas a paradigm shift 
has not occurred in the US.   
The extent to which other policy areas in the US and the EU are 
dominated by paradigms that reflect opposing worldviews is a subject of great 
interest but beyond the scope of this study, which concentrates on a specific 
policy area.  
 
6.1 Economic competitiveness versus environmental and health 
protection 
 
US and EU paradigms described 
US policy on GM food and other applications of biotechnology has been 
devised against the backdrop of the larger goal of achieving and maintaining 
economic growth and international competitiveness. Industry in general and the 
biotechnology industry in particular are seen as motors of the US economy, and 
the role of policy is hence to create a secure and predictable regulatory 
environment that will make it possible for industry to operate efficiently and 
productively. Connected with this competitiveness paradigm is a model of 
agricultural growth based on industrial methods (so-called “agribusiness”131). 
This agricultural growth model in turn is intimately linked with geography and 
the economic importance of agricultural exports for the US economy. 
Although EU policy emphasizes the need to strike a balance between 
competitiveness through and protection from biotechnology, the latter goal 
prevails in the case of GM food. The EU’s policy in this area is guided by the 
paradigm that consumer health and the environment should be protected from any 
potential harm from GM foods. As a result, EU policies are relatively restrictive, 
imposing regulations on the biotechnology industry that may hinder economic 
                                                     
131 “Agribusiness” refers to large-scale and capital-intensive agricultural business practices and 
models. 
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competitiveness for the sake of upholding strong environmental and health 
protective measures. The EU’s recent attempt to move away from intensive 
farming to more sustainable forms of agriculture further accentuates the 
protective EU paradigm.132 
It is crucial to emphasize that the described paradigms are an expression 
of US and EU priorities, not an exclusive focus. Both the EU and the US view 
biotechnology as contributing to economic competitiveness, and both aim to 
protect their citizens’ health and the environment. However, the EU and US set 
different priorities and give these elements varying degrees of importance. A 
search for balance is especially noteworthy in European Union policy documents, 
which clearly refer to science and technology as driving forces of the economy, 
but privilege protective and precautionary aspects. The US also strives for 
balance: while prioritizing economic growth and competitiveness, it also attempts 
to protect the environment and consumer health, though as a subordinated goal. 
The strength of the economic competitiveness paradigm is “invisible” in the 
sense that US policy makers do not necessarily think that they are subordinating 
other policy goals to economic competitiveness. They consider their level of 
protection of the environment and health to be adequate. 
The weight given to one or another paradigm in a public debate is of great 
importance and is influenced by the impact of actors and actor coalitions. This 
topic will be dealt with in Chapter 7.  
 
Paradigm manifestations 
The described paradigms appear in primary GM food policy documents, 
and are discussed in secondary literature, either overtly or implicitly. In its 1984 
“Proposal for a Coordinated Framework”, the White House’s Office of Science 
and Technology Policy (OSTP) underlined the Congressional Office of 
Technology Assessment’s recent finding that “[a]lthough the United States is 
currently the world leader in […] commercial development of new 
                                                     
132 Intensive farming or agriculture is an agricultural production system seeking to maximize 
production, using methods such as monoculture, and tools such as chemical pesticides. 
Sustainable refers to a method of using a resource so that it is not depleted or permanently 
damaged. Sustainable agriculture aims to farm in a manner that is efficient and productive while 
conserving and improving the environment and local communities. 
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biotechnology, continuation of the initial preeminence of American companies 
[…] is not assured” (Office of Science and Technology Policy 1984: 50857). 
Accordingly, OSTP emphasized that the “tremendous potential of biotechnology 
to contribute to the nation's economy [...] makes it imperative that [its] progress 
[…] be encouraged” (Office of Science and Technology Policy 1984: 50856).  
Confirming the goals of the 1984 Proposal, the 1986 Coordinated 
Framework sought “to achieve a balance between regulation adequate to ensure 
health and environmental safety while maintaining sufficient regulatory 
flexibility to avoid impeding the growth of an infant industry” (Office of Science 
and Technology Policy 1986: 23302-3). Further analysis suggests an emphasis on 
achieving and increasing economic growth and international competitiveness as 
the greater goal, and a subordination of the goal of protecting the environment 
and public health. In line with the product-based approach, explained in Chapter 
3, the Coordinated Framework established that existing laws would be applied to 
GM food. This decision was justified by the statement that 
“existing health and safety laws [have] the advantage that they [can] 
provide more immediate regulatory protection and certainty for the 
industry than [would be] possible with the implementation of new 
legislation” (Office of Science and Technology Policy 1986: 23303). 
In any case, “[a]ny approach to implementing guidelines should not impede 
future developments in rDNA technology” (Office of Science and Technology 
Policy 1986: 13308). This language indicates that US priorities at that time lay in 
providing a reliable and efficient regulatory environment for the biotechnology 
industry to produce and commercialize GM products in order to promote US 
economic growth and competitiveness. 
A further element connected to the competitiveness paradigm and raised 
by a number of interviewees is that the first commercially successful applications 
of agricultural biotechnology were developed in the United States, and not in 
Europe,133 and that this fact can help explain why US policy is more supportive 
                                                     
133 It should be noted, however, that the methods underlying agricultural biotechnology 
applications were not developed only by industry, nor were they exclusively the result of work 
done in the United States. As recounted by Charles, modern agricultural biotechnology 
applications resulted from the work done in parallel at several research institutions, in particular 
the Washington University of St. Louis in the US (Mary-Dell Chilton), the University of Ghent in 
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of these applications than EU policy. Margaret Mellon of the Union of Concerned 
Scientists (UCS), a US-based non-governmental organization critical of 
agricultural biotechnology134, captures the essence of this argument: 
“this technology is our baby; you regard your own offspring much more 
tenderly than someone else’s. […] The reverse situation would have been 
interesting to watch: what would have happened if it had been European 
companies to develop the technology and bring it to the US?” (interview 
with Margaret Mellon, Union of Concerned Scientists, 9 June 2004, 
Washington, DC). 
In this context, it is also worth mentioning that Europe’s negative reaction 
to GM products can be viewed as being motivated by a wider negative sentiment 
towards the paradigm of economic competitiveness itself, a sentiment that 
manifests itself in a suspicion of large multinational corporations and American 
hegemony. This attitude reflects the European sociopolical context of the late 
1990s and at the beginning of the new millennium, characterized by the 
uncertainties that come hand and hand with globalization. As Geert Ritsema and 
Carmen Olmedo of Friends of the Earth Europe put it, “in Europe, there is a 
stronger suspicion than in the US regarding corporations and corporate influence” 
(interview with Geert Ritsema and Carmen Olmedo, Friends of the Earth Europe, 
3 September 2004, Brussels). According to the personal views of another 
interviewee who preferred not to be identified, 
“the anti-GM movement [in Europe] seems not to be motivated only by 
opposition to a particular technology. It is delivered too passionately to be 
just that. It is motivated to some extent by anti-globalization, anti anti-big 
business sentiment, anti-industrialization of food production, and so on.” 
Similarly, Mellon suggests that “European GM crop and food critics feed not off 
fear of risk, but off fear of hegemony and resentment of American power.” 
(interview with Margaret Mellon, Union of Concerned Scientists, 9 June 2004, 
Washington, DC). 
                                                                                                                                                             
Belgium (Jozef Schell and Prof. Marc Van Montagu), and at Monsanto (Rob Horsch) (Charles 
2001). 
134 Despite its name, the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) is not a scientists’ association, 
although some of its members are scientists. It is a non-governmental not-for-profit organization 
open to all citizens that are concerned about environmental issues. Further information on UCS is 
provided in Chapter 7. 
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The economic competitiveness paradigm underlying US GM food policy 
and biotechnology policy more generally has persisted into the 1990s and up to 
the present day. In 1990, former US President George H.W. Bush’s “Principles of 
regulatory review” (reproduced as annex 1 of Office of Science and Technology 
Policy 1992) stated that “all regulation in environmental and health areas […] 
should use performance standards [setting goals to be achieved] rather than 
specifying rigid controls or specific designs [specifying means of achieving 
results] for compliance” in order to encourage the development of modern 
products by methods that are less costly and effective than traditional methods. 
The US agencies implementing the Coordinated Framework of 1986 have 
adhered to the economic competitiveness paradigm in more or less explicit ways. 
FDA is the most vocal of the US agencies in its implementation of the economic 
competitiveness paradigm. One of the goals expressly stated in FDA’s 1992 
document on “Foods Derived From New Plant Varieties” is “to ensure that 
relevant scientific, safety, and regulatory issues are resolved prior to the 
introduction [ ... of GM foods] into the marketplace” (Food and Drug 
Administration 1992: 22984). This goal illustrates that health and environmental 
security issues are taken seriously, but that they are viewed as conditions for 
entering the market. This accentuates the primacy of the market economy, and 
emphasizes that the main priority is to adapt regulation to industry’s needs. 
APHIS and EPA are less openly concerned with economic issues, as their 
mandates are to oversee agriculture and the environment respectively. However, 
they too operate within the economic competitiveness paradigm. An illustrative 
example was given by Stephen Johnson, Assistant Administrator of EPA’s Office 
of Prevention, Pesticides, and Toxic Substances in 2003 when he testified to the 
US Congress that “EPA had been working with companies and individuals since 
the early 1980s in developing a regulatory approach for pesticide-related 
biotechnology products” (US Congress, House of Representatives 2003a, my 
emphasis). The fact that an agency would characterize the policy process as one 
of “working with companies” indicates that support for the biotechnology 
industry is a key element of EPA’s main mission of protecting the environment. 
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A detailed look at EU GM food policy reveals a serious attempt to 
achieve a balance between the goals of competitiveness through biotechnology 
and protection from biotechnology. Current article 95 of the Treaty establishing 
the European Community (consolidated text, 2002), which forms the legal basis 
for former Council Directive 90/220 and current EP and Council Directive 
2001/18 (revised Directive 90/220), deals with the approximation of laws135 in 
the context of EU internal market provisions. While its goal of implementing the 
internal market is mainly economic in character and therefore stresses primarily 
economic goals, it also mandates “a high level of protection” of the environment 
and consumer health. EU lawyer Christoforou summarizes this search for balance 
in the EU’s GM food policy by emphasizing that the EU seeks to balance 
consumers’ and the biotechnology industry’s interests while trying to foster 
consumers’ confidence in the regulatory process” (Christoforou 2004: 708-9). 
Despite this search for balance, EU policy documents put a decidedly 
stronger emphasis on the need to protect health and the environment than on 
economic competitiveness. While directives and regulations on GMOs and GM 
foods mention the need for harmonization and strengthening of the internal 
market, they more frequently and forcefully mention the need to protect from 
GMOs than to grow economically through them. Moreover, the emphasis on the 
need for environmental and health protection has increased with the passage of 
the Directive 2001/18 on deliberate release of GMOs (European 
Parliament/Council of the European Union 2001), food and Regulations 
1829/2003 and 1830/2003 on food and feed (European Parliament / Council of 
the European Union 2003a, 2003b). 
Council Directive 90/220 (Council of the European Union 1990b), 
negotiated during the mid to late 1980s and adopted in 1990, was the first 
comprehensive EU directive on the deliberate release of GMOs into the 
environment. Its first article states two policy goals. The first is to harmonize 
legislation, which is explained by the EU’s more general objective of integration 
and contains a commitment to economic competitiveness by furthering the EU’s 
internal market. The second goal is “to protect human health and the 
environment” (Council Directive 90/220, art. 1.1). These two goals are 
                                                     
135 “Approximation of laws” refers to the aligning of national laws to be coherent with EU law. 
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unchanged in EP and Council Directive 2001/18, but explicitly refer to the 
precautionary principle (see discussion of the precautionary principle paradigm 
below), an illustration of the trend towards increasing restrictiveness in the EU’s 
GM food and crop policies. Furthermore, both directives must ensure “that all 
appropriate measures are taken to avoid adverse effects on human health and the 
environment [...]” (art. 4.1 in both Directives). The repeated use of this type of 
language is indicative of an underlying environmental protection paradigm. 
Evidence of the protection paradigm can also be found in regulations 
specifically regarding GM foods. EP and Council Regulation 258/97 (European 
Parliament/Council of the European Union 1997), now replaced by EP and 
Council Regulation 1929/2003, showed a relatively strong commitment to 
economic competitiveness through a functioning internal market, but established 
that GM foods must not present a danger for or mislead the consumer (art. 3). 
Regulation 1829/2003 reflects the recent emphasis on the environment and health 
protection paradigm by inserting the explicit objective of “ensuring a high level 
of protection for human life and health, animal health and welfare, [and] 
environmental and consumer interests […] (art.1.a). 
 
Linking competitiveness and protection to agriculture 
The US’s emphasis on economic competitiveness and the EU’s focus on 
environmental and public health protection are to some extent reflected in 
different US and EU models of agricultural growth and “agri-environmental” 
reform trends. The dominant US agricultural model, often referred to as 
“agribusiness”, privileges agricultural industrialization, standardization and cost 
reduction in order to increase profits from agriculture. In the US, agri-
environmental reform, that is the use of environmentally sustainable agricultural 
methods, has always been subordinated to the agribusiness model which has a 
“less public, more managerial approach to agri-environmental issues […] (Potter 
1998: 161). Within this model, GM crops can represent a useful technological 
innovation tool for agribusiness, and this helps explain why US policy 
encourages their use through relatively permissive policies. 
The EU, which like the US has used intensive or “agribusiness” farming 
methods for many decades, has recently attempted to move away from this model 
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of agricultural growth in a more decided way than the US. At least at the level of 
political rhetoric, it currently emphasizes the ideal of sustainable agricultural 
growth, and suggests goals such as taking intensively cultivated farmland out of 
production and focusing on maintaining or reestablishing biodiversity. In the 
context of this new trend, the EU has little incentive to embrace GM crops and 
foods, which are associated with intensive farming practices by the EU public. In 
connection with public sentiment and with the new European ideal of 
environmentally sustainable agriculture, the EU is more inclined to take a 
protective and thus restrictive stance towards the environment in its GM food and 
crop policies. 
As in the case of the general economic growth and protection paradigms, 
it is important to stress that US and EU agricultural growth models are different 
in relative terms, and that they have similarities as well as differences. Since 
World War II, both US and EU agricultural policies have pursued the objectives 
of “feeding a population”, “self-sufficiency” and achieving a sense of 
“community” (Richardson 2000: 78, see also Ingersent/Rayner 1999). In order to 
reach these objectives, both the US and EU farming sectors have widely used 
intensive farming methods widely. 
It should be noted here that the food shortages accompanying World War 
II in Europe had a profound impact on the development of postwar agricultural 
policy in Europe. There was a conviction among policy-makers that Europe 
should be able to feed itself and should be self-sufficient in basic food production 
even if certain foods could be produced more cheaply in other countries, such as 
the US or Canada, particularly suited to cost-effective production of grains. The 
European Economic Community (EEC), later followed by the EC and the EU, 
therefore followed an agricultural policy in which cost issues were balanced 
against a wide range of other social and historical considerations.  The US, which 
often accuses the EU of protectionism in the area of trade, is insufficiently aware 
of the importance of these issues in shaping policies in Europe. 
The EU and the US began to recognize the need for agri-environmental 
reform in the late 1970s (Potter 1998, Richardson 2000). In the United States, this 
realization resulted in the innovative Conservation Title of the 1985 Farm Act, 
which focused mainly on subsidizing farmers engaging in soil conservation and 
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was hailed as a “magic bullet” that could “save soil, cut production, and support 
farmers’ incomes” (Potter 1998: 61). The problem with its co-called 
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) was the wide degree of discretion that it 
granted during the implementation phase. In essence, it was seen by many to be a 
farmer subsidy scheme rather than a soil conservation program (Potter 1998: 70 
et seq.). The 1990 Food, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act achieved a 
broadening of agri-environmental goals from soil conservation to irrigation, 
reforestation and other environmental issues, but the mid-1990s brought 
agricultural policy’s focus back onto soil and production. As Conservation 
Reserve Program contracts expired, a significant proportion of CPR land was 
returned to production (Potter 1998: 78). The 1990s trend towards increasing 
world trade liberalization brought about the Federal Agricultural Improvement 
and Reform Act of 1996, which decoupled the level of subsidies from the level of 
from production, thus introducing a “flexibility that encouraged area shifts 
towards crops where yield-improving GMOs were entering commercial use” 
(mainly corn and soybeans) (Haniotis 2001: 172). This trend was reversed in 
2002 by the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act, which once again coupled 
subsidies to production, but also increased expenditure for environmental 
protection. 
As this snapshot of American farm and agri-environmental policy shows, 
environmental goals were never central to agricultural policy reform, but merely 
a by-product. Even the 1985 Conservation Title, which was viewed at the time as 
being revolutionary, in the end subordinated conservation to income maintenance 
(Potter 1998: 156). 
In the EU, agri-environmental reform was announced some years later 
than in the US as part of the 1992 reforms of the EU’s Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP). The overall goal of CAP reform was to make agriculture more 
sensitive to market forces by decoupling subsidies from production levels and 
thus decreasing output. The 1992 reform contained a series of measures 
encouraging environmentally friendly agriculture including farming practices 
reducing pollution, environmentally friendly land use and management, and the 
setting aside of agricultural land (Bruckmeier/Wiking 2002: 15). The underlying 
idea was to recognize “farmers as potential producers of the countryside” and to 
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subsidize “them for the environmental services they provided” (Potter 1998: 
156). 
According to the authors of the 1992 reform, it represented no less than a 
“renegotiation of the social contract between farmers and the state” (Potter 1998: 
156). However, the implementation of these reforms has produced mixed results. 
A positive result in agri-environmental terms is that, in terms of rhetoric, “EU 
emphasis is [now] not on increased quantity, but on enhanced quality” (Haniotis 
2001: 173). On the downside, “[…] there is still no breakthrough in the 
conversion of intensified agriculture” and “no clear and coherent trend towards 
sustainable development in the near future” (Bruckmeier/Wiking 2002: 40, 42). 
Despite this mixed result, it can be concluded that on balance, the EU’s attempts 
to pursue environmentally friendly agricultural policies have been more 
consistent and somewhat more successful than has been the case in the United 
States. 
Most importantly, in Europe, the ideal of reinforcing sustainable farming 
and of linking agricultural and environmental policies, has gained popularity over 
the last decade or so. Europeans increasingly appear to care about the process of 
agricultural production, just like they care about the process of production of 
food. Karin Ricker adds to this consideration the personal opinion that 
“Europeans are willing to make personal sacrifices for the environment. I 
believe Americans would object to this, because it goes against the 
concept of pursuit of personal happiness and freedom” (interview with 
Karin Ricker and Edmundo Garcia, Jr., Food and Drug Administration, 10 
June 2004, Washington, DC).136 
Hayden Milberg of the National Corn Growers Association (NCGA) further 
explains that 
“US and EU citizens have two different viewpoints on what agriculture is, 
and how it can and should serve the greater public good. There is a 
perspective in the United States that farming is primarily for food 
production, whereas the European view of farming is more complex, 
                                                     
136 Ricker emphasizes that this is a personal opinion in no way connected with official FDA 
positions. 
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including other social benefits that are not quantifiable” (interview with 
Hayden Milberg, NCGA, 9 June 2004, Washington, DC). 
These comments reflect different conceptions of the “social contract” or balance 
of rights and obligations that should exist between the state and its citizens. In 
general terms, Europeans are willing to make sacrifices for the good of society as 
a whole in exchange for public support in areas such as health services, welfare, 
employment, education, etc. In comparison, Americans are less apt to request less 
social protection and support from the state, but they expect individual freedom 
and economic opportunity. 
A further element to mention are Europeans’ and US Americans’ different 
perceptions of what food and food quality means (Echols 1998). Food in the US 
is primarily seen as a commodity that must be safe and nutritious. Jeffrey Barach 
of the Food Products Association (FPA) suggests that 
“sometimes Americans look at food as just fuel – ‘just fill the tank and go 
on with the next event’, whereas Europeans maybe have more of an 
interest in the many social aspects of food […]. Not that Americans don’t, 
but it seems to be more of a priority all the time for Europeans […]” 
(interview with Jeffrey Barach, Food Products Association, former 
National Food Processors Association, 15 June 2004, Washington, DC). 
Indeed, while nutrition and safety are important aspects for Europeans, 
too, quality has a wider-ranging meaning for them. Food is an expression 
of culture and tradition in Europe. Thus, Europeans seek food quality in 
production methods (e.g. food made following a traditional recipe) or in 
food originating from a specific region of Europe where its production is 
traditional. They also value foods that are relatively unprocessed, and 
foods that have been produced by “natural” or “organic” methods. 
Specialty wines, cheese, and meats are a few examples of the many 
products that receive particular attention in these respects. 
By extension, in Europe, GM food is perceived as the ultimate result of 
intensive agriculture and therefore is considered unnatural. It does therefore not 
qualify as a high quality food. Austrian Member of the European Parliament 
Karin Scheele suggests that Europeans are not inherently more skeptical of GM 
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foods than Americans because of sock events such as the BSE crisis (described in 
Chapter 2. Instead, “European consumers are more emancipated, environmentally 
conscious, and aware of the issue of genetic engineering than Americans” 
(interview with Karin Scheele and Sigrid Semlitsch, European Parliament, 7 
September 2004, Brussels. In summary, as one observer notes, GMOs “challenge 
traditional European ideas about food” (Richardson 2000: 81).137 
To a certain extent, different agricultural growth models are also the result 
of structural and economic factors that transcend politics. Geography is one of 
these factors. The area of arable land is far greater and more continuous in the 
United States than is the case in countries of the European Union. Hayden 
Milberg of the NCGA observes that 
“the US and Europe have different scales of production. You can see it in 
the size of farm machinery: farm machinery in the United States is large 
in comparison with European equipment because of different farm and 
plot sizes” (interview with Hayden Milberg, NCGA, 9 June 2004, 
Washington, DC). 
The wide, flat expanses of land in the American Midwest are well-suited for large 
farms and intensive cultivation of crops such as corn, soybeans and wheat, and 
are far away from main US cities. There are clear geographical divisions between 
the part of the US that is farmed, and the urban centers and suburbs, where most 
US Americans live. As one Margaret Mellon of the Union of Concerned 
Scientists summarizes the situation, 
“In the US, most people live on the two coasts, and agriculture is 
somewhere else. People don’t see it, so when you talk about risks, they 
are not in anybody’s back yard” (interview with Margaret Mellon, Union 
of Concerned Scientists, 9 June 2004, Washington, DC). 
US soybean and corn producing states are Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas 
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, and South Dakota. Cotton is grown in the 
South and West of the US, for example in Georgia, Mississippi, Tennessee, 
                                                     
137 Some actors within the GM food debate do not share this point of view. For example, Friends 
of the Earth Europe maintains that "US citizens care about their food just as much as Europeans. 
The main difference is that they don't know about GMOs" (interview with Geert Ritsema and 
Carmen Olmedo, Friends of the Earth Europe, 3 September 2004, Brussels). 
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Texas, and California, and in some Midwestern states such as Kansas and 
Missouri.  
European farms, on the other hand, are more numerous, on average 
smaller (Richardson 2000: 78), and less concentrated in specific areas. Roxane 
Feller of the Committee of Professional Agricultural Organisations in the 
European Union and General Confederation of Agricultural Co-operatives in the 
European Union (COPA-COGECA) notes that 
“In contrast with US agriculture, European agriculture is more family-
farm oriented. We do not have the wide expanses of grain fields that the 
US does. In Europe, dimensions and approaches are both on a more 
human scale. Perhaps the European farmer is closer to the consumer than 
the US farmer and is therefore more aware of his concerns” (interview 
with Roxane Feller, Committee of Professional Agricultural 
Organisations in the European Union and General Confederation of 
Agricultural Co-operatives in the European Union (COPA-COGECA), 14 
September 2004, Brussels). 
In Europe, main intensive grain-growing farming areas are found in the Eastern 
part of England, Northern France, and in parts of Belgium, Germany, Denmark 
and Spain. Main producers of crops including wheat and corn are France, 
Germany, the UK, and Spain. Very few soybeans are grown in Europe. 
As a result, in the US, land to be used for agriculture and land to be 
protected by environmental policies are conceptually divided. In Europe, such a 
division is impossible in most farming areas, which are a heterogeneous mixture 
of farmland, areas protected for conservation, towns and recreational areas. 
Moreover, population density is generally much higher in EU farming areas than 
is the case in the US since they are closer to towns and cities. According to 
Levidow,  
“[a]lthough European agriculture also uses chemical-intensive methods, it 
is widely regarded as an integral part of the environment, i.e. as an 
aesthetic landscape, an element of local heritage, and wildlife habitat […] 
U.S. farms are seen as analogous to factories and are sharply demarcated 
from wilderness and nature conservation areas. “ (Levidow 1999b: 20). 
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The US’s relative preference for the “agribusiness” model should also be 
seen within the wider context of trade. Revenue from corn and soybean trade is 
much more important for the US than for the EU. The US produces and exports 
far more corn and soybeans (GM and non-GM varieties) than the EU. In 2004, 
the US produced 298 million metric tons of corn and 85 million metric tons of 
soybeans while the EU produced 53 million metric tons and 0.8 million tons 
respectively (Food and Agriculture Organization FAOSTAT database). On 
average, over the past decade, the US exported one quarter to one third of its corn 
and 30 to 40% of its soybeans (US Department of Agriculture, Foreign 
Agricultural Service Statistics for Bulk, Intermediate, and Consumer Oriented). 
Its revenue from export of bulk commodities such as corn and soybeans to the 
EU is considerable. Within this context, and given the geographical features of 
the American Midwest, it makes sense from a purely economic standpoint for the 
US to use GM crop varieties: the US experienced “a strong supply push that 
encouraged [its] development of agricultural biotechnology” (Haniotis 2001: 
173). 
However, the increased use of GM seed varieties from the mid-1990s 
onwards did not taken into account the negative reaction of the European public. 
The blow that US exports of corn and soybeans to Europe has suffered over the 
past years as a result is an indication of how important agricultural exports to 
Europe are for the US (see Table 14). Before the facto moratorium came into 
effect in 1999, 4.7% of US corn exports and 32% of US soybeans went to the EU. 
In 1999, these numbers had sunken to 0.3% and 22.8% respectively and have 
remained low since. The lifting of the moratorium in 2004 is not yet reflected in 
trade figures, and might not be for some time in the light of remaining Member 
State disagreements over GM foods. For the US, this reduction in export volume 
has meant a considerable cut in revenue from trade. Its revenue from corn sales to 
the EU has been reduced from over US$392 million in 1996 to just under US$9 
million in 2004. Soybean sales to the EU have gone from over US$2.3 billion in 
1996 to about US$863 million in 2004. EU revenue from export of corn and 
soybeans to the US is negligible in comparison (well under US$100,000 most 
years for both corn and soybeans, as of 1996). 
In conclusion, revenue from trade, in particular from crops such as corn 
and soybeans are of great importance for the US. As a result, “US policies tend to 
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be […] supply-driven” and “encourage production flexibility and export” 
(Haniotis 2000: 84). This is one part of the explanation for permissive US 
policies regarding GM crops. 
 
Table 14: US corn and soybean production, total exports, exports to the EU 
 
  Corn Soybeans 
1996 Production $25,250,000,000 $17,490,000,000 
 Total exports 1996 $8,404,170,000 
(33.3% of production) 
$7,324,455,000 
(41.9% of production) 
 Exports to the EU $392,672,000 
(4.7% of exports; 
1.5% of production) 
$2,340,311,000 
(32.0% of exports; 
13.4% of production) 
1999 Production $17,100,000,000 $12,290,000,000 
 Total exports  $4,924,202,000 
(28% of production) 
$4,531,580,000 
(36.9% of production) 
 Exports to the EU $15,053,000 
(0.3% of exports; 
0.09% of production) 
$1,032,860,000 
(22.8% of exports 
8.4% of production) 
2004 Production $23,020,000,000 $17,750,000,000 
 Total exports $5,740,716,000 
(24.9% of production) 
$6,672,115,000 
(37.6% of production) 
 Exports to the EU $8,945,000 
(0.2% of exports; 
0.04% of total production) 
$863,121,000 
(12.9% of exports; 
4.9% of production) 
 
Source: (US Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service. Statistics for Bulk, 
Intermediate, and Consumer Oriented) 
Note: All figures are in US$ and based on the European Union of 15 EU Member States before 
enlargement to 25 Members in 2004. 
 
 
6.2 Sound science versus precautionary principle 
 
US and EU paradigms described 
A second fundamental paradigm difference lies in US and EU perceptions 
of the capacity of science to deal with uncertainty, and, by extension, in how 
potential risks connected with GM foods are defined and addressed. 
The United States bases its GM food policy on the so-called “sound 
science principle” or “science-based approach”, a strong and unwavering faith in 
science's capacity to furnish unequivocal information and establish clear answers. 
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This in turn supposes that science and scientific expertise can and do deliver the 
uncontestable evidence necessary to make sound policy decisions. In the case of 
agricultural biotechnology, this principle has led to regulators’ perceived 
certainty that GM foods do not pose significant risks, and that a narrow definition 
of risks connected to GM foods is acceptable. It is supposed that GM foods pose 
no significant risk until proven otherwise, for example by consumers or by a 
demonstrated impact on the environment. This approach makes a relatively 
permissive GM food policy possible.  
The European Union also abides by the sound science principle, but 
introduces an important caveat by also basing its GM food policy on the 
precautionary principle. The idea behind this is that “sound science” as a 
principle alone may not always suffice, and that scientific certainty may not 
always be achievable. The precautionary principle states that lack of scientific 
information and certainty shall not stop measures from being taken to prevent 
potential hazards. The EU views the area of GM foods as one of scientific 
uncertainty, and therefore assumes that GM products may be hazardous until 
proven safe. As will be explained more fully below, this in turn is connected with 
the fact that the definition of potential risks attributed to GM foods is fairly wide. 
A relatively restrictive GM food policy is necessary to conform to this paradigm. 
Empirical evidence suggests that the “sound science” and “precautionary 
principle” paradigms are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, in the case of GM food, 
both the US and the EU believe in the power of science to furnish a sound basis 
for policy-making, and both also emphasize the need for precaution where 
appropriate. The US, however, shows a strong tendency to accept the current 
level of information on potential risks as adequate, while the EU is not satisfied 
by the available body of knowledge and thus mandates a precautionary approach 
until further scientific information becomes available. 
 
Paradigm manifestations 
The US’s sound science paradigm can be illustrated by policy documents 
on GM foods from the beginning of regulation in this area until today. In 1984, 
OSTP attributed the US’s leadership in the area of biotechnology to “a strong 
science base” and underlined the goal of creating a regulatory process “based on 
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the best available scientific facts […]” (Office of Science and Technology Policy 
1984: 50856-7). In the 1986 Coordinated Framework, OSTP ruled out process-
based regulation, affirming that “there is no scientific basis for specific legislation 
for the implementation of rDNA technology and applications” (Office of Science 
and Technology Policy 1986: 23308). This kind of language reveals the 
perception that “best science” and “scientific facts” are indeed available to furnish 
necessary information and answers to policy-makers. 
Policy based on this principle can be understood as “a means of asserting 
that science alone, not politics or values, [is] the basis of setting policy” 
(Krimsky/Murphy 2001: 5). Moreover, this “belief in the rationality of science” 
leads to science being “used as an important instrument for legitimating 
government decisions” (König 2002: 73). Skeptics of the approach note that the 
result may be “junk science”, which aims “to protect and defend strongly held 
values, [while] the arguments are cast in the guise of scientific debate (Sundlof 
2000: 139). Similarly, Krimsky and Murphy suggest that US regulatory agencies 
use the sound science principle to make “discretionary choices” 
(Krimsky/Murphy 2001: 39). 
After the US’s initial biotechnology policy had been developed in the 
early 1980s, the sound science principle and reliance on scientific expertise was 
reiterated on many occasions. For example, the White House endeavored to 
reinforce “the strength of science-based regulation” in a press release in 2000 
regarding a series of recent food and agricultural biotechnology initiatives: 
“The US regulatory approach to agricultural biotechnology applies 
principles of sound science to ensure that there are no unacceptable human 
health and environmental risks. This system [...] has resulted in rigorous 
scientific review of products, while providing a predictable regulatory 
environment that fosters scientific advancement and product innovation” 
(White House 2000). 
Also in 2000, in a speech entitled “making good on biotechnology’s 
global potential” and focusing on food safety, Undersecretary of State Alan 
Larson not only emphasized that the US food safety system is based on sound 
science, but also wished for the worldwide adoption of this model. He 
particularly deplored the “particular struggle in Europe”, marked by “undue and 
 164
unscientific fears of new technology and a paralysis in science-based food safety 
approvals and regulations”. He further stated that “[d]espite early positive efforts 
by some European authorities, political parties and governments now invoke the 
so-called ‘precautionary principle’ to justify decisions that have no scientific 
foundation” (Larson 2000). This type of rhetoric suggests the conviction that the 
US’s sound science principle is the best regulatory approach, and that any 
diversion from it is irrational. 
As suggested above, the EU’s policies are also based on sound science. 
However, the EU tries harder than the US to achieve a balance, in this case 
between the goal of achieving an acceptable level of scientific certainty and the 
need to deal with scientific uncertainty. In summary, the EU is dedicated to 
“creating a science-based and comprehensive regulatory framework based on the 
precautionary principle” (Christoforou 2004: 708-9). According to Christoforou, 
this potentially contradictory goal is partly connected to new doubt regarding the 
sound science paradigm: “the positivist view of science, considering it to be a 
powerful and neutral tool capable of predicting risk and causality […], seems to 
be no longer valid” (Christoforou 2004: 686). As will be discussed below, the 
GM food debate in Europe goes beyond narrow risk considerations to include 
social, cultural and ethical issues. Therefore, the need for non-scientific expertise, 
for example farmers’ expertise, is increasingly valued and trusted (Heller 2002). 
This trend is not motivated by distrust of science per se. As mentioned earlier, the 
rise of globalization and the power of multinationals have led to increased 
suspicion that industry and its supporters inside and outside government may 
manipulate scientific information for their own benefit. 
The German “Vorsorgeprinzip”, introduced in Germany’s environmental 
policy in the 1970s, is habitually identified as the precautionary principle’s 
forerunner (König 2002: 69). Since that time, the precautionary principle has 
been prescribed, defined and referred to in various forms by several international 
bodies. It was explicitly recognized in 1992 by the United Nations (UN) 
Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro for the case of 
environmental policy in a generally accepted definition: 
“In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be 
widely applied by states according to their capabilities. Where there are 
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threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty 
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to 
prevent environmental degradation” (United Nations General Assembly 
1992: Principle 15). 
The idea that precaution and prevention are necessary if scientific 
evidence is inconclusive has been widely applied at the EU-level, in particular 
with regard to the environment. It was first introduced at the European 
Community level by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on European Union). 
Consequently, the consolidated Treaty establishing the European Community 
mentions the precautionary principle under its section on EU environmental 
policy: 
“Community policy on the environment shall aim at a high level of 
protection taking into account the diversity of situations in the various 
regions of the Community. It shall be based on the precautionary principle 
and on the principles that preventive action should be taken, that 
environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source and that 
the polluter should pay” (Treaty establishing the European Community, 
consolidated text, 2002, art. 174.2). 
In 2000, the European Commission published guidelines for the principle’s 
application to EU policies. These guidelines stated that in the EU, the 
precautionary principle can cover those instances 
“where scientific evidence is insufficient, inconclusive or uncertain and 
 there are indications through preliminary objective scientific evaluation 
that there are reasonable grounds for concern […] (European Commission 
2000d: 10). 
The precautionary principle entered into GMO and GM food regulation implicitly 
even before these the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 introduced the concept into the 
Treaty establishing the European Community. Council Directive 90/220, 
approved in 1990, mentioned that “Community action relating to the environment 
should be based on the principle that preventive action should be taken” where 
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necessary (Council Dir. 90/220: preamble).138 After GM foods and crops entered 
the commercial phase in the mid-1990s, controversy intensified and led to further 
emphasis on precautionary aspects of GM food policy (Levidow/Carr/Wield 
2000: 189). Rene von Schomberg summarizes this development as follows: 
"EU policy on GMOs has become increasingly precautionary from 1990 
until today. The original version of Directive 90/220 contained the basis 
for this precautionary dimension, but focused on direct effects of GMOs, 
while Directive 2001/18 also addresses indirect and delayed effects, and 
even can take into account long term effects. This change has occurred 
because of both public discussion and scientific deliberation on risk over 
the past years. It has led to new measures in consistency with the 
precautionary principle being introduced such as mandatory labeling, post-
market monitoring, and traceability" (interview with Rene von 
Schomberg, European Commission, 2 September 2004, Brussels). 
The EU’s current policy on GMOs and GM food makes explicit reference 
to the precautionary principle. EP and Council Directive 2001/18 recalls that 
under the Treaty on the European Union, “action by the Community relating to 
the environment should be based on the principle that preventive action should be 
taken” (preamble 6). Moreover, one of the general obligations of the Directive is 
that 
“Member States shall, in accordance with the precautionary principle, 
ensure that all appropriate measures are taken to avoid adverse effects on 
human health and the environment which might arise from the deliberate 
release or the placing on the market of GMOs” (art. 4.1). 
The precautionary principle paradigm has been both praised and 
criticized. For example, Myhr and Traavik support the precautionary principle by 
suggesting that the “obvious lack of data and insufficient information calls for the 
application of the precautionary principle” and that this may “provide the best 
                                                     
138 Levidow et al. note that as a result of its precautionary approach, “[s]oon after its enactment, 
[this] directive was […] attacked as ‘irrational’ by some industry lobbyists.” Therefore, 
“subsequently, the European Commission redefined environmental goals “in market terms”, that 
is with more of an emphasis on economic growth. According to Levidow et al. this was a sign that 
the “precautionary potential of Directive 90/220 was coming under pressure”. It was much 
debated by Member States during the implementation phase of Council Directive 90/220 
(Levidow et al. 1997: 481, see also Levidow et al. 1996). 
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opportunity to narrow uncertainty about health and environmental cause and 
effects” (Myhr/Traavik 2001: 74). Critics of the precautionary principle such as 
Morris contend that the precautionary principle, as used by the EU, is “likely to 
lead to arbitrary restrictions on international trade” and “irrelevant objections by 
interest groups who “raise unnecessary fears” (Morris 2002: 59). Further 
criticism comes from Marchant who characterizes the precautionary principle as 
“a policy and intellectual cul-de-sac” that, because it is ambiguous and arbitrary, 
does not provide “a legal standard for environmental decision-making” 
(Marchant 2002: 44). De Sadeleer confirms that the precautionary principle’s 
legal status is extremely vague and malleable, despite widespread reference to it 
in laws and regulations (de Sadeleer 2001).139 
Contrary to what is often said and believed, the EU does not apply the 
precautionary principle to all policy areas as it does to GM foods and crops. Nor 
is the United States consistently as adverse to precautionary measures as it is in 
the case of agricultural biotechnology. Calestous Juma underlines that “The 
current striking differences between EU and US regulation are specific to GMOs. 
For example, the EU's regulation of pharmaceuticals is more permissive than that 
of the US” (interview with Calestous Juma, Harvard University, 25 June 2004, 
Cambridge, MA). 
Vogel (2001) and Löfstedt/Vogel (2001) have identified a change over 
time or an “exchange of regulatory systems” on health and environmental issues 
(Löfstedt/Vogel 2001: 399 et seq.). They suggest that the EU was less 
precautionary from the 1960s to the 1980s than it is today, and that the US was 
more precautionary during that period than it is today. The main reason for this 
finding is “the emergence of a new European approach toward risk regulation” 
(Vogel 2001: 18) resulting from the rise of a risk averse and public health-
oriented civic culture, the growing regulatory role of the EU, and a series of 
regulatory failures such as BSE. 
Wiener and Rogers (2002) investigate a broader sample of policy areas 
and find that the EU appears to be more precautionary than the US in some cases 
(e.g. GMOs, hormones in beef, toxic substances, climate change, guns, 
                                                     
139 On the wide range of possible interpretations of the precautionary principle, see Sunstein 2004, 
as well as Dratwa (2002), who describes the different “understandings, claims and hopes” present 
within the European Commission itself with respect to the principle. 
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antitrust/competition policy), whereas the US seems more precautionary than the 
EU in others (e.g. pharmaceuticals, nuclear energy, lead in gasoline, highway 
safety, teenage drinking, cigarette smoking, missile defense) (Wiener/Rogers 
2002: 322-323). They conclude that: “neither the US nor the EU is a more 
precautionary actor across the board, today or in the past. Relative precaution 
appears to depend more on the particular risk than on the country or the era.” 
(Wiener/Rogers 2002: 323). Sunstein agrees with Wiener and Rogers, making the 
larger point that “the operation of the Precautionary Principle is inextricably 
intertwined with social risk perceptions” (Sunstein 2004: 3). 
It can also be argued that the extent to which the precautionary principle is 
applied may depend on how it interacts with other paradigms such as the 
economic competitiveness paradigm. In the case of biotechnology in the US, a 
precautionary approach definitely took second place to encouragement for a new 
and promising industry with great export potential. In the EU the economic 
consequences of applying a precautionary approach were probably considered as 
less significant. 
 
Linking sound science and the precautionary principle to risks 
The potential risks associated with GM food and crops are what Giddens 
would term “manufactured risks”, since they are the product of human activity 
(Giddens 1999). Beck, a sociologist like Giddens, views the concept of risk as a 
systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities resulting from 
modernization (Beck 1986). Based on the sound science principle and the 
precautionary principle, the US and the EU have found very different ways of 
dealing with such manufactured risks. These are reflected in US and EU 
definitions of the potential risks connected with GM foods, as well as in risk 
assessment requirements and possibilities for exemptions within the authorization 
process. 
Risk definitions The US and the EU define the potential risks attached to 
GM foods and crops in very different ways. In the US, the potential risks posed 
by GM foods are precisely defined in terms of their specific characteristics and 
immediate impacts on human health and the environment. The definition of risk 
used by US agencies is relatively narrow, specific, direct and short-term.  
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This narrow risk definition connected to GM food has its origins in the 
1970s debate on regulation of rDNA discussed in Chapter 5. After the 
development of rDNA techniques in 1973, the initial debate took into account 
social and ethical aspects in addition to health and environmental concerns. At 
the 1975 Asilomar conference, however, influential scientists such as Paul Berg 
and James Watson pushed for a limited definition of potential risks in order to 
keep the topic of rDNA research manageable, and make a consensus among 
scientists possible. 
In US regulators’ minds, by the time the Coordinated Framework was 
developed in the early 1980s, enough experience had been gained for the validity 
of this limited risk definition-approach to be confirmed. US President Reagan’s 
emphasis on economic competitiveness and on limiting the introduction of new 
laws at that time offered further support. M.E. Jones even suggests that “the need 
to preserve American competitiveness was so important [in the US government’s 
perception] that unproven hazards were downplayed because benefits to the 
economy were so great” (Jones, M.E. 1999: 262). 
The Office of Science and Technology Policy’s 1984 proposal for the 
Coordinated Framework signaled that a narrow risk definition would be used for 
the evaluation of biotechnology hazards. Referring to the product-based 
approach, OSTP stated that each review agency would develop “product review 
criteria and procedures which [were] consistent with its historical experience and 
scientific data bases from reviewing other products with similar uses” (Office of 
Science and Technology Policy 1984: 50858). The 1986 Coordinated Framework 
confirmed this approach. It acknowledged that concerns had been raised “as to 
whether products resulting from the recently developed techniques would pose 
greater risks than those achieved through traditional manipulation techniques” 
(Office of Science and Technology Policy 1986: 23302). By concluding that 
existing laws “would address regulatory needs adequately”, it implicitly 
reiterated the view that potential risks from GM foods and crops were of a limited 
nature (Office of Science and Technology Policy 1968: 23303). Krimsky calls 
this limited risk approach the “simple model”, in which 
“familiarity with the parental plant and the well-characterization of a gene 
whose protein product is not known to be harmful to animals or humans 
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would qualify the GM crops as safe for human consumption” (Krimsky 
2000: 231). 
In 1992, OSTP further specified the US regulatory “risk-based”-approach 
towards GM foods and crops in a policy document on “planned introductions of 
biotechnology products into the environment”. This document stated that the 
“oversight of planned introductions of biotechnology products into the 
environment [should be exercised] only upon evidence that the risk posed by the 
introduction is unreasonable”. According to OSTP, a risk is unreasonable “where 
the full value of the reduction in risk […] exceeds the full cost of the oversight 
measure”. More specifically, according to OSTP, risk is “a function of the 
characteristics of the organisms or other products, the particular application […], 
and the environment itself” (Office of Science and Technology Policy 1992). 140 
In accordance with this narrow risk definition, federal agencies such as FDA do 
not expect GM foods to pose significant risks (Food and Drug Administration 
1992: 22986). Under potential “unexpected effects” “that may require evaluation 
to assure food safety”, FDA lists precise and immediate risks including the 
introduction of toxicants or new substances, the alteration of nutrients, as well as 
allergenicity (Food and Drug Administration 1992: 22987). 
The EU defines potential risks more broadly than the US, and includes 
delayed effects on health and the environment, as well as social and ethical 
issues. In contrast to the US, in the EU it is “generally accepted that defining the 
level of acceptable risk is a normative decision that belongs to the democratically 
elected and accountable institutions of a state” (Christoforou 2004: 702). This 
decision can therefore not always be precisely determined through “sound 
science”. It is telling that “[…] although the acceptable level of risk can be 
defined both in qualitative and quantitative terms, in the [European Union] it is 
practically never expressed in a precise quantitative manner, such as one-in-a-
million risk of death from the use of a specific product […]” (Christoforou 2004: 
644-5). 
                                                     
140 Levidow et al. (2000) note that the 1992 OSTP guidelines were published within the context of 
a particularly cost-benefit conscious political climate. They posit that this climate changed 
somewhat with the Clinton administration, which focused more on promoting biotechnology as an 
environmentally friendly technology than on controlling oversight costs connected with 
biotechnology. 
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EU policy documents are based on the view that there is no conclusive and 
comprehensive evidence on the potential effects and side effects of GM foods, 
and therefore mandate a “long-term socio-economic impact analysis” (König 
2002: 74). Krimsky might classify this as the “complex model” of GM food and 
crop risk assessment which considers that “introduced genes may affect the 
expression of other genes in the parental plant” (Krimsky 2000: 233).  
Moreover, since the adoption of EP and Council Directive 2001/18, the 
definition of risks connected to GMOs is intimately linked with the precautionary 
principle. The Directive underlines that “it is important not to discount any 
potential adverse effect on the basis that it is unlikely to occur” (European 
Parliament/Council of the European Union 2001, Annex II). A special emphasis 
is placed on the need to evaluate “indirect” and “delayed” effects in addition to 
“direct” and “immediate” effects. An “analysis of the ‘cumulative long-term 
effects’ […] is to be carried out as part of an environmental risk assessment 
(Annex II).  Examples of potential risks include the “likelihood of [GM crops] 
becoming more persistent than the recipient or parental plants in agricultural 
habitats […]” and “immediate and/or delayed effects on animal health and 
consequences for the feed/food chain”. Further possible risks are “immediate 
and/or delayed, direct and indirect impacts of the specific cultivation, 
management and harvesting techniques” (ibid.). 
Directive 2001/18 foresees a wide definition of risk, which includes not 
only environmental and health aspects, but also ethical and social concerns. 
Issues of particular concern include consumer choice and rights, the boundary 
between what is natural and unnatural, industry consolidation or monopoly, 
intellectual property rights and patenting, liability, impacts on developing 
countries, public involvement in decision-making, and transparency (Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics 1999). For Margaret Mellon, this wide definition of risk is 
linked to the fact that Europeans are more willing than US Americans to 
collectively address and take responsibility for the impact of a technology on 
their society, while in the US the need to address these impacts is circumvented 
by emphasizing “sound science” (interview with Margaret Mellon, Union of 
Concerned Scientists, 9 June 2004, Washington, DC). 
 172
Risk assessment requirements Both United States and European Union 
regulators request technically complex and extensive risk assessments in order to  
grant GM foods and crops authorization. As a general rule, however, the US 
system is more flexible and case-by-case oriented than the EU’s rules, thus 
leaving more space for discretion, exceptions and exemptions. This quality also 
makes US regulation more permissive than EU regulation. Alistair Clemence of 
Monsanto confirms that in his view, “data requirements are universal. It’s the 
way in which the regulatory process works that is different from country to 
country” (interview with Alistair Clemence, Monsanto, Brussels, 15 September 
2004, Brussels). 
Under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), APHIS and EPA 
must require environmental assessments (EAs) to determine the environmental 
impact of GM foods and crops. EAs are relatively concise documents, drafted by 
parties introducing or registering plant pests or pesticides. In practice, APHIS 
requires Environmental Assessments only if new species and modifications are 
involved, but exempts “notified” field trials from this requirement. As described 
in Chapter 3, the matching “notification” process, which has come to apply to 
most GM crop field testing, requires little information as compared to the more 
demanding procedure of applying for a permit. 
APHIS approval of nonregulated status requires the submission of 
experimental data and an environmental assessment. EAs are used by regulatory 
agencies to determine whether a more detailed statement called an Environmental 
Impact Statement (EIS)141 should be required or not. If not, a so-called “Finding 
Of No Significant Impact” (FONSI) is issued. To date, no nonregulated status 
petition has led to an EIS. In the case of EPA, the agency “is responsible for 
establishing what data is needed to assess risks” on a case-by-case basis since the 
new section of 40 CFR 174 is not yet completed (Krimsky/Murphy 2001: 10-11). 
For FDA, by the time a GM food has advanced to the marketing stage, its 
potential impact on the environment is perceived as being low, or, in any case, 
oversight is seen as not being cost-effective: 
                                                     
141 An Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is a detailed document of usually 50-70 pages that 
covers the purpose, need, and possible alternatives for the action, as well as short and long-term 
environmental effects. 
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“The agency has determined [...] that this action is of a type that does not 
individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human 
environment. Therefore, neither an environmental assessment nor an 
environmental impact statement is required” (Food and Drug 
Administration 1992: 23005). 
In contrast, EU risk assessment requirements are clearly laid out in EP 
and Council Directive 2001/18 on environmental release. It foresees a long and 
complex environment risk assessment described in Annex II, which applies to 
Part B and Part C of the Directive, and to EP and Council Regulation 1829/2003 
on food and feed. In accordance with the EU’s wide definition of potential risks 
in connection with GMOs, an applicant submitting an environmental risk 
assessment must address a long list of direct, indirect, immediate and delayed 
effects on human and animal health, and on the environment. These go beyond 
environmental and health considerations to include social and economic aspects 
such as GMOs’s potential impacts on agricultural management and harvesting 
techniques. 
Moreover, EU rules and regulations no longer foresee the possibility of an 
expedited procedure. Under EP and Council Regulation 258/97 (European 
Parliament/Council of the European Union 1997), the substantial equivalence 
clause allowed a simplified approval procedure under article 5, as described in 
earlier chapters. In the late 1990s, however, this clause was widely criticized by 
GM food critics and by some Member States as being too permissive. As a result, 
EP and Council Regulation on feed and food of 2003, which replaces Regulation 
258/97, does not contain a substantial equivalence clause. Every GM food must 
now go through the same procedure. 
 
Risk-taking and judicial systems 
The US and the EU’s different approaches to risk are also reflected in the 
distinct ways in which the state intervenes in the case of market failure142 in the 
EU and the US. 
                                                     
142 In economic theory, market failure is defined as any situation in which the free market is 
incapable of finding an efficient outcome without intervention. Said somewhat differently, it can 
be a condition that arises when unrestrained operation of market forces yields socially undesirable 
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In the US, the philosophy underlying GM food policy is that the federal 
government should remain as disengaged as possible and not intervene as long as 
the market performs as it should.143 If a market failure does occur, the US jury-
based judicial system intervenes afterwards. In this system, a civil court may 
award both compensation and punitive damages (fines) which can be very high 
(CambsQuality 2004). For example, biotechnology company Aventis paid 
millions of dollars to US farmers and grain elevator owners to compensate for 
financial losses resulting from the StarLink affair (25 cents per bushel of 
StarLink or contaminated corn). 
Moreover, the US jury-based system allows class action suits, i.e. lawsuits 
brought by one or more plaintiffs on behalf of a larger group of individuals who 
have a common interest.144 It is easier for individuals to bring a claim in the US 
than in Europe as lawyers are allowed to take on cases on a contingency fee 
basis. This means that the individual is not required to finance the case him or 
herself. Instead, his or her lawyers are paid a percentage of the damages if they 
win a case. The result is that US lawyers have an incentive to sue for very high 
maximum damages as their compensation depends on it. This type of agreement 
is generally not allowed in the EU. 
These features of the US legal system encourage biotechnology 
companies to fully comply with all existing obligatory and voluntary regulatory 
procedures in order to discourage damage claims, especially since agricultural 
biotechnology developers have had trouble finding companies to insure GM food 
liability. Indeed, both in the US and Europe, existing insurance connected to GM 
foods is usually limited both in terms of scope and financial coverage (Kumar 
2004). 
In contrast, the EU regulatory system is a model in which the state 
regulates GM food in order to prevent market failures such as environment or 
health-related problems before they can occur. The focus is on protecting health 
                                                                                                                                                             
results. In the case of GM foods, a resulting health or ecological problem would be considered a 
market failure in which the state must intervene. 
143 Following this logic, Calestous Juma suggests that "in the US, the market puts pressure on 
regulation to remain permissive and flexible" (interview with Calestous Juma, Harvard 
University, 25 June 2004, Cambridge, MA). 
144 Within a context of business globalization, some European countries have taken first steps 
towards adopting the concept of class actions (Wegener/Fitzpatrick 2005). 
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and the environment even if growth is hampered in the process. There is less 
reliance on the judicial system to correct problems after a failure, a fact that is 
connected with the above-mentioned lack of a class action tradition based on 
contingency fees, as well as comparatively high court fees (Wegener/Fitzpatrick 
2005). The judicial system also provides less of a deterrent for industry since 
judges (not juries) merely award compensation to victims of product defects in a 
civil court. Additional fines can be levied only after a successful criminal 
prosecution (CambsQuality 2004). Potential plaintiffs therefore have lowered 
expectations as to the money they might expect to obtain from a defendant and, in 
most cases, bear a substantial personal financial risk. Most court cases involving 
GM food in Europe have so far been connected with the destruction of field test 
plots (Smyth et al.: 28). 
 
6.3 Conclusion 
Empirical study indicates that GM food policy in the US and the EU is 
built on different underlying paradigms as summarized in Table 15. As suggested 
by proposition 2, these different paradigms help to explain the transatlantic rift in 
genetically modified food. In the US, the economic competitiveness and sound 
science paradigms are predominant, and favor a relatively permissive GM food 
policy. In the EU, environmental and health protection and precautionary 
principle paradigms define EU policy, and render GM food policy relatively 
restrictive. At the same time, this chapter reveals that both US and EU policies 
contain “opposite” paradigm elements. In other words, US policy contains 
protection and precautionary elements and the EU includes competitiveness and 
sound science elements. Overall paradigms are a result of the weighting and 
balancing of priorities. This chapter has shown that the US and EU policies 
contain clear priorities: for the US, competitiveness and sound science comes 
first, whereas the EU privileges protection and precaution. 
It is further useful to link these paradigms to dimensions that are common 
to the US and the EU cases, and that enable them to be better understood. The 
paradigms of competitiveness and protection are coupled with agriculture and 
based on two different models of agricultural growth. In the case of sound 
science and the precautionary principle, risk is an essential dimension. The sound 
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science principle is based on a narrow risk definition, whereas the precautionary 
principle is based on a wide definition. 
It is apparent from this chapter that the paradigms discussed are 
connected, and that they have links to the preceding policies discussed in the 
previous chapter. The rDNA debate and the sociopolitical context in the US in 
the 70s and 80s formed the basis for the sound science and competitiveness 
paradigms in the area of agricultural biotechnology. In the case of the EU, the 
precautionary and the protection paradigm are both the expression of the EU’s 
tendency to attempt a complicated balancing act between opposing goals. As will 
emerge in the following chapter, paradigms are also clearly visible in the so-
called “story-lines” or discourses that determine the goals and activities of actors 
and actor coalitions in the GM food policy debate. 
 
 Table 15: US and EU paradigms 
United States European Union 
Economic competitiveness 
- creating a secure regulatory environment for 
industry 
- agriculture as business with great relevance 
for trade  
Environmental and health protection 
- protecting consumers and environment from 
GMOs 
- agriculture to move towards sustainability 
model 
Sound science 
- science as an infallible source of 
information 
- narrow definition of risk, comprising only 
short-term effects on health and the 
environment 
- judicial system encourages corrective role of 
the courts after commercialization 
Precautionary principle 
- science as a possible source of uncertainty 
and unanswered questions 
- broad definition of risk, including long-
term, delayed effects, and socioeconomic 
effects in addition to short-term effects 
- judicial system encourages preventive role 
of state before commercialization 
? relatively permissive regulation of GM food ? relatively restrictive regulation of GM food 
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7. ACTORS AND ACTOR COALITIONS: DIFFERENT LEVELS OF 
SUCCESS 
 
Both in the US and the EU, a search for key players in the GM food policy 
debate reveals two main types of actors and actor coalitions: those fundamentally 
opposing agricultural biotechnology, and those actively promoting it. Proposition 
3 suggests that in the US, actors and actor coalitions supporting GM food have 
been more successful than GM food critics, and that they have therefore been able 
to push for permissive regulation of GM foods and crops. In the EU, on the other 
hand, the proposition expects that actors and actor coalitions opposing GM food 
have been more successful than GM food supporters, and have obtained 
restrictive GM food and crop policies. 
Accordingly, in this chapter, I investigate whether and how pro-GM food 
actors and actor coalitions have been able to obtain relatively permissive GM 
food policies, and to what extent anti-GM actors and actor coalitions have 
achieved relatively restrictive GM food policy. As explained in Chapter 4, I make 
use of the concepts of “advocacy coalition” and “discourse coalition” to assess 
levels of coalition success. The argument developed here on the basis of my 
empirical findings is that coalitions are most successful when they combine the 
goal-oriented and coordinated activity of advocacy coalitions, and the deeply 
ideological story-lines that characterize discourse coalitions. In my empirical 
discussion, I emphasize concepts from the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) 
and the argumentative approach that are both particularly useful and 
representative. From within the ACF, I make use of the notion that actors and 
coalitions act rationally and are guided by specific interests and goals, as well as 
the idea that these coalitions engage in coordinated action. From within the 
argumentative approach, I emphasize the concept of story-lines that hold together 
coalitions, as well as the idea that particular story-lines are successful when they 
reach discourse dominance. I also pay specific attention to the potential impact of 
context factors.145 
                                                     
145 This chapter relies mainly on two sources: a series of semi-directive interviews conducted with 
US and EU actors in the GM food debate, and primary documents written by these and other 
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The analysis in this chapter focuses on actors and actor coalitions after the 
mid-1990s since this is when the controversy surrounding GM foods and crops 
began. For both the US and EU cases, I first present actors and actor coalitions in 
terms of their positions, interests and shared story-lines, then investigate the role 
and impact of shock events, and finally discuss actors’ and actor coalitions’ 
activities in pursuing their policy goals.  
 
7.1 Actors and actor coalitions in the United States 
US actors and actor coalitions in favor of GM food and crops 
Over the past decade US actors in favor of GM foods have been very 
successful in achieving their policy goal of relatively permissive regulation. As 
this section will show, a main reason for this success is that in the US, GM foods 
are supported throughout the food chain, as well as and by regulators. This 
support is motivated by common goals and common story-lines. Moreover, in 
comparison with their European counterparts, GM food proponents in the US 
have faced relatively mild shock events and a fairly disengaged public. 
Actors Main US actors supporting and promoting, or at least not actively 
opposing or hindering agricultural biotechnology, are multinational agricultural 
biotechnology companies, large-scale farms using intensive farming methods 
(“agribusinesses”), as well as food processors, producers, and retailers.146 Further 
supportive actors are a majority of US states and the US federal government, in 
particular the White House and the State Department – mainly regarding trade 
issues –, as well as the regulatory agencies dealing with agricultural 
biotechnology (FDA, EPA, and APHIS). As GM food regulators, these 
governmental actors are not part of the more formal activities of GM food 
proponents, but their informal collaboration with pro GM food actors is 
                                                                                                                                                             
actors, many of them drawn from organizations’ and institutions’ websites. A third source is 
secondary literature describing and analyzing the GM food policy process and debate. 
146 US researchers in the field of molecular biology are for the most part also supportive of GM 
food. They are not discussed in this chapter, however, because they do not appear in the GM food 
debate as prominently as was the case in the 1970s when the debate was about rDNA researcher’s 
stakes were higher. As of the 1990s, they are less important as players in the GM food debate than 
the other actors discussed in this chapter. 
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indicative of their support and crucial to understanding why GM food policy is 
relatively permissive in the US. 
Main agricultural biotechnology companies with US headquarters are 
Monsanto of St. Louis, Missouri, the world's largest genetically engineered seed 
business, and DuPont-owned Pioneer Hi-Bred of Des Moines, Iowa. 
“Agribiotech companies”, as they are often referred to, are represented in 
Washington, DC by the Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO). 
Biotechnology companies devote vast resources to supporting GM foods, both 
individually and through BIO. 
Since a large proportion of the GM seed produced is herbicide tolerant, the 
GM seed market is intimately linked with the pesticide market. Monsanto 
commands 9% of the pesticide market, and between 80 and 88% of the GM seed 
market. DuPont controls 6% of the pesticide market, and shares the remaining 12 
to 20% of the GM seed market with Syngenta and Bayer CropScience, both 
headquartered in Europe (ETC Group 2005a, 2005b). Monsanto unquestionably 
is the giant of agricultural biotechnology. As Bernard Graciet, Head of 
Syngenta’s Brussels Office, explains, “Monsanto bet on adopting green 
biotechnology as a priority over chemicals. Monsanto bet on the replacement of 
pesticides147, whereas Syngenta thinks that both are necessary”; moreover, “the 
big difference between Monsanto and other agricultural biotechnology companies 
is that Monsanto makes important profits from agbiotech, while other companies 
invest in biotech research, but do not yet make a profit in this sector”(interview 
with Bernard Graciet, Syngenta, 15 September 2004, Brussels). 
Large-scale farms or agribusinesses are found mostly in the American 
Midwest and are represented by the American Farm Bureau Federation (AFBF or 
Farm Bureau). Depending on the crops they produce, US farmers also look to 
organizations like the American Soybean Association (ASA), the National Corn 
Growers Association (NCGA), and the US Grains Council for representation. 
Farm Bureau is funded by membership dues and voluntary contributions, and is 
skillful at raising funds. Supporting agricultural biotechnology is one of its 
priorities. 
                                                     
147 At the same time, Monsanto is the number one producer of herbicides containing glyphosate, 
the active ingredient in its “Roundup” herbicides. Monsanto’s Roundup Ready GM crops are 
engineered to tolerate glyphosate. 
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The third main group supporting agricultural biotechnology consists of 
food processors and producers, as well as retailers. Main US food processors and 
producers include Kraft Foods, ConAgra, and Archer Daniels Midland. Major 
associations representing them are the Food Products Association (FPA) (former 
National Food Processors Association, NFPA) and Grocery Manufacturers of 
America (GMA). Large US food retailers are supermarkets such Wal-Mart, 
Kroger, Albertson's and Safeway. As is the case for food producers, many US 
retailers are present on both sides of the Atlantic. For example, Wal-Mart owns 
the UK supermarket chain ASDA. Food retailers operating in the US are 
represented by Grocery Manufacturers of America (GMA). For the case of the 
US, food processors, producers and retailers are discussed together because their 
positions and story-lines are very similar. In addition, they are in part represented 
by the same associations, in particular GMA. The food processing, producing and 
retailing industry also devotes a significant amount of resources to the topic. Like 
Farm Bureau and BIO, GMA and the FPA are well-funded lobbies. 
Within the US federal government, the most vocal supporters of 
agricultural biotechnology are the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the 
Food and Drug Administration148, and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection 
Service. True to its mission of protecting the environment, the Environmental 
Protection Agency displays support of a somewhat more cautious nature, but 
does not fundamentally question the relatively permissive nature of US policy. 
Federal resources devoted to publicizing information about agricultural 
biotechnology and its regulation have been considerable over the past decade. 
Most of the fifty US states are also supportive of federal policy, especial states in 
the American Midwest, where most GM crops are grown. 
Positions and interests All the actors presented, including governmental 
actors, are in favor of relatively permissive and product-based regulation of GM 
crops and foods, with as few labeling requirements as possible. Therefore, the 
goal of supportive actors has been to keep in place the relatively permissive, 
product-based US regulatory framework devised in the 1980s, stretching it to 
make adjustments when necessary. As early as 1990, key food industry actors 
                                                     
 148 FDA officials Ricker and Garcia would describe FDA as “not explicitly supportive of any 
given technology [and suggest that] a better formulation would be that we do not discriminate 
against biotechnology or other methods of manufacture” (interview with Karin Ricker and 
Edmundo Garcia, Jr., Food and Drug Administration, 10 June 2004, Washington, DC). 
 181
had agreed that “no new regulations are needed for food and food ingredient 
products from sources that are genetically modified […]” and that a “flexible, 
tiered-approach system of safety evaluation that is guided by decision trees” 
would be the best type of regulation (International Food Biotechnology Council 
1990: xvii-xviii). These recommendations, applauded by other GM food 
supporters, had an important level of influence, especially on FDA policy 
(interview with Jeffrey Barach, Food Products Association, former National Food 
Processors Association, 15 June 2004, Washington, DC). Pro-GM food actors are 
critical of the EU’s process-based policies and support decisive action against 
what they perceive as the European Union's “imposition [...] of trade restrictions” 
(American Farm Bureau Federation 2005). Ron Gaskill of the American Farm 
Bureau Federation expresses what many US actors think of the EU’s policies on 
GMOs when he states that: “the European regulatory position is illogical” 
(interview with Ron Gaskill, American Farm Bureau Federation, 9 June 2004, 
Washington, DC).  
Pro-GM food actors have somewhat differing but interrelated interests in 
promoting GM crops and foods. As documented by position papers, the 
agricultural biotechnology industry, as developer of GM crops and producer of 
GM seeds worldwide, strongly supports and promotes its products and is 
primarily profit-oriented. Contrary to what is sometimes thought, industry prefers 
flexible and relatively permissive regulatory oversight to no oversight at all. Food 
and Drug Administration officials explain that from biotechnology companies’ 
perspective, having a “stamp of approval” is very important for market success. 
This explains why the FDA has, to date, been consulted on all GM products 
before they have entered the US market even though this procedure is voluntary 
(interview with Karin Ricker and Edmundo Garcia, Jr., Food and Drug 
Administration, 10 June 2004, Washington, DC). 
After the agricultural biotech industry, large farms or agribusinesses are 
the actors that stand to gain most from GM crops such as herbicide-tolerant and 
insect-resistant soybeans, corn and oilseed rape. Particularly when used on large 
areas, GM crop varieties can produce substantial benefits to farmers including 
less need for tillage, lower labor costs, reduced use of pesticides, higher yields, 
and greater profits (Madsen et al. 2003). Major GM crops were indeed developed 
by companies like Monsanto and Pioneer Hi-Bred primarily for US Midwestern 
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farmers who are the main beneficiaries of the technology, and therefore their 
main clients.  
The interests of US food processors, producers and retailers are the least 
clear-cut within the food chain. More than the biotechnology industry and large-
scale farmers, these actors depend on consumers for profit, and they are the first 
to feel the impact of consumer preferences. When the first GM foods and crops 
were introduced in the mid-1990s, food processors, producers and retailers in the 
US viewed these products as an innovation that would lead to benefits not only 
for farmers, but also for consumers and therefore to greater profits for 
themselves. They therefore enthusiastically endorsed them. When European 
consumers rejected GM foods in the late 1990s, US food processors, producers 
and retailers feared a similar backlash in the United States. However, despite the 
several shock events described in Chapter 2 and in this chapter, the mainstream 
US consumer has not turned against GM foods in a major way. Thus, for the 
moment, there is no compelling reason for food processors, producers and 
retailers to distance themselves from the successful pro-GM food coalition in the 
US.149 Their interests and positions, however, clearly depend on consumer 
reactions and preferences, and therefore have the potential to change relatively 
quickly. Jeffrey Barach describes the situation as follows: 
“NFPA has not really changed its policy on genetic engineering of food 
over the years, but it has refined it. We have become more attentive to 
food chain issues and realized that we cannot look only at the food 
producer segment of the food chain. We have to look from the researcher 
to farmers to the elevators to processing to the final consumer. StarLink 
and the development of PMPs have made us particularly attentive to food 
chain issues” (interview with Jeffrey Barach, Food Products Association, 
former National Food Processors Association, 15 June 2004, Washington, 
DC). 
                                                     
149 From the point of view of some stakeholders, however, food industry and retailer support for 
GM products is not as strong as it might be. Ron Gaskill of AFBF suggests that US retailers are 
“trying to duck” and that they would prefer to not be involved with genetic engineering “to avoid a 
headache”. This is also a reaction to the European stance and a result of the fact that there is a lot 
of integration between large US and large European retailers (e.g. Royal Ahold, Carrefour, 
Sainsbury’s) (interview with Ron Gaskill, American Farm Bureau Federation, 9 June 2005, 
Washington, DC). 
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The interests of US governmental institutions and the reasons for their 
pro-GM stance have been discussed in the chapter dedicated to paradigms. In 
summary, the US government, including its regulatory agencies, supports the US 
biotechnology industry in the context of a policy prioritizing economic growth 
and competitiveness.  
Story-lines Actors supporting GM foods and crops are held together by a 
powerful story-line, and thus represent a strong discourse coalition. Some actors 
tell this story in a more outspoken manner than others, but all agree on its basic 
elements. 
The story-line is based on the fundamental belief, shared by governmental 
and non-governmental actors alike, that science and technology bring about 
advancement, and that they are inherently virtuous and unbiased. Agricultural 
biotechnology is therefore synonymous with progress. This element links back to 
both the sound science and the competitiveness paradigms introduced in Chapter 
6. 
An important part of the story is also the viewpoint that genetic 
engineering is viewed as an extension of conventional breeding. The Food 
Products Association and Grocery Manufacturers of America both emphasize that 
the concept of enhancing food production techniques is not new, since “[f]or 
centuries farmers have selectively bred plants to pass on desirable traits (Food 
Products Association What is Food Biotechnology?). GM foods should therefore 
be assessed according to the risks they present. Karil Kochenderfer of Grocery 
Manufacturers of America explains that  
“the question is how to manage [risks] in a way that allows for safe 
products to go to market. A government’s job is to harness a technology’s 
benefits and manage its risks. We call that process the ‘risk paradigm’. 
The EU, in comparison, has a ‘hazard paradigm’. The idea is to identify 
the hazard and regulate to eliminate it. What is the difference between the 
hazard and risk paradigms? The hazard paradigm only recognizes that 
there is a danger inherent to a product. The risk paradigm recognizes the 
danger, but also examines how frequently it occurs. Risk is hazard times 
frequency” (interview with Karil Kochenderfer, Grocery Manufacturers of 
America, 17 June 2004, Washington, DC). 
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Many Farmers also take the approach that crops grown with the help of 
agricultural biotechnology are not a fundamental departure from other modern 
varieties.  As summarized by Hayden Milberg of National Corn Growers 
Association, “all modern cultivated crops are modified to some extent. […] We 
view biotechnology as an additional tool in the farmer’s toolbox which can help 
meet production needs” (interview with Hayden Milberg, National Corn Growers 
Association, 9 June 2004, Washington, DC). US agencies also emphasize this 
aspect of the pro-biotech story-line in numerous policy documents. 
In addition, the story-line emphasizes that biotechnology benefits 
agriculture, the environment and consumers alike. With regard to the 
environment, the story goes that the use of GM crops enables farmers to 
considerably cut down their use of herbicide as well as tillage, which decreases 
soil erosion. With respect to possible risks, BIO carefully explains that potential 
negative effects on health and the environment have been scientifically proven to 
be negligible. 
Food processors, producers and retailers especially emphasize the benefits 
of biotechnology for consumers. Jeffrey Barach of the Food Products Association 
explains that  
“we are looking for foods that are safe and wholesome and can get to the 
consumer in the best form possible. Any technology [like genetic 
engineering] that can do that interests us” (interview with Jeffrey Barach, 
Food Products Association, former National Food Processors Association, 
15 June 2004, Washington, DC). 
Karil Kochenderfer of the Grocery Manufacturers of America adds that:  
“society constantly introduces new products and always tries to improve 
efficiency and performance. The challenge is to make sure that there is a 
perceived consumer benefit to that effort” (interview with Karil 
Kochenderfer, Grocery Manufacturers of America, 17 June 2004, 
Washington, DC) 
GMA and FPA’s story-lines are implicitly based on free market values, 
and center on consumerism. According to their story-line, not only will food 
supplies be more abundant and healthier, but they will also be better-tasting and 
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provide a healthier diet to consumers. FPA announces that soon, “fruits and 
vegetables may be able to resist drought. We may remove allergens from foods 
such as nuts. Scientists may develop plants that absorb nitrogen more efficiently 
and need less fertilizer. The benefits are nearly endless!” (Food Products 
Association What is Food Biotechnology?). The GMA and FPA websites make 
little mention of dissenting voices, which may give their very positive story-lines 
a somewhat naive quality in the eyes of readers acquainted with the GM food 
controversy. An exception is made for trade: EU regulations are conceptualized 
as an unjustified and “serious trade barrier” since “there is no safety or nutrition 
issue associated with the products of agricultural biotechnology” (Food Products 
Association 2004). Kochenderfer summarizes GMA’s position succinctly: “If the 
science says these products are safe, political preferences should not be keeping 
US products out of the EU market” (interview with Karil Kochenderfer, Grocery 
Manufacturers of America, 17 June 2004, Washington, DC). 
A further particularly controversial element of the pro-biotech story-line 
is that if “coupled with important developments in other areas”, GM crops can 
“assist in meeting the food demands of a growing global population”, i.e. 
developing nations, for example by improving the efficiency of production and 
the quality of the food supply (Biotechnology Industry Organization Frequently 
Asked Questions On Agricultural Biotechnology). Hayden Milberg of the 
National Corn Growers Association voices a similar view as a representative of 
US corn growers in stating that “the only way to feed the world as population 
around the globe increases is to grow more food on less land. Biotechnology has 
proven itself to be able to meet that challenge” (interview with Hayden Milberg, 
National Corn Growers Association, 9 June 2004, Washington, DC). 
All the above-mentioned organizations and stakeholders use positive and 
upbeat language. BIO shows its thoroughly enthusiastic and confident approach 
with its slogan “Partner to a Dynamic Industry Coming of Age” (Biotechnology 
Industry Organization. About BIO: Partner to a Dynamic Industry Coming of 
Age). Similarly, Farm Bureau projects an image of the American farmer as the 
producer of “the world's highest quality food and fiber”. This story-line, complete 
with symbolic references to the US constitution, claims and defends the freedom 
to produce crops and foods improved through genetic engineering. Farm 
Bureau’s fundamental beliefs are cogently summarized in the assertion that 
 186
“America's unparalleled progress is based on freedom and dignity of the 
individual, sustained by basic moral and religious concepts” (American Farm 
Bureau Federation We are Farm Bureau). 
What allows industry and food processors, producers and retailers to act 
so self-assured about GM foods and its benefits while other US actors make 
opposite claims? It is not only their belief in science, but also in the US 
regulatory system. According to BIO, “rigorous scientific reviews” and 
“extensive field testing” have led to “scientific consensus [which] continues to 
inform US regulatory policy.” In BIO's view, the United States is particularly 
fortunate in this respect: “many countries have not enjoyed a reliable regulatory 
environment like that in the United States” (Biotechnology Industry Organization 
Frequently Asked Questions On Agricultural Biotechnology).  
 
US actors and actor coalitions against GM foods and crops 
Actors opposing GM foods and crops in the US have been less successful 
than actors supporting them. Since the Coordinated Framework of 1986, 
agricultural biotechnology proponents have not succeeded in rendering US GM 
food policy more restrictive. This can be explained in part by the fact that these 
actors have somewhat different positions, interests, and story-lines, and a 
relatively modest level of coordinated activity. Moreover, the US anti-GM food 
coalition’s lack of success is connected to a relative lack of public and media 
interest regarding the issue of GM foods, and to the relatively mild role played by 
shock events in awakening such interest. 
Actors US actors opposing the development and use of agricultural 
biotechnology and favoring restrictive regulation are small-scale, family and 
organic farmers, consumers, and environmental and public interest groups. Some 
members of the US Congress and some US state legislatures have also played a 
role in calling attention to issues of concern in connection with GM foods. 
Family farmers and organic farmers are found throughout the US, 
including in the American Midwest, where many of them have been merged into 
larger farm operations. Family farmers are represented by associations and 
organizations such as the National Family Farm Coalition (NFFC) and 
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specialized associations like the American Corn Growers Association (ACGA). 
Organic farmers, represented by numerous regional and state organizations, are 
also opposed to GM foods. These groups are funded by their members and by 
donations; they are represented by small staffs in Washington, DC. 
US consumers concerned about genetic engineering in food are 
represented by Consumers Union (CU) and by smaller groups such as the 
Organic Consumers Association. Main environmental groups in the United States 
are the US sections of Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth. Further organizations 
worth noting, which form an important part of the GM food-critical coalition in 
the US, can be described as hybrids between environmental and public interest 
groups. Key organizations are the Center for Food Safety (CFS), the Council for 
Responsible Genetics (CRG), the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), and the 
United States Public Interest Research Group (US PIRG). These groups are 
generally funded by membership dues and donations, some by individuals and 
some by foundations. They do not receive government or corporate funding; 
Greenpeace even has a policy against acceptance of such funding. Their resources 
are considerably limited in comparison with corporate actors. The US Congress 
and some US state legislatures cannot be classified as being consistently opposed 
to GM foods, but some members of Congress and certain state legislatures have 
been known to highlight issues of controversy. Finally, the US Green Party, 
which is opposed to GMOs and GM foods, is not very vocal or present in the US 
debate. It does not have the weight that some European Green parties do, in large 
part because of the US two-party system, but its base of support has been 
increasing in recent years. 
Positions and interests US actors critical of GM foods and crops adopt 
comparable positions and make similar demands regarding regulation. They call 
for a more demanding and rigorous approval process, which is mandatory during 
the commercialization phase. They request a process-based approach as well as 
the labeling of GM foods. Some groups advocate an explicitly precautionary line 
and wish to see a ban on new GM foods and crops until they are proven safe. 
Their interests differ somewhat, but are not incompatible and lead to 
similar positions. The main goal of small farmers’ is to stay in business by halting 
or at least slowing the trend towards concentration in agriculture. Organic 
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farmers’ interest in opposing GM foods is to increase their own market share 
since organic foods may not be genetically engineered under US national 
standards for organic foods. 
In contrast to the actors represented so far, consumers are a very broad 
category, theoretically comprising every US American. In the GM food debate, 
however, these individual consumers are represented by consumer organizations. 
These organizations’ success depends on consumers’ trust and attention, so it is 
in their interest to critically address topics of concern and importance to 
consumers, such as genetically modified foods. Regarding the issue of GM foods, 
consumers’ first and foremost want their health to be protected. They also want a 
transparent information system when buying produce. Consumer organizations’ 
mission is therefore to inform consumers and protect their health and rights. 
Further key actors are environmental groups, whose mission is to protect 
the environment. Since these groups do not get direct input from the environment 
in the same direct way that BIO does from Monsanto or GMA from Kraft Foods, 
they decide on their agendas and priorities autonomously. Moreover, 
environmental groups have individual members supporting them out of 
conviction, but they are not accountable to these individual members in the same 
way that an industry representation is accountable to a dues paying member 
industry. Environmental groups therefore generally do not have an elaborate 
internal process for developing policy priorities and positions. By and large, it is 
in environmental organizations’ interest to have the freedom to select 
environmental issues that attract attention and membership, thereby securing the 
success and growth of the organizations.150 Depending on how much emphasis 
they put on serving the public interest, “hybrid” environmental and public interest 
groups are in similar situations, balancing a mission of protecting the 
environment and the public interest with a need to stay in business.  
Story-lines The story-lines used by GM food opponents contain similar 
elements despite somewhat differing focuses. An important difference lies in the 
                                                     
150 Accordingly, a criticism often voiced by industry representatives is that environmental groups, 
although they have dues paying members, are not governed by a democratic process, and that they 
select issues consistent with their goal of being successful organizations. One interviewee 
illustrates this point well by stating that “you cannot escape the fact that this has been a hugely 
motivating campaign for NGOs. It’s a high priority campaign for Friends of the Earth and 
Greenpeace, so it must be a popular campaign and it must be a money-spinning campaign”. 
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language that they adopt to communicate their goals and positions. Different 
rhetoric points toward different degrees of activism. Generally, groups mainly 
concerned with the environment (Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, Center for 
Food Safety) are more outspoken than organizations that consider themselves 
consumer groups (e.g. Consumers Union) or representatives of a specific interest 
(e.g. National Family Farm Coalition) or of a particular issue (e.g. Council for 
Responsible Genetics). Exceptions are the US Public Interest Research Group, a 
relatively outspoken public interest group, and the Union of Concerned 
Scientists, an environmental group that focuses more than other groups on 
developing positions that are scientifically sound151 (interview with Margaret 
Mellon, Union of Concerned Scientists, 9 June 2004, Washington, DC). 
An element common to each of these groups’ story-lines is that genetic 
engineering is fundamentally new and that it is by no means just a continuation of 
conventional breeding techniques. Consumers Union represents the viewpoint of 
this group of GM opponents when it writes that genetic engineering is “a 
quantum leap” away from conventional breeding since it makes possible the 
creation of “what can be regarded as synthetic life forms” (Consumers Union 
1998a). For these actors, scientists are fallible and cannot be trusted blindly. 
All the groups discussed also agree that GM foods might pose a threat to 
health and the environment, although they vary in their levels of conviction about 
this. Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth’s positions are based on an image of a 
planet plagued by environmental problems. GM foods are one of these many 
problems because they are unnatural and their development and marketing is 
based entirely on the profit motive: “when we force life forms and our world's 
food supply to conform to human economic models rather than their natural ones, 
                                                     
151 The unique nature of the Union of Concerned Scientists (USC) is worth mentioning. UCS 
members are citizens, some but by no means all of them scientists, concerned with environmental 
issues. UCS “augment[s] rigorous scientific analysis with innovative thinking and committed 
citizen advocacy to build a cleaner, healthier environment and a safer world” (Union of 
Concerned Scientists About UCS). Founded in 1969 by students and faculty of the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT), UCS is concerned about potential abuses of science and 
technology in society, aims to “persuade” and “urge” regulatory agencies to conduct “rigorous 
reviews of ecological risks” and “require safety testing and labeling before biotech foods are 
allowed on the market” (UCS Biotechnology). This type of formulation hints at argumentation on 
the basis of scientific arguments more than on the basis of ethical and social issues. Indeed, USC 
views itself as separate from other organizations: “The Union of Concerned Scientists stands out 
among environmental organizations as the reliable source of sound scientific information. UCS is 
the most effective group to combine credible scientific analysis with effective citizen advocacy to 
bring about policy change” (UCS How UCS is Unique). 
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we do so at our own peril” (Greenpeace International Say no to genetic 
engineering). In the words of Friends of the Earth USA, allergic reactions to GM 
foods have already shown that genetic engineering of food is “a major gamble 
with human health” and that “genetic engineering gives pollution a life of its 
own” (Friends of the Earth USA Organic, not genetically engineered). Expected 
long-term effects include mutations, transfers to other plants and “superweeds” 
that are resistant to herbicide. For CFS and US PIRG, risks can include not only 
allergenicity, antibiotic resistance and the “contamination” of non-GM plants and 
ecosystems, but also cancer, plant and animal extinction, poisoning of the soil, 
and increasing world hunger. 
Other environmental and public interest actors are skeptical but less 
fundamentally condemnatory. The Union of Concerned Scientists makes claims 
of a less sweeping scope than Greenpeace or Friends of the Earth USA. For 
example, it speaks of engineered crops that might contaminate the food supply 
with drugs (in the case of plant-made pharmaceuticals) or kill beneficial insects. 
One of its main views is that there should be “an open-end process in adopting 
new technologies. There should be more participants than just government, 
business, and the scientific community. All three of those groups have short-term 
interests […] we are interested in slowing technology down” (interview with 
Margaret Mellon, Union of Concerned Scientists, 9 June 2004, Washington, DC). 
Consumers Union, although it is a major GM food critic, paints a mixed 
picture of the technology: GM foods may be full of potential, but they may also 
harbor many risks. Genetic engineering may be precise in achieving specific 
results, but its wider effects are unpredictable and may have adverse effects on 
human health and the environment. Consumers Union further stresses possible 
effects on health which may include toxicity, allergies and resistance to 
antibiotics due to the use of antibiotic resistance markers in genetic engineering. 
It also addresses hazards that reach beyond health issues. For CU, the most 
important thing is the consumer’s right to choose between GM foods and non-
GM foods. 
Like other GM food opponents, US family farmers point out that the 
scientific knowledge underlying agricultural biotechnology is insufficient, thus in 
effect requesting the application of the EU’s precautionary principle that was 
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described in the previous chapter. They particularly fear environmental effects 
such as contamination of non-GM plants and ecosystems, increased pest and 
weed resistance, and the destruction of wildlife and beneficial insects. Katherine 
Ozer of the National Family Farm Coalition explains that “We have a sense that 
this technology is being imposed on farmers […] without being adequately 
tested, without anyone really knowing what the negative implications could be 
[…]” (interview with Katherine Ozer, National Family Farm Coalition (NFFC), 7 
June 2004, Washington, DC). 
A further common point of GM food opponents’ story-line is a general 
disapproval of the activities and motivations of big corporations. 
Environmentalists base their policies on the deeply held belief that big business is 
consistently motivated by profit and shareholder value, often to the detriment of 
the environment. A main theme in the writings of Greenpeace USA, Friends of 
the Earth, CFS and US PIRG is the deception practiced and environmental harm 
caused by corporations. They tell a story of a planet earth that is ruthlessly and 
continuously abused by agribiotech industries. The health of innocent citizens of 
this earth is also endangered, and they are increasingly left without the possibility 
to make a desirable ethical choice against GM food. They are further convinced 
that it is wrong to allow companies to claim intellectual property rights over plant 
technologies. US PIRG summarizes this point by stating that “[i]n general, these 
crops are being engineered to increase corporate profitability, not to alleviate 
world hunger” (US Public Interest Research Group What isn't the biotech 
industry telling you?). 
True to the farms it represents, the National Farm Family Coalition 
(NFFC) takes a somewhat different approach, although it also agrees with many 
of the points raised by environmental NGOs and public interest groups. NFFC 
deplores agribusiness concentration, it sees as putting the livelihood of individual 
small farmers at risk, and as destroying whole rural communities. Its story-line 
about agricultural biotechnology is less a condemnation of the genetic 
engineering of food than a narrative of how the increasing concentration of 
agribusiness threatens the livelihood and independence of family farms. The fact 
that companies are now patenting GM  seeds, developed out of varieties that 
farmers have been growing for centuries, is equally unacceptable to NFFC. 
Katherine Ozer of NFFC states that “a central issue for NFFC is the question of 
 192
who is in control. We see corporate control as a threat to the ability of family 
farmers to be independent and to make a living” (interview with Katherine Ozer, 
National Family Farm Coalition (NFFC), 7 June 2004, Washington, DC). 
According to the NFFC's “Farmers’ Declaration on Genetic Engineering”, GM 
crops and foods have “increased the economic uncertainty of US family farmers” 
and are threatening traditional agricultural practices in the US and around the 
world (National Family Farm Coalition Farmers’ Declaration on Genetic 
Engineering). NFFC also fundamentally opposes patents on GM seed varieties, 
thus introducing the ethical issue of who has the right to “own” life. 
GM food opponents agree that there is more at stake than just risks for the 
environment and health. For example, in exploring why consumers may reject 
GM food, CU addresses social and cultural questions. According to CU, food is 
special because it is “something we literally take into ourselves”. Therefore, 
“consumers make decisions about what they eat for a wide variety of religious, 
ethical, philosophical and emotional reasons” (Consumers Union 1998b). A 
further example is given by the Council for Responsible Genetics, which is 
concerned with genetic engineering in particular, and which notes that 
“consumers also are concerned with the corporate ownership of seeds and 
genetically engineered food plants. Monopolistic business practices, the 
extreme consolidation of the seed industry, coupled with the patenting of 
seeds has led many consumers to question whether the agribusiness 
corporations have public welfare or private profit as top priority.” 
(Council for Responsible Genetics 2000). 
 
 
Shock events 
The US’s experience with GM foods and crops is marked by three main 
shock events: the monarch butterfly case (1999), the StarLink affair (2000), and 
the ProdiGene incident (2002), all described in more detail in Chapter 2. Because 
they led to only limited public reactions and because they were dealt with quickly 
and efficiently by US regulators, these incidents did not significantly set back the 
work of US actors and actor coalitions favoring relatively permissive GM food 
policies, and did not significantly help coalitions favoring restrictive regulation.  
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In the case of the monarch butterfly, a scientific paper by a Cornell 
University entomologist provided evidence that Bt corn was harmful to monarch 
butterfly larvae. As reported by the Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology, 
actors critical of US policy on GM foods and crops, in this case especially the 
Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) “worked very hard to make this a high-
profile issue because without media attention [they] knew nothing would be 
done” (Margaret Mellon of UCS, cited in Pew Initiative on Food and 
Biotechnology 2002: 8-9). Despite this effort, however, the issue died down, 
probably because the EPA’s regulatory response appeared to be adequate and the 
impact on monarch butterflies less harmful than first expected. 
In the case of StarLink, traces of StarLink corn, a GM corn variety 
approved for use in feed but not in food, were discovered in Kraft taco shells. 
After this discovery, 51 consumers reported allergic reactions as a result of 
consuming taco shells. Roughly half of these qualified for testing, and 17 were 
willing to give blood samples to the Center for Disease Control and Prevention. In 
a report released in 2001, the Center for Disease Control and Prevention found no 
“evidence that the reactions that the affected people experienced were associated 
with hypersensitivity to the Cry9c protein” (Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention 2001, see also Kaufman 2001). 
These events, together with the fact that StarLink producer Aventis agreed 
to compensate for financial losses due to StarLink, eventually resulted in the issue 
dying down without having created a major loss of public trust. The reactions of 
industry and regulators alike were swift and efficient, displaying an “in control” 
situation to American consumers. As summarized by Ron Gaskill of the 
American Farm Bureau Federation, StarLink caused little public outcry because 
regulators did their job: they stepped in, made the necessary inquiries and 
removed the product from the market (interview with Ron Gaskill, American 
Farm Bureau Federation, 9 June 2004, Washington, DC). 
StarLink did, however, have an important effect on certain actors of the 
food chain. Food processors, producers and retailers realized the need to put in 
place certain safeguards to avoid further StarLink-type episodes. For example, 
they strongly recommend and have been successful in obtaining regulatory 
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procedures resulting in authorizations that are always for both feed and food, and 
not for just feed as was the case with StarLink corn.  
Like the monarch butterfly and StarLink, the ProdiGene incident did not 
have drastic effects on public opinion, mainly because APHIS discovered that 
soybeans had been contaminated with GM corn engineered to produce 
pharmaceuticals before they could enter the food chain. The ProdiGene incident 
led food producers and processors to question the use of food crops for new 
biotechnology applications such as plant-made-pharmaceuticals (PMPs) because 
they fear widespread US consumer rejection if a future such event occurs and 
PMPs are found to have actually entered the food chain. 
In summary, although the shock events described attracted media and 
public attention for a while, they did not have a lasting effect on public opinion on 
GM food and crops, and did not undermine public trust in regulatory institutions. 
Birkland’s statement that “[if] no advocacy coalitions react, events will gain little 
more than passing attention” holds true for the United States: only individual 
actors reacted to the shock events, but did not act as convincing advocacy 
coalitions (Birkland 1998: 72). Krimsky suggests that in order for there to be real 
public reaction, a catastrophe leading to many deaths, or a major book (such as 
Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, referred to above) is needed. He concludes that 
“StarLink drew media attention, but did not result in any deaths” and that “the 
monarch butterfly did cause some reaction”, but not enough because it “is an 
insect, not a human being” (interview with Sheldon Krimsky, Tufts University, 25 
June 2004, Medford, MA).  
One possible reason for the US public’s relative lack of reaction to these 
events described may be its fairly high level of acceptance of GM foods and 
crops. Cantley et al. write that throughout the 1990s, US consumers displayed 
generally positive views about GM foods (Cantley et al. 1999). Similarly, Hoban 
showed in 1997 that US consumers were among the most likely to purchase GM 
foods, compared with consumers in a series of European countries (Hoban 1997). 
This trend has continued into the new millennium. In 2001, around 70% of 
Americans were willing to buy GM foods (Falk et al. 2002: 1386-7), and in 2004, 
almost 50% of consumers who were told that over half of all supermarket 
products contain GM ingredients believed them to be safe (Pew Initiative on Food 
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and Biotechnology 2004b). Mainstream consumers’ only real point of criticism is 
that they would like to see GM products labeled (ibid.). 
These high levels of acceptance and US Americans’ lack of reaction to 
shock events might be also connected to the fact that “most Americans [are] 
unaware of the extent to which crops derived from biotechnology have entered 
the marketplace” (Falk et al. 2002: 1386). Asked in 2002 whether they had ever 
eaten GM foods, only 19% of Americans questioned replied that they had, 
although it is estimated that over 60% of processed food contain GM ingredients 
(ibid.). In 2004, the Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology confirmed that 
“Americans remain relatively uninformed about genetically modified foods” 
(Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology 2004b). According to critics such as 
the Union of Concerned Scientists, this does not mean that the public wants GM 
foods: “The US public is not accepting, […] it’s just passive” (interview with 
Margaret Mellon, Union of Concerned Scientists, 9 June 2004, Washington, DC). 
The US public’s support for GM foods is undoubtedly also connected to 
its relatively high level of trust in US regulatory institutions (Gaskell et al. 1999, 
Gaskell et al. 2002). Actors in the field of GM foods especially cite the Food and 
Drug Administration as enjoying a high level of trust, perhaps going back as far 
as FDA’s judgment with respect to the drug thalidomide.152 
According to Gaskell et al., another possible reason for different levels of 
public support is “media intensity” (Gaskell et al 2002: 373). US media coverage 
of GM food, although critical at times, is supportive or non-existent in 
comparison with European media, especially the UK media, which launched an 
all-out war on GM food in the late 1990s, and remains very critical today. A 
further example is the German media which, although not as sensationalist as the 
UK press, treats GM food as a high profile issue, a phenomenon connected with 
                                                     
152 Thalidomide, a drug produced by the West-German company Chemie Grünenthal, was 
authorized in European countries and administered to pregnant women to treat morning sickness 
in the late 1950s and early 1960s. At this time, the Food and Drug Administration judged that 
there was insufficient proof of the drug’s safety and did not approve it. Thalidomide was 
withdrawn worldwide in late 1961 and 1962 after doctors linked it to an epidemic of birth defects. 
It should be noted, however, that the public’s trust in FDA with respect to pharmaceutical 
approvals has recently suffered as a result of a series of setbacks relating to drug safety (Harris 
2005). The 2004 withdrawal from the market of the osteoarthritis drug Vioxx due to concerns 
about increased risk of heart attack and stroke is an example of this. 
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the German public’s strong concern with environmental  issues, and with the 
importance of the German Green Party. 
 
Activity and impact on policy 
US actors supporting GM food work both individually and in 
collaboration, and in both formal and informal ways. Since non-governmental 
pro-GM food actors in the United States display relatively cohesive opinions and 
share very supportive views, it has been relatively easy for them to engage in both 
informal cooperation and coordinated activity over time. Overall, as stated above, 
US actors and coalitions of actors in favor of a permissive GM food policy have 
been able to keep policy at the permissive level set by the 1986 Coordinated 
Framework. Actors opposing GM foods and supporting restrictive policy, on the 
other hand, have been unable to present a united front and have not shown as 
much cohesion and cooperation as GM food supporters. They have also had to 
contend with the status quo of permissive GM food policy. To date, they have not 
been successful in achieving a change in policy. 
One of the most successful individual GM food supporters is the 
Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO). BIO began to launch campaigns to 
raise government and industry support for biotechnology and permissive policies 
in the 1980s, earlier than EuropaBio, its European counterpart, and earlier than 
many other pro-GM food organizations in the US. After GM crops and food 
became a large-scale and profitable business in the mid-1990s, BIO continued to 
represent agricultural biotechnology effectively and aggressively. 
An important forum for coordinated activity created by GM food 
proponents is the Alliance for Better Foods (ABF). ABF's sponsors include 
Grocery Manufacturers of America, the American Farm Bureau Federation, the 
Food Products Association, and other more specialized food sector organizations. 
ABF, which was most active during the late 1990s, was created to lobby 
regulators in Washington, DC with the primary goals of promoting public 
acceptance and of opposing the labeling of genetically modified foods. In the 
words of GMA, 
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“The Alliance is committed to helping people understand [the] benefits as 
well as the safety of using biotechnology in foods, and to providing useful 
and balanced information on the topic” (Grocery Manufacturers of 
America Biotechnology-Alliance for Better Foods). 
Karil Kochenderfer of Grocery Manufacturers of America further explains that 
“the Alliance for Better Foods was a collective effort along the food chain 
to make sure that we were talking openly and robustly about the 
technology. Its activities subsided primarily because that need died down. 
The height of its activity was between 1998 and 2001/02.” (interview with 
Karil Kochenderfer, Grocery Manufacturers of America, 17 June 2004, 
Washington, DC). 
A crucial semi-formal vehicle for cooperation is the AgBiotech Planning 
Committee. It is not widely publicized, but it is cited by most actors supporting 
GM foods and crops as an important and regular forum for the exchange of 
opinions and for the launching of coordinated actions. The AgBiotech Planning 
Committee, based in Washington DC, consists of organizations that represent the 
biotechnology industry, farmers, food processors, food producers and retailers. It 
typically meets once or twice a month to discuss current GM food policy issues, 
and to devise common positions and strategies whenever judged useful. This 
committee ensures that supportive actors are informed of one another’s activities 
and positions, and puts in place a platform to plan and organize more formal joint 
actions. No other coalition of actors discussed in this chapter has put in place this 
type of forum. 
An informal, but significant form of cooperation exists through the often 
close collaboration that exists between regulatory agencies and stakeholders. 
Regulators often describe their relationships with companies as “working with 
them” to get products approved. To biotechnology companies, regulators seem 
generally accessible and collaborative in their dealings with actors wanting GM 
products to be approved. To GM food critics, this seems like industry favoritism: 
“there is a very strong de facto coalition between government and industry in 
favor of GM food and crops” (interview with Katherine Ozer, National Family 
Farm Coalition, 7 June 2004, Washington, DC). 
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This type of informal collaboration is denounced by GM food critics as a 
result of the “revolving door” phenomenon, which could be described as the fact 
that many individuals in industry and in government frequently change 
professional positions, and often switch back and forth between government and 
industry. The “revolving door” is a variation of the US-developed “iron triangle” 
concept, which refers to the close relationship between the US Congress, 
bureaucracy and interest groups, and has many different names, depending on the 
context. This phenomenon is not specific to agricultural biotechnology and is 
found in many sectors. It is important to mention that this phenomenon seems 
more widespread in the US than in the EU, where switches between industry and 
government, while certainly present, seem to occur less frequently. Moreover, the 
fact that the US government should appoint individuals who have worked for 
industry for many years to high responsibility and political positions points 
towards a deliberate search for a collaborative relationship between the regulator 
and the regulated. 
Three prominent examples of individuals who have worked in multiple 
high responsibility positions in government and industry are the following: 1) 
Linda Fisher, who currently works in an executive position for DuPont, was 
previously Deputy Administrator of EPA and EPA assistant administrator of the 
Office of Prevention, Pesticides and Toxic Substances. Before that, she had 
worked as vice president of Government Affairs for Monsanto. 2) Val Giddings 
is currently the Vice President for Food and Agriculture of the Biotechnology 
Industry Organization (BIO). Before joining BIO, Giddings worked within 
APHIS, serving on the US delegations that negotiated the Biodiversity 
Convention and represented the US at the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development Conference in Rio de Janeiro in 1992.  3) Richard 
Crowder was recently nominated US Trade Representative's Chief Agricultural 
Negotiator. His jobs before this appointment include senior positions with the 
American Seed Trade Association, a Washington lobby for the seed industry, and 
Dekalb Genetics, an agricultural biotechnology company now part of Monsanto.  
A number of US states have supported GM foods and crops by passing 
bills on specific aspects of agricultural biotechnology. Bills supporting the use of 
GM foods have, for example, called for the banning of crop-destruction, or have 
expressed general support for biotechnology. The content of state bills tends to 
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reflect regional interests. Measures that support agricultural biotechnology are 
usually passed by states with large farming sectors (Pew Initiative on Food and 
Biotechnology Legislation Tracker 2004). 
 
US actors critical of GM food have engaged in some, but not continuous 
coordinated activity. Some actors, like Greenpeace and the Union of Concerned 
Scientists, tend to act on their own instead of with other groups, even though they 
may share compatible views and goals. Coordinated activity is usually on specific 
issues, and is often concentrated in individual regions of the United States. The 
US government and mainstream political parties in no way support GM food 
opponents’ activities. 
An important collaboration took place through the Genetically Engineered 
Food Alert, which was especially active in the late 1990s. Genetically Engineered 
Food Alert is a coalition of several organizations including US PIRG, Friends of 
the Earth, the Center for Food Safety, and the Organic Consumers Association. 
The focus of this campaign was a call for the labeling of GM foods, as well as to 
protest against GM foods produced by Kraft Foods (“Genetically Krafted Foods 
campaign”). A visibly successful campaign by US opponents of GM foods was 
the “Stop GM Wheat Campaign”. Many of the above-mentioned actors 
participated in this campaign. Their efforts were rewarded when, in May 2004, 
Monsanto, anticipating a negative reaction from farmers and consumers, 
announced that it was dropping plans to commercialize GM wheat. While 
successful in influencing Monsanto’s company policy, the company did not have 
an impact on federal regulation.  
A further campaign worth mentioning, launched by the National Family 
Farm Coalition (NFFC), is the “Farmer to Farmer Campaign on Genetic 
Engineering” (National Family Farm Coalition Farmer to Farmer Campaign on 
Genetic Engineering). This network of US farm organizations seeks to build a 
farmer-driven campaign informing farmers of the risks of genetic engineering in 
agriculture. They focus on issues such as labeling, industry liability, and banning 
biopharmaceuticals in food crops. 
The US Congress and several US states have proposed a series of bills on 
various issues regarding genetically modified food. By far the most active US 
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congressman is Dennis Kucinich, a GM food skeptic from Ohio who ran in the 
2004 Democratic presidential primaries. A member of the House of 
Representatives since 1997, Kucinich has introduced several versions of various 
bills questioning current US regulation of GM foods. His more recent bills 
include the “Genetically Engineered Food Safety Act” (US Congress, House of 
Representatives 2003b, introduced in 2003), which calls for amendments to the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act which would make GM food approval 
obligatory and more stringent. A second bill is the “Real Solutions to World 
Hunger Act of 2003” (US Congress, House of Representatives 2003c, introduced 
in 2003), which prevents exports of non-authorized GM produce. A third 
noteworthy bill is the “Genetically Engineered Food Right to Know Act” (US 
Congress, House of Representatives 2003d, introduced in 2003), which calls for 
the labeling of GM food. A similar bill was introduced in 2000 by Senator 
Barbara Boxer (US Congress, Senate 2000). None of these bills came near to 
being passed or even voted on. Margaret Mellon of the Union of Concerned 
Scientist comments that 
“the US Congress is out of the loop because of the White House’s decision 
taken in the mid-1980s to pass no new laws on biotechnology. Some 
people in Congress are interested in the issue, but it’s a non-starter to want 
to legislate against the will of the administration.” (interview with 
Margaret Mellon, Union of Concerned  Scientists, 9 June 2004, 
Washington, DC). 
The 1986 Coordinated Framework has never been fundamentally 
questioned by state legislation (Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology 
Legislation Tracker 2004). Topics addressed have included labeling and liability, 
but also anti-crop destruction or the expression of general support for 
biotechnology, as mentioned above. State legislative initiatives have not led to 
any change in US federal policy on GM foods (as was indirectly the case for 
rDNA research), in stark contrast to the impact of European Union Member 
States. Most legislative initiatives are not passed, but serve to raise awareness and 
spark a debate. US States most active in raising contentious issues connected to 
GM foods and in questioning US federal regulations are California, Vermont and 
Maine. Examples of bills passed that show a critical stance towards current 
federal regulation include Maine’s June 2003 bill imposing a civil violation for 
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the false labeling of products as non-GM (Maine Legislature 2003), and 
Vermont’s April 2004 bill requiring all GM seed to be labeled (Vermont 
Legislature 2004) (Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology Legislation Tracker 
2004). 
 
7.2 Actors and actor coalitions in the European Union 
EU actors and actor coalitions in favor of GM food and crops 
EU actors supporting GM foods and permissive regulation have been 
unable to render the EU’s relatively restrictive policy more permissive. There are 
three main reasons for this. The first is that in the EU, there are fewer supportive 
actors than in the US, and that the supportive actors appear to be less convinced 
by the positions they advocate. The second is that these actors are only 
moderately united, both in terms of their goals and with regard to the story-lines 
they tell. Third, EU actors wanting to promote GM foods have had been 
confronted with hostile public opinion and a low level of trust in institutions in 
Europe, a result of several important shock events related to food safety.  
Actors In the EU, the only consistent supporter of GM food is the 
agricultural biotechnology industry. Large farmers, and food processors and 
producers have taken an equivocal approach, offering neither clear support, nor 
outspoken criticism. The positions of farmers, and food processors and producers 
are discussed in this section, since their approach to agricultural biotechnology 
does not present an obstacle to GM foods. In addition, certain government actors 
– the European Commission and some Member States – have taken supportive 
stances towards GM foods.153 
Key European agricultural biotechnology companies, all of which operate 
worldwide, are Bayer CropScience, a unit of the German company Bayer, and the 
Swiss company Syngenta. As explained above, the GM seed market is strongly 
linked with the pesticide market. Syngenta and Bayer control 17% of that market 
                                                     
153 As in the case of the US, molecular biologists in the EU have not been very active in the debate 
surrounding GM foods and crops. When they have voiced their views, their opinions on GM foods 
have been as divided as those of other actors in the EU. Noëlle Vonthron confirms this impression: 
“In Europe, even scientists disagree on whether GM foods are safe or not” (interview with Noëlle 
Vonthron, EuroCommerce, 17 September 2004, Brussels). 
 202
each, but share only roughly 12 to 20% of the GM seed market with DuPont, 
while Monsanto dominates 80-88% of it (ETC Group 2005a, 2005b). At the EU-
level, they are represented by the European Association for Bioindustries 
(EuropaBio). Like their US counterparts, EU-based multinationals favor flexible 
regulation of GM products. Bernard Graciet of Syngenta summarizes their 
position well when he says that Syngenta welcomes legislation that “minimizes 
risks and is realistically applicable” (interview with Bernard Graciet, Syngenta, 
15 June 2004, Brussels). As with US multinationals, these companies’ resources 
are considerable, although EuropaBio, is a small organization in comparison to 
BIO in the US.154 
Large-scale farms using intensive farming methods are less frequent in 
Europe than in the US. Large farms (by European standards) mainly growing 
grain exist in countries like Denmark, France, Germany, Spain and the UK. At 
the EU-level, this type of mainstream farmer is represented by the Committee of 
Agricultural Organisations in the European Union - General Confederation of 
Agricultural Co-operatives in the European Union (COPA-COGECA). This is a 
relatively large lobbying group, but again, Farm Bureau’s staff in Washington, 
DC is larger, and its resources vaster. 
Main food processors and producers are European-based multinational 
companies such as Nestlé (Switzerland) and Unilever (UK/Netherlands). The 
relatively small staff (as compared to GMA in the US) of the Confederation of 
the Food and Drink Industries of the European Union (CIAA) represents their 
interests in Brussels. For the case of the EU, food producers are discussed 
separately from food retailers, who have adopted more GM food-critical position. 
Governmental actors that are supportive, but sometimes reticent and inconsistent, 
are the European Commission, as well as certain Member States, although this 
can fluctuate a great deal with national political agendas and situations. 
Positions and interests The regulatory goals of EU actors supporting 
agricultural biotechnology are more modest and less cohesive than those of US 
supporters. Aiming to sell its products and improve the image of GM foods in 
Europe, the biotechnology industry is the only constant and convinced supporter 
                                                     
154 Simon Barber of EuropaBio notes that “EuropaBio is tiny. We are ten people and [BIO] are 
probably 100. Our budget for the green sector is less than a tenth of what theirs is” (interview with 
Simon Barber, EuropaBio, 16 September 2004, Brussels). 
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of GM technology in the EU. The agricultural biotechnology industry points out 
the problems of what it perceives to be an illogical process-based regulatory 
system, but does not dwell on this point, instead formulating its position as a 
reaction to the regulatory status quo. The biotech industry’s main focus is to limit 
the degree of restrictiveness imposed by current regulation, for example as 
regards labeling and traceability, as well as more recent issues like liability and 
coexistence. Overall, the industry encourages a regulatory framework which, for 
all its restrictiveness, is reliable and predictable and will facilitate product 
authorization. This goal is illustrated by one interviewee close to the 
biotechnology industry who prefers to remain anonymous:  
“What we have at the moment is a lack of predictability within the 
regulatory process. It should be reasonably predictable whether your 
product can be approved or not. Approval should be science-based, but 
decision-making in this area has become entirely politicized”. 
 Berhard Graciet of Syngenta voices similar discontentment: 
“First, the issue was traceability and labeling of GM foods in connection 
with consumer choice. Now that those rules are in place, The European 
Commission has decided that GM crops cannot be grown without the 
regulation of coexistence, the details of which are to be defined by the 
Member States. When coexistence rules are in place, the issue of 
environmental liability is likely to be taken up. This is a very unstable and 
unpredictable regulatory environment for industry to deal with. Every time 
an obstacle for the new technology is overcome, a new one is put in place” 
(interview with Bernard Graciet, Syngenta, 15 September, Brussels 2004). 
Large-scale mainstream farmers are more equivocal supporters of GM 
food and crops. They are neither ideologically opposed nor particularly 
enthusiastic about agricultural biotechnology. As Roxane Feller of COPA-
COGECA summarizes, “our position with respect to GMO is not very strong: we 
are neither for nor against GMOs” (interview with Roxane Feller, Committee of 
Professional Agricultural Organisations in the European Union and General 
Confederation of Agricultural Co-operatives in the European Union (COPA-
COGECA), 14 September 2004, Brussels). Furthermore, 
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“COPA-COGECA has two principles with respect to GMOs: 1. To each 
his own responsibility: it is not up to farmers to decide whether GM crops 
and foods should enter the marketplace or not. 2. Each farmer should be 
able to choose what he grows and how he grows it” (ibid.).  
Farmers in the EU thus support the principle of maintaining farmer and consumer 
choice by applying process-based rules and the precautionary principle when 
necessary, as well as by adopting an enforceable (i.e. not too strict) approach to 
labeling. 
This relatively vague position is connected to the fact that the benefits that 
European farmers can expect from commercialized GM crops are not all that 
tangible. First, most European farms are not as large as the agribusinesses for 
which GM crops have been developed, thus reducing the potential benefit of high 
yields that usually occur through efficient cultivation of large expanses. Second, 
soybeans, a major GM crop, are hardly grown in Europe. Third, as discussed 
under paradigms, European agricultural policy has been increasingly rewarding 
farmers for taking land out of production, and emphasizing quality over quantity, 
whereas GM crops, in the European context, are not associated with quality. 
Fourth, interconnected with this point, European consumers appear to reject GM 
crops and foods. This rejection has traveled up the food chain, from consumers to 
retailers to producers and processors, and finally to farmers and even to the 
biotechnology industry. If EU consumers do not want to eat GM foods and they 
do not present a significant advantage for farming, why should farmers plant 
them?155 
True to their pragmatic and somewhat ambiguous approach to GM foods, 
EU food industries tend to orient their policies toward consumer preferences. 
This is summarized for the case of Nestlé by Guido Kayaert who states that his 
company’s 
“position is that the use of biotechnology is acceptable if GM products 
are safe, and if this approach can be communicated properly to the 
                                                     
155 The only country to plant GM crops commercially in the EU is Spain. 12% of the corn grown 
in Spain is Bt corn (about 58.000 hectares), used mainly for animal feed (TransGen 2005a). Bt 
corn is a reasonable choice for Spanish farmers in the northeastern and central Spanish regions of 
Aragón, Castilla-La Mancha, and Cataluña, where the European corn borer is widespread. 
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consumer. The underlying principle is self-responsibility” (interview with 
Guido Kayaert, Nestlé, 6 September 2004, Brussels). 
In the mid-1990s, food industries opposed labeling and supported the use of GM 
ingredients in processed food. In the late 1990s, however, when it became clear 
that the EU public might not accept GM food easily, they adopted a more reticent 
if still basically supportive position. Food industries advocate a policy that is 
permissive enough to allow for innovation, and restrictive enough to give 
consumers and industry alike the option to choose between GM and non-GM 
food. They support labeling with a “realistic” threshold, that is a threshold that 
industry will be able to apply relatively easily and at as low a cost as possible. 
Dominique Taeymans of the Confederation of the Food and Drink Industries of 
the European Union (CIAA) explains that 
"the main problem for CIAA members is the issue of GM food labeling 
[…]. It is CIAA's policy to try to avoid overly strict labeling regulations. 
Our view is that labeling leads to unfair stigmatization of a product" 
(interview with Dominique Taeymans, Confederation of the Food and 
Drink Industries of the European Union, 7 September 2004, Brussels). 
Instead of going overtly “GM free” as retailers have, food industries producing 
for the EU market generally circumvent the GM ingredient problem by 
reformulating the recipes of their products to not contain GM ingredients, or by 
ensuring that individual GM ingredients stay under the adventitious presence 
threshold of 0.9%. 
The positions of the European Commission and EU Member States 
supporting GM foods are conditioned by the dual goal of increasing the 
continent’s international competitiveness while protecting consumer health and 
the environment. As explained in Chapter 6, the European Commission has 
always aimed to develop regulations that would both stimulate growth and 
competitiveness and offer consumers and the environment adequate protection. 
Much the same regulatory goals can be found in individual supportive Member 
States. Their regulatory aim is thus to strike a balance between these two 
potentially contradictory goals. Member States’ positions and internal political 
situations are reflected by the Council of Ministers’ voting records on the 
authorization of individual GM products. 
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Specific reasons for promoting GM foods are rooted in national research 
and industry traditions in biotechnology that began to develop in the 1980s. For 
example, the Netherlands has made significant investments in biotechnology 
since the 1980s, and wants to capitalize on them (Gutteling et al. 2001).156 
Similarly, in Finland, biotechnology became firmly established both in academia 
and business in the 1980s, and is thus considered a strategic sector (Rusanen et al. 
2001). In the UK, a country with a similarly strong tradition in biotechnology 
research and applications, there exists a tradition of pragmatic and case-by-case 
policy-making, which was shaken somewhat when the GM food controversy 
surfaced (Gaskell et al. 2001). Some countries have been supportive in the past, 
but have pulled back from that position for political reasons. For example, Spain, 
the only EU country cultivating GM crops commercially, has been generally 
supportive, but recently has abstained from voting on controversial authorizations 
since the 2004 national election produced a new center-left majority in parliament 
and government. Other examples are France and Belgium, which have reviewed 
their supportive stance somewhat due to pressures from civil society. 
Story-lines The story-line told by GM food proponents in the EU is less 
cohesive than is the case in the US. While EuropaBio’s story-line is similar to 
that told by its US counterpart BIO, narratives by farmers and the food industry 
are more cautious and less confident. 
EuropaBio tells a story of a technology based on sound science, and of a 
technology with the potential to greatly benefit the environment. Despite 
presenting the same types of arguments in favor of GM plants and foods, 
EuropaBio comes across as somewhat more defensive than BIO (EuropaBio 
Frequently asked Questions about Plant Biotechnology). Its slogan, “The Voice 
of the European Bioindustries”, is more neutral, and much less strident and 
ideological than that of BIO (“Partner to a Dynamic Industry Coming of Age”). 
EuropaBio seems to expect that EU citizens will not be as easily convinced as US 
citizens by the potential benefits of biotechnology. In its fact sheet on “green 
                                                     
156 Oscar Meuffels of the Permanent Representation of the Netherlands to the EU further explains 
that the Netherlands have been supportive of agricultural biotechnology since its introduction, a 
position connected with a  tradition of research in this area, the importance of the agricultural 
biotechnology industry in the Netherlands, as well as with the Dutch people's relatively non-
emotional relationship with food (interview with Oscar Meuffels, Representation of the 
Netherlands to the EU, 17 September 2004, Brussels). 
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biotech”, the organization seems to feel obliged to refer to Europeans' negative 
public perception of biotechnology – possibly a result of “confusion with other 
food scares” – and their “lack of trust in the regulatory system” (EuropaBio 
Green Biotech). EuropaBio tries to convince European citizens that scientifically 
sound and rigorous safety assessments conducted by independent government 
experts, and following international standards ensure safety in the field of 
agricultural biotechnology. All in all, EuropaBio conveys the impression that it is 
mainly concerned with “saving what there is to be saved”. 
The story-line told by the Committee of Agricultural Organisations in the 
European Union/General Confederation of Agricultural Co-operatives in the 
European Union (COPA-COGEGA), the organization representing EU 
mainstream farmers, is bland and pragmatic, a striking contrast to Farm Bureau’s 
fiery rhetoric (Committee of Agricultural Organisations in the European 
Union/General Committee for Agricultural Cooperation in the European Union 
2000) “Freedom of choice” is the only element that Farm Bureau’s and COPA-
COGECA’s story-lines have in comon, and yet they mean different things by that 
phrase. While Farm Bureau is referring to the right to choose GM crops, COPA-
COGECA is referring to farmers' freedom to choose between the use of GM 
crops and non-GM crops. COPA-COGECA does not oppose GM crops and food 
on principle and its feelings toward agricultural biotechnology are clearly 
ambivalent. Its position is that precaution is necessary in the face of scientific 
uncertainty. It also voices support for publicly funded research instead of 
research conducted by private industries. In particular, it advocates public 
research on the possible consequences of GM food for human health and the 
environment. It also calls for a wide public debate on GM foods. The story-line 
told by COPA-COGECA contains a pragmatic dimension: agricultural 
biotechnology is here to stay. Whether it ends up being particularly beneficial or 
not, European farmers and citizens alike should be in a position to make informed 
decisions.  
Like its US counterparts (GMA and FPA), the Confederation of the Food 
and Drink Industries of the European Union (CIAA) promotes free market 
values, but its story-line is far less ideologically motivated. In the context of 
European consumer rejection of GM food, CIAA advocates industry's right to 
choose between the use of GM and GM-free foods and food ingredients, a 
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responsible use of agricultural biotechnology, and maintaining consumer 
confidence. It tells a somewhat colorless story of the trouble that European food 
industries face trying to avoid using GM foods and ingredients altogether. CIAA 
further stresses that “industry is convinced that a responsible use of 
biotechnological developments would benefit all actors of the food chain”. The 
only reason why CIAA promotes process-based regulation and labeling is that the 
European consumer might otherwise reject the food industries' products. It fears 
that the recently updated EU labeling rules will create a sizable administrative 
burden. From CIAA's point of view, the old and less rigorous labeling rules 
served the food industry well: they kept administrative costs relatively low while 
keeping the consumer satisfied. 
As documented in Chapter 5, the European Commission has gone to great 
trouble to promote biotechnology starting in the 1980s (Nollert 2000, Abels 
2002). It has assigned biotechnology research and development the main role in 
closing a perceived technological gap between Europe and the United States. At 
the same time, the late 1990s saw a shift towards precaution, and towards the 
need to understand and address European citizens’ skeptical approach towards 
science and technology. 
In response to this skepticism, in its “White Paper on Governance”, the 
Commission emphasizes the need to “[b]uild public confidence in the way policy 
makers use expert advice” by opening the decision-making process to greater 
public scrutiny and debate (European Commission 2001: 19, 33). Its recent 
strategy document entitled “Life sciences and biotechnology – A Strategy for 
Europe” (European Commission 2002) reiterates Commission support for 
biotechnology by stating that “Life sciences and biotechnology are widely 
recognised to be, after information technology, the next wave of the knowledge-
based economy, creating new opportunities for our societies and economies”. It 
specifically underlines that in “the agro-food area, biotechnology has the 
potential to deliver improved food quality and environmental benefits through 
agronomically improved crops”. The Commission’s solution to public rejection 
of biotechnology and especially GM foods includes “societal dialogue” and 
respect for “ethical values and societal goals” (European Commission 2002: 11). 
In summary, the European Commission has remained supportive of GM foods, 
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while at the same time trying to widen its acceptance through improved methods 
of “governance”157. 
Some have analyzed this shift as a new, necessary focus on “input 
legitimacy”, i.e. rendering the decision-making process more representative and 
accountable, in addition to the already developed “output legitimacy”, based on 
performance and expertise (Abels 2002, Landfried 1998158, Skogstad 2003, von 
Schomberg 1998159). According to Skogstad, “the EU faces a dual legitimation 
imperative […] in policy areas, like genetic engineering, of declining authority of 
unaccountable experts and deep societal cleavages over public policy goals” 
(Skogstad 2003: 334).  
From the perspective of critics of GM foods, the Commission is indeed 
biased in favor of agricultural biotechnology. For example, Éric Gall of 
Greenpeace’s European Unit states that “the European Commission is very pro-
innovation […] and tries to push GMOs onto the market whenever it has the 
opportunity” (interview with Éric Gall, Greenpeace, 13 September 2004, 
Brussels).160 
Similarly to the Commission, Member States supportive of GM foods 
emphasize the need to fully utilize the potential of biotechnology while providing 
citizens with adequate protection. In the late 1990s, these countries generally 
switched from a policy of simply promoting modern biotechnology as part of 
public policy and seeing it as a tool for future R&D to creating more possibilities 
for involving the public and recognizing the need to address ethical and social 
                                                     
157 The Commission’s White Paper on Governance defines governance as “rules, processes and 
behaviour that affect the way in which powers are exercised at the European level, particularly as 
regards openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence (European 
Commission 2001: 8). For example, it is in the name of governance that the Commission took 
what could be defined as a consumer-friendly position in the 2003 regulations of GM food and 
feed, and on labeling and traceability.  
158 Landfried does not use the term “input legitimacy”, but her call for “communicative 
knowledge” in the area of genetic engineering policy is a comparable concept. 
159 Von Schomberg calls for a “discursive” policy process, which follows “the logic of […] 
uncertainty”, and which can therefore be “flexible […], effective and legitimate” (von Schomberg 
1998: 125, 135). 
160 Gall adds that “the fact that there is a strong lobby by the biotech industry and strong pressure 
from the United States also explain the Commission’s stance on GMOs. It has, however, been 
pushed in other directions by public opinion and by some EU Member States” (interview with 
Éric Gall, Greenpeace, 13 September 2004, Brussels). 
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issues (Gutteling et al. 2001, Rusanen et al. 2001, Gaskell et al.). Simon Barber 
of EuropaBio sees this shift as 
“a phenomenon of total schizophrenia in Europe, in which the Council 
starts out emphasizing the Lisbon agenda161, and then individual Member 
States or individual ministers of Member States sabotage the effort” 
(interview with Simon Barber, EuropaBio, 16 September 2004, Brussels). 
 
EU actors and actor coalitions against GM foods and crops 
Actors and the coalition of actors opposing agricultural biotechnology in 
the EU have been very successful in achieving many of their policy goals. Since 
the EU first passed legislation on GM foods, they have been able to obtain more 
restrictive rules, for example in the areas of labeling and traceability. One of the 
reasons for this success is that EU actors opposing GM foods have pushed for 
common goals throughout. Furthermore, the coalition is relatively strong because 
it includes important actors that the US coalition does not. Finally, anti-GM food 
actors and actor coalitions found fertile ground for their anti-GM agenda in 
Europe, where a series of much-publicized shock events consolidate the European 
public’s distrust in its regulatory institutions. 
Actors EU actors opposed to GM foods are small-scale and organic 
farmers, food retailers, consumers, environmental groups and green parties, both 
at the European and national levels. Small-scale and organic farmers are 
represented by European Farmers Coordination (CPE, Coordination Paysanne 
Européenne) at the EU-level, an organization that consists of farmer and rural 
organizations that radically oppose any introduction of GM crops and foods into 
the food chain. CPE members include José Bové's Confédération Paysanne. Small 
retailers operate on a national level while large retailers may be present in more 
than one country. They are represented by EuroCommerce at the EU-level. 
Examples of large retailers are Carrefour in France, Metro in Germany, Royal 
Ahold in the Netherlands, and Tesco in the UK. European Consumers are 
represented by the European Consumers' Organisation (BEUC, Bureau européen 
                                                     
161 In 2000, at the Lisbon European Council (summit meeting of heads of state and government of 
EU Member States), European leaders committed themselves to making the European Union “the 
most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in the world” by 2010 (European 
Council 2000). 
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des consommateurs). Key environmental groups are Greenpeace and Friends of 
the Earth. Green parties are generally opposed to GM food; examples are the 
European Greens (consisting of Member State green parties) and the European 
Free Alliance (consisting of green parties from European regions described as 
“stateless nations”, such as Scotland or the Basque Country). Together, these 
make up the European Parliament’s “European Greens – European Free 
Alliance”. Particularly supportive and active national green parties include 
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (Germany), Les Verts (France), and ECOLO and Groen! 
(both from Belgium). 
An important difference between the EU and the US is that in the EU, 
non-governmental actors that are not funded by industry tend to receive support 
from governmental institutions. For example, almost one third of Friends of the 
Earth Europe’s budget consists of financial support from the European 
Commission’s Environment Directorate-General, and another 4% comes from 
national environmental ministries, whereas Friends of the Earth USA does not 
receive financial support from government (Friends of the Earth Europe About 
Us, Friends of the Earth USA 2004: 13)162 Greenpeace Europe, however, has a 
policy of not accepting donations from governments, corporations or political 
parties.  
Governmental and non-governmental EU actors opposed to GM foods are 
strongly united in their quest for ever-stricter process-based regulation of GM 
foods based on the precautionary principle. They have called for and obtained 
more stringent labeling rules, as well as a traceability regime. They are now 
pushing to make other areas of regulation more restrictive, in particular, liability, 
coexistence and adventitious GM presence in seed. 
Positions and interests These actors’ interests in restrictive regulation are 
slightly different, but all lead to the same basic position and policy goals. Small 
and organic farmers’ interest is to expand support and markets for the kind of 
farming that they depend on for their livelihood: non-intensive farming, based on 
principles of sustainability and quality instead of low cost and quantity. EU 
retailers’ support for restrictive regulation, on the other hand, is directly linked to 
                                                     
162 Nevertheless, Friends of the Earth USA’s revenue is more than thee times that of Friends of 
the Earth Europe. 
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consumer preference. They wish to be able to sell non-GM foods since that is 
what the consumer wants to buy. As in the US, consumers are interested is the 
right to choose between GM food and non GM food, as well as the protection of 
their health, and consumer organizations have a stake in representing these 
interests in order to operate successfully. Like in the United States, 
environmentalists’ objective is to protect the environment. Their interest in 
seeking restrictive GM food regulation is also in maintaining and increasing 
public support, trust and therefore membership and financial contributions. 
Parties and governmental actors opposed to GM foods have an interest in 
representing the views of their members and electorate. 
Story-lines EU actors critical of GM foods are united by a story-line that is 
similar in many ways to the narrative of critical actors in the US, but one which is 
stronger and more successful. Some of its more extreme elements are not shared 
by EU retailers, most consumers or government actors. This has not been an 
obstacle, however, for the development of a thriving discourse coalition. 
All of the actors involved believe that genetic engineering is a 
fundamental departure from conventional breeding, which, in the words of 
BEUC, “will change the nature and scale with which humanity is able to 
intervene with genetic processes” (European Consumers’ Organisation 1996). A 
common theme is that GM foods and crops may cause hazards to health and the 
environment, as well as a strong belief that consumers have a right to be informed 
and to choose between GM foods and non-GM foods through labeling. One 
interesting if subtle difference with the US is that BEUC often describes 
consumers as citizens, thus framing consumer rights as political rights. A further 
point often raised by critics is that the European Commission has too much power 
in dealing with the GMO dossier, considering that it is only a bureaucracy, which 
is not democratically elected. 
A noteworthy difference is between actors that firmly condemn GM foods 
as a product of a global economic system emphasizing production and profit 
irrespective of the impact on the environment (CPE, Greenpeace, Friends of the 
Earth, some green parties), and actors who do not focus on these aspects because 
they are more concerned with consumers (BEUC, EuroCommerce, governmental 
actors). While the former seek a wide debate on all possible risks of genetic 
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engineering, the latter focus on consumer choice through labeling, and are 
generally more open to compromise. 
European Consumers’ Organisation (BEUC) points out that the “last five 
years have shown that GM food will never be accepted in Europe without 
consumer choice” (European Consumers’ Organisation 2002). Therefore, Beate 
Kettlitz of the BEUC states that “the content of BEUC’s campaign on labeling 
GM foods was to give the consumer a choice” (interview with Beate Kettlitz and 
Patrick Sutton, European Consumers’ Organisation, 14 September 2004, 
Brussels). However, Kettlitz specifies that “we should not enter a course of 
rejecting everything” and that “BEUC agrees with the idea of a threshold because 
a ‘no GMO’ policy is not realistic” (ibid.).163 As a result, consumer groups are 
satisfied with the 2003 EU regulations which introduced stricter labeling rules 
and the concept of traceability. Kettlitz is of the opinion that “In Europe, a robust 
approval system is [now] in place. Europeans basically trust the approval system 
[…]” (ibid). 
As has been noted above, seen from the point of view of GM food 
supporters in Europe, food retailers represent a decidedly weak link in the 
campaign to encourage the acceptance of GM foods. Noëlle Vonthron of 
EuroCommerce explains that “EuroCommerce members changed their policy on 
GM food as a result of a wave of rejection by consumers towards the end of the 
1990s”. More specifically,  
“on the GM food dossier, EuroCommerce members took a consumer-
oriented approach, because commerce is the closest link between industry 
and the 450 million consumers in Europe. When retailers recognized that 
consumers did not want GMOs in their food, they decided to follow that 
trend. That does not mean that they will not market foods containing 
GMOs at all, but for their own-brand products they have a clear non-GMO 
policy” (interview with Noëlle Vonthron, EuroCommerce, 17 September 
2004, Brussels). 
                                                     
163 An important part of BEUC’s position is that GM content should only be adventitious, i.e. 
accidental, because this signals that producers have decided to go for non-GM production and that, 
as a default, they try to preserve the identity of the product. 
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In contrast to consumer groups, environmental groups condemn genetic 
“contamination” in a broader sense. Geert Ritsema and Carmen Olmedo of 
Friends of the Earth Europe confirm that their organization 
“has a different position than some consumer organizations such as BEUC 
on the GMO issue. While BEUC reduces the issue to consumer choice and 
labeling of GM foods, Friends of the Earth Europe goes further by asking: 
‘do we really need to grow GMOs?’” (interview with Geert Ritsema and 
Carmen Olmedo, Friends of the Earth Europe, 3 September 2004, 
Brussels). 
Greenpeace GMO Policy Advisor Éric Gall illustrates this wider-ranging 
approach in a description of the reasons behind Greenpeace’s campaign against 
GMOs: 
“the primary reason for Greenpeace’s campaign against the release of 
GMOs in the environment are the potential irreversible impacts of GMOs 
on the environment and on health. […]. Secondly, GMOs have been a tool 
to impose strong intellectual property rights on genetic resources […], for 
the benefit of multinationals and agribusiness, and at the detriment of 
farmers and public research. […] Thirdly, GMOs are the ultimate step of 
industrial agriculture, which destroys farmers and the environment around 
the world […]” (interview with Éric Gall, Greenpeace, 13 September 
2004, Brussels). 
Despite these differences in approach, in the European case, a strong and 
successful story-line has emerged, which blends the condemnatory anti-corporate 
tone of environmental groups with consumers’ and detailers’ demand for choice. 
Éric Gall of Greenpeace is convinced that the anti-GM food movement goes 
against more than just GM foods: 
“The GMO debate helped open European citizens’ eyes on how their food 
is produced; many feel that the industrialization of agriculture and food 
production has gone too far” (interview with Éric Gall, Greenpeace 
European Unit, 13 September 2005, Brussels). 
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 In connection with the shock events that alarmed Europeans, the anti-GMO 
story-line bound together the European public, thus becoming generally accepted 
as a truthful description of the situation surrounding GM food. 
It is not surprising to note that industry denounces this story-line and the 
coalition behind it. For example, EuropaBio’s Simon Barber declares the 
following:  
“My view is that much of this is an NGO-made issue that probably would 
not have arisen if the NGOs had not chosen to make it an issue. I don’t 
think the average consumer would have been concerned at all. […] If 
someone devotes enough money to frightening people about a certain 
issue, then they will get frightened” (interview with Simon Barber, 
EuropaBio, 16 September 2004, Brussels). 
A further perspective comes from Karil Kochenderfer of Grocery Manufacturers 
of America in the US, who contends that European NGOs tell only half the truth 
about GM foods: 
 “European NGOs underline future risks, but do not mention the present 
lack of risks. GM foods are probably the most well-examined global 
products that we’ve ever seen” (interview with Karil Kochenderfer, 
Grocery Manufacturers of America, 17 June 2004, Washington, DC). 
Bernard Graciet of Syngenta is more congratulatory, but essentially points out 
that NGOs carefully construct their agendas with the goal of public success: 
“I must congratulate environmentalists’ professionalism. They are 
extremely active and efficient. The lobbying done by multinational 
companies is much less successful than the organization of civil society 
by environmental groups” (interview with Bernard Graciet, Syngenta, 15 
September 2004, Brussels). 
 
 
Shock events 
The series of shock events in Europe chronicled in Chapter 2 that 
coincided with the development and marketing of biotechnology has helped 
actors opposing GM foods and favoring restrictive regulation achieve their policy 
goals, and has made it very difficult for GM food supporters to realize theirs. 
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An event that caught not only the world’s attention, but also their 
imagination was the news, announced in February 1977, that a cloned sheep 
named Dolly had been born in July 1996 in the United Kingdom (UK). In the 
minds of European citizens, this event symbolized the beginning of a new era in 
which scientists could clone mammals and had therefore seemed to have gained 
control over creation itself. Europeans were not necessarily comfortable with this 
new prospect.  
The shock event with the most profound repercussions was Bovine 
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) or “Mad Cow Disease”. Around the time that 
the first GM crops were being planted and harvested, the BSE crisis reached its 
high point. In 1995, the first case of a new variant of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease 
(vCJD), a disease in humans resembling BSE, was diagnosed in the UK, and in 
March 1996, the UK government announced that there appeared to be a link 
between BSE and vCJD. The EU reacted by imposing a worldwide ban on UK 
cattle and beef exports. Although the probable causes of BSE are completely 
unrelated to genetic engineering and GM food, the UK public and the EU public 
in general made a connection between BSE with GM foods. In both the cases, 
intensive farming and industrialization of the farming and food industries were 
seen as the culprits. In both cases, regulators were perceived as having failed in 
their responsibilities, and as having important concealed information from the 
public. It is a commonly held view that “BSE appeared, at least around 1999, to 
be the leading reason […] for skepticism over GM food” (Toke 2004: 63). 
Jasanoff does not treat BSE as the single cause for rejection of GM food, but does 
note that it “is hard to disentangle the story of opposition to GM foods in Britain 
in the late 1990s from the still unfolding story of BSE” (Jasanoff  2005: 121).164 
Further shock events pertaining to GM foods that compounded the effects 
of the BSE affair were public outrage over “terminator” technology, and the 
release of Puzstai’s experiments feeding GM potatoes to rats. The May 1999 
discovery of high levels of dioxin in chicken and egg products in Belgium only 
                                                     
164 In the UK, a further blow was dealt to agricultural biotechnology by Prince Charles, who, in 
June 1999, expressed his doubts about GM foods in the Daily Mail. In this article, he raised a 
number of questions that went beyond health and the environment, including “do we need GM 
food in this country?” and “what sort of world do we want to live in?”. He judged that that “the 
public’s reaction shows that we are nervous about tampering with Nature when we can’t be sure 
that we know enough about the consequences” (Windsor 1999). 
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made matters worse. This shock event related to food safety but did not involve 
genetic engineering or GM food. A factor aggravating this episode in the public 
consciousness was the fact that Belgian authorities became aware of a possible 
problem in late April 1999, but did not inform the public until one month later. 
In Europe, such shock events incited or at least consolidated negative 
public opinion with respect to GM foods and crops, although they were not 
directly necessarily connected to the genetic engineering of foods. This rejection 
of GM foods, that began in the late 1990s and remained into the present, has 
become part of a mainstream view on GM foods in many European countries. As 
one interviewee who asked to remain anonymous noted, 
“with the benefit of hindsight, the trouble was that GM technology was 
perceived as something new and mysterious for the public, which led to 
consumer concerns about being involuntarily exposed to risk. In the view 
of consumers, this is not like smoking or driving, which involve 
voluntarily risk taking. […] people feel a lack of control.” 
A recent “Eurobarometer” on biotechnology confirms that “a majority of 
Europeans do not support GM foods”; In 2003, actual support for GM foods 
existed in only four countries: Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Finland (European 
Commission 2003: 1-2). The Eurobarometer notes that public support began 
declining after 1996, when first GM products began to be commercialized, and 
after vCJD had appeared. A 2005 Special Eurobarometer on “Europeans, Science 
and Technology” confirms the trend: 54% of Europeans think that GM food is 
“dangerous”, 23% neither agree nor disagree, and only 14% disagree (European 
Commission 2005c). It is important to note that there are important differences 
among Member States, often reflected in Member State government positions. In 
Cyprus, Austria and Greece, 70 to 90% of citizens believe that GM foods are 
dangerous against 30 to 40% in the Netherlands and Finland (ibid.). 
As a result of BSE and other crises, many Europeans mistrust not only 
industry, but also their regulators. In 1999, Cantley et al. noted that in “Europe, 
the public’s faith is in consumer and environmental organizations rather than in 
governments, industry, or academia” (Cantley et al. 1999: 38). The 2003 
Eurobarometer found that 55% of Europeans trust the European Commission, and 
that less than 50% have confidence in their own government and in industry 
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(European Commission 2003: 3). Actors supporting GM food are critical of 
regulators’ failure to react in a more convincing manner. For example, Simon 
Barber of EuropaBio states that: 
“if citizens are fed all sorts of scary stories, especially after there have 
 been real scares, they can become worried. I’m disappointed that 
regulatory authorities and governments did not do more to tell people 
about the history of safety assessment of agricultural biotechnology. It is a 
shame that governments did not stand up and support their regulatory 
decisions” (interview with Simon Barber, EuropaBio, 16 September 2004, 
Brussels). 
In conclusion, shock events, especially BSE, were very important for the 
success of EU actors and actor coalitions opposed to GM food. GM proponents 
had little hope of convincing Europeans that GM foods were good for the 
environment and had nothing to do with BSE. For Europeans, the marketing of 
GM foods was just one more food issue that their governments, at EU and 
national levels, had not dealt with adequately, since GM foods seemed to have 
found their way into Europe without citizens being informed. Birkland suggests 
that what he calls a focus event, which is a specific type of shock event, “is more 
likely to be focal if an interest group or groups are available to exploit the event in 
their quest for policy change” (Birkland 1998: 72). Indeed, the anti-GM food 
coalition was able to pick up on and very effectively exploit the resentful and 
fearful mood resulting from the series of shock events very effectively in its push 
for increasingly restrictive GM food policies (e.g. Ansell et al.).  
 
Activity and impact on policy 
EU actors for and against GM foods have both acted alone and 
collaborated in a number of ways. Positions, story-lines and methods are not that 
entirely cohesive in either one of these camps. 
Within the EU, stakeholder organizations supporting GM food have found 
it more difficult than their US counterparts to engage in coordinated activity. Due 
to their different interests, cooperation among actors throughout the food chain, as 
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takes place both formally and informally in the US, is weak to non-existent 
among EU actors. Actors tend to act alone rather than as part of a coalition. 
Some cooperation has developed among individual biotechnology 
companies, in the form of common promotion and educational events, for 
instance, joint sponsorships of conferences and debates. One example is 
“BioVision”, the so-called “World Life Sciences Forum” held yearly since 1999, 
and supported financially by numerous US and EU biotechnology companies, as 
well as the European Commission. 
In the mid 1990s, some of the actors supporting GM foods disagreed on 
how best to make GM foods known to and accepted by the public. From 
interviews and secondary literature, it appears that Monsanto was criticized by 
potential allies in Europe for its lack of cooperation. For example, Guido Kayaert 
of Nestlé recalls that 
“European food industries received only a brief advance warning that 
Monsanto was going to send its first shipments of GM grain to Europe. 
This event took us [within the food industry] by surprise and did not 
leave any time to inform and educate the public. This caused some 
annoyance among European industries" (interview with Guido Kayaert, 
Nestlé, 6 September 2004, Brussels). 
Similarly, Dominique Taeymans of the Confederation of the food and drink 
industries of the European Union feels that  
“the biotechnology industry communicated poorly in 1995-96. That is one 
of the elements that led to the public's negative reaction to GMOs. The 
public was shaken at the same time by the BSE crisis in Europe, and these 
elements together led to a crisis of public trust in institutions" (interview 
with Dominique Taeymans, Confederation of the food and drink industries 
of the European Union, 7 September 2004, Brussels). 
Monsanto seems to also have irritated European-based agricultural biotechnology 
companies, who felt that the US company was taking an arrogant and 
irresponsible approach to entering the European market, seeing it as identical to 
the US market, and without listening to European industries’ advice. This 
amounted to a “very St. Louis [the home of Monsanto Headquarters] attitude that 
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Europe didn’t really matter” (Linda Fisher, who worked for Monsanto at the time, 
quoted in Charles 2001: 210). EuropaBio became active in the biotechnology 
debate only around this time, too late to contribute to achieving the level of public 
acceptance necessary prior to the arrival of GM crops in the mid-1990s. 
EU actors against GM foods diverge to some extent on the methods they 
use. While environmentalists and critical farmers are sometimes ready to employ 
radical activist tactics such as burning test fields or stopping ships transporting 
GM grain, consumer-oriented groups and government actors are not. Because of 
actors’ different focuses, collaborations usually take place among several 
environmental groups, or several consumer-oriented actors. Greenpeace’s 
European Unit suggests that environmental and consumer groups were also 
competing for the very issue of GMOs: 
“In terms of cooperation with other actors on the GM food and crop issue, 
Greenpeace and environmental groups generally experienced some trouble 
with consumer groups, which were not happy that what they regarded as 
their territory was being trampled on” (interview with Éric Gall, 
Greenpeace European Unit, 14 September 2004, Brussels). 
In 1998, European retailers initiated a collaboration that gave GM food 
proponents a particularly harsh blow. After it had become clear that European 
consumers strongly preferred GM free products, Iceland, a UK supermarket, went 
“GM-free”. In March 1999, several other major European retailers, including 
Carrefour (France), Delhaize (Belgium), Esselunga (Italy), Marks & Spencer 
(UK), Migros (Switzerland), Sainsbury's (UK) and Superquinn (Ireland) joined 
suit by forming a consortium committed to eliminating GM ingredients from their 
own brand products. Other retailers (for example Auchan (France), Coop (Italy), 
and Tesco (UK)) and chain restaurants (e.g. Burger King and Kentucky Fried 
Chicken in the UK) have since followed in the steps of this consortium, thus 
exercising considerable pressure up the food chain, first and foremost on food 
producers, and processors who are the retailers’ suppliers. As mentioned above, 
food producers have not joined against GM foods as retailers have, but have 
found ways to quietly work around the problem which, for farmers and 
biotechnology companies, means lower demand for GM foods. As has been 
explained previously, this decision by major retailers in Europe presented a 
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problem for food producers, especially large ones that engaged in voluntary 
labeling. Guido Kayaert recounts Nestlé’s situation and its opinion of the 
retailers’ move:  
“The main problem for [Nestlé] arose when certain retailers, especially in 
the UK, decided to ban GM products from their shelves. We were one of 
the few companies that labeled voluntarily, so we were one of the only 
ones to be kicked off the shelves. Retailers' decision to go 'GM-free' was 
not a safety decision, but a commercial move” (interview with Guido 
Kayaert, Nestlé, 6 September 2004, Brussels). 
Some environmental and farmer groups have adopted various forms of 
activism. Aside from numerous demonstrations and letter-writing campaigns, 
they are particularly renowned for their direct protest actions, some of them at 
odds with the law. For example, since late 1996, when first exports of GM crops 
were transported from the US to Europe, Greenpeace has been famous for 
blocking and delaying the entry of ships transporting GM soy and corn into major 
European ports such as Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and Antwerp. Protesters have 
also been known to disrupt the production, transportation, and distribution of GM 
grain by storming plants, transport equipment, and supermarkets, often dressed 
up as GM food and feed debate-related animals (chickens, cows, butterflies) or 
vegetables (tomatoes, corn cobs) to attract attention and underline the potential 
effects of GM foods. 
A further widespread form of protest has been the destruction of GM crop 
test fields. Jose Bové’s Confédération Paysanne, part of CPE, as well as national 
sections of Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, have been known to damage test 
fields in several European countries including Belgium, France, Germany, and 
the UK. These included test sites that were part of the UK government’s Farm 
Scale Evaluation165. 
These groups have also extensively used the strategy of spreading and 
collecting information on GM foods and crops in Europe. Examples are 
                                                     
165 The Farm Scale Evaluations were a three-year program (2000-2003) run by the UK 
government’s Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs to assess the environmental 
impact of herbicide tolerant corn, sugar beet, and oilseed rape in terms of biodiversity. To date, it 
is the most comprehensive study of its kind worldwide. Results of the study were mixed: while 
GM rape and beet cultivation seemed to have a negative impact on biodiversity, GM corn 
appeared to improve biodiversity in comparison with conventional corn. 
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Greenpeace International’s “Trolley Watch”, which encourages European 
consumers to report labeled GM foods in European supermarkets to a specific 
website (Greenpeace International Trolley Watch) and the “GM Contamination 
Register” set up by Greenpeace International and GeneWatch UK (Greenpeace 
International/GeneWatch UK GM Contamination Register) to record all incidents 
of “contamination” through the release of genetically modified organisms, that is 
the unwanted and unplanned presence of GM varieties among non-GM crop 
varieties. 
The European Parliament’s role in the GM food debate has been to form a 
counterbalance to the relatively supportive European Commission. A key 
participant in the legislative processes leading towards the main directives and 
regulations on GMOs and GM foods, the European Parliament has a track record 
of requesting more stringent rules and regulations than suggested by the 
European Commission. Examples of issues it has been especially attentive to 
include the threshold for the labeling of GM foods, as well as the explicit mention 
of the precautionary principle. The European Parliament can also send signals 
through resolutions. For example, the Parliament used this possibility in 
December 2003 by passing a resolution on “Coexistence of GM crops with 
conventional and organic plants”, in which it called for “uniform and binding 
rules” on this issue (European Parliament 2003, art. 3). 
Of course, the legislative story of each directive and each regulation is 
complex. The 2003 regulations, for example, are relatively stringent not only due 
to the European Parliament, but also as a result of the Commission’s relatively 
consumer-oriented proposal, made in the name of a more transparent and 
accountable decision-making process. MEP Karin Scheele recalls that “in the 
case of the 2003 regulations, the European Commission put forward a 
progressive and consumer-friendly proposal, which led to a strongly polarized 
debate in the European Parliament. Although the largest parliamentary group was 
opposed to the reforms proposed, we were successful in putting together a 
majority in favor of the Commission proposal” (interview with Karin Scheele and 
Sigrid Semlitsch, European Parliament, 7 September 2004, Brussels). 
Member States that have frequently presented a hurdle to GM foods are 
Austria, Denmark, Greece, and Luxembourg. Voting patterns in some other 
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Member States, including France, Germany, Italy, and Spain, have changed 
frequently and have included abstention. These positions are usually connected to 
internal political situations. For example, from 2001 to 2005, the German Federal 
Ministry of Consumer Production, Food, and Agriculture was headed by Minister 
Renate Künast, a Green Party member who pushed for a restrictive Genetic 
Modification Act implementing EP and Council Directive 2001/18 in Germany, 
and against new GMO adoptions at the EU level. Not all members of the 
government were necessarily in agreement with this line, and the result of this 
national deadlock was a series of abstentions on votes concerning new 
authorizations. 
Furthermore, Member States have the possibility to express their views 
and influence GM food policy through the safeguard clause contained in GM 
food policy. As described above, this clause provides the possibility for a 
Member State to “provisionally restrict or prohibit the use and/or sale of that 
GMO as or in a product on its territory” if it has detailed grounds to believe that it 
may be harmful to health or the environment” (Dir. 2001/18, European 
Parliament/Council of the European Union 2001, article 23). 
 
7.3 Conclusion 
As suggested by proposition 3, in the US, actors and actor coalitions 
supporting GM foods are stronger than those opposing GM foods, and have 
successfully pushed for permissive regulation of GM foods and crops. In contrast, 
in the EU, actors and actor coalitions opposing GM foods are stronger than those 
supporting GM foods, and have succeeded in obtaining restrictive GM food and 
crop policies. The empirical evidence presented in this chapter shows that the 
types of coalitions that actors form are important. For example, US actors in 
favor of GM foods and crops form both a successful advocacy coalition and a 
strong discourse coalition. Their counterparts, on the other hand, form only weak 
advocacy and discourse coalitions. In addition, empirical study of US actors 
supporting GM foods suggests that it is important to consider how many actors 
are involved, whether the whole food chain is represented, whether support from 
governmental actors exists, and what impact shock events have had. The main 
findings of this chapter are summarized below in Table 16. 
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Pro-GM food coalitions consist of comparable actors in the US and the 
EU, but the US coalition is more cohesive and more strongly convinced of its 
mission than its EU counterpart. In the US, actors throughout the whole food 
chain, as well as regulators, support or at least do not oppose agricultural 
biotechnology. Stakeholders form an advocacy coalition united by common 
regulatory goals and successfully engage in coordinated activity. All supportive 
actors, including regulatory agencies, are bound by a strong common story-line 
about GM foods. US actors supporting permissive regulation have benefited from 
the lack of devastating shock events and from generally uncritical public opinion. 
The fact that Americans place greater trust in their regulatory institutions than 
Europeans is of further assistance to actors favoring GM foods. In the US, the 
long-established discourse in favor of maintaining a relatively permissive, 
product-based regulation without labeling has retained its dominance and is not 
seriously questioned by the wider public. 
In the European Union, in contrast, actors backing GM foods and a 
permissive GM food policy are fewer than in the US, and not all are as convinced 
as their US counterparts. An important element is that the food chain is divided: 
while biotechnology companies and large food processors and producers are 
supportive of GM foods, farmers take an almost neutral approach166, while 
retailers have turned against GM foods. Moreover, supportive actors have a weak 
degree of cohesion in terms of positions, goals and activities, and their story-lines 
are divided between consumer orientation (food processors and producers) and 
biotechnology enthusiasm (biotechnology industry). They are relatively weak 
advocacy coalitions and discourse coalitions. Support from the European 
Commission, meanwhile, has been constant but cautious in terms of the language 
used. Few Member States are consistently supportive of GM foods, with 
positions fluctuating, for example with changes of government. Finally, the many 
shock events that took place throughout Europe during the late 1990s, although 
mostly unrelated to GM foods, have been devastating to the cause of GM food 
supporters, leading to intensive public criticism and distrust. 
                                                     
166 It might be suggested that actors that are neither whole-heartedly supportive nor completely 
critical of GM foods and crops form a third “neutral” and relatively passive coalition within the 
European debate. Two actors would fit into this category: farmers and the European Commission. 
I choose to classify these actors as relatively reticent supporters. This choice emphasizes the role 
that this type of reticent supporter can play in weakening a supportive coalition.  
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Turning to actors and coalitions opposing GM foods, in the US, actors 
critical GM foods have been only moderately successful at forming a successful 
advocacy coalition and a strong discourse coalition. This is one of the reasons 
why they have not succeeded in obtaining a more restrictive GM food and crop 
policy. In the EU, on the other hand, actors opposing GM food form both a 
successful advocacy coalition and a strong discourse coalition, which have 
successfully pushed for restrictive regulation of GM foods and crops and 
achieved discourse institutionalization. 
US actors and actor coalitions opposing GM foods are relatively weak for 
three main reasons. First, GM food critics are fewer than in the EU, consisting of 
small farmers, consumers, and environmentalists. The US Congress and certain 
US states have contributed to the debate, but cannot be counted as actors in a 
coalition dependably supporting restrictive GM food policy. Food processors, 
producers and retailers remain supporters of agricultural biotechnology even if 
they have backed away from showing too much enthusiasm. They are not willing 
to be part of a coalition against GM foods. The second reason is those actors who 
do take a clear stand against GM foods make up weak advocacy coalitions and 
weak discourse coalitions, although they do display elements of both. Even 
though these actors do have some common positions, their interests are 
sufficiently different to make coordinated activity a second choice over 
independent action. Moreover, although story-lines have common elements, they 
are not a forceful and united narrative, thus making it difficult to qualify US 
actors against GM food as a discourse coalition. Third, the lack of comparable 
shock events occurring in the United States and a consequent lack of public 
interest or criticism have meant that US critics have been and remain unable to 
achieve high levels of credibility, acceptability and trust. 
In contrast, EU actors and the actor coalition critical of GM foods are 
numerous and strong, as compared to the situation in the US. They are strongly 
united in their common goal of rendering policy more restrictive, and share 
important story-line elements. What is remarkable in the EU case is how the 
story-lines told by actors opposing GM foods have merged and have become 
mainstream. As in the case of GM food supporters, empirical study adds several 
useful considerations. Here again, the number and types of actors are crucial, in 
particular the presence of strongly opposed governmental actors (Member States) 
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in the EU. What is more, shock events, as well as public opinion and distrust of 
regulators are crucial in explaining EU actors’ success in achieving restrictive 
policy. A great part of their success was being able to seize a particular public 
mood and capitalize on it.  
 
Table 16: US and EU actors and actor coalitions  
 
 Supportive 
or not actively opposed to GM 
foods and crops 
Critical 
or not actively supportive of GM 
foods and crops 
Actors US: industry, large and mainstream 
farmers, food processors and 
producers, retailers, consumers, 
regulators 
US: small and organic farmers, 
environmentalists and NGOs 
 
 
 EU: industry, large and mainstream 
farmers, food processors and 
producers, governmental actors 
(European Commission) 
EU: small and organic farmers, 
retailers, consumers, 
environmentalists, governmental 
actors (EU Member States) 
Main arguments - genetic engineering as an extension 
of traditional breeding 
- environmental benefits 
- no proven health hazard 
- alleviating world hunger 
- genetic engineering as something 
fundamentally new 
- unknown effects on health and the 
environment 
- too much power for agbiotech 
multinationals 
- ethically wrong (“patents on life”) 
Impact on policy US: policy remains relatively 
permissive 
US: policy remains relatively 
permissive 
 EU: policy remains relatively 
restrictive 
EU: policy becomes increasingly 
restrictive 
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8. CONCLUSION 
 
Summary This dissertation explains how and why GM food policies are 
different in the United States and the European Union. In order to create a 
comprehensive framework explaining GM food policy differences, I use three 
theoretical approaches – policy process theory, comparative historical analysis, 
and science and technology studies. This is a fitting choice for a broad, macro-
social topic like the transatlantic rift in GM food policy. It enables me to take 
several different explanatory angles into account that together can give a broad 
answer to the research question. 
In accordance with the “why-question” I pose, my work is fundamentally 
defined by a search for causalities, and therefore by policy process theory and 
comparative historical analysis. At the same time, this study is very attentive to 
constructivist elements. For this reason, the use of science and technology studies 
proves to be enriching. This use of multiple theories brings with it the problem of 
epistemological pluralism, in my case, the inherent and practically insuperable 
contradiction between positivist and constructivist theories. I therefore establish 
that this study is written within a positivist tradition, but that constructivist 
elements are used to deepen the analysis. Moreover, the methodological strategy 
of developing a medium-range framework and of conducting a focused and 
systematic comparison of GM food policy in the EU and the US allows me to do 
the macro-social nature of my research question justice. 
GM food policy, the dependent variable of this dissertation, is analyzed 
through a detailed study of regulatory policies in the US and the EU. A 
systematic comparison of GM food and crop policies in the areas of field testing 
and commercialization establishes that GM food policy in the US is relatively 
permissive, whereas GM food policy in the EU is relatively restrictive, both in 
terms of the number and complexity of rules and with respect to empirical data 
on the numbers and speed of authorizations. 
Why have US and EU regulators developed such different policies on the 
same GM products? A first explanation of why GM food policies are different 
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can be found by a comparison of “preceding policies” or, in the case of GM food, 
rDNA policies in the US and the EU in the 1970s and early 1980s, as well as the 
processes leading to the beginnings of GM food policy. My research shows that a 
policy reversal has taken place in both the EU and the US. In the US, extensive 
experience with and debate on the regulation of rDNA research in the 1970s 
facilitated a less heated debate and therefore acceptance of a relatively permissive 
regulation of rDNA technology’s applications in the early 1980s. In contrast, the 
relative lack of regulatory experience and debate on rDNA research at the 
European Community level in the late 1970s and early 1980s was one of the 
elements leading to a controversial debate in the late 1980s, and to relatively 
restrictive EU GM food policy. Factors of great importance in bringing about this 
policy switch were public attitudes with respect to science and the environment in 
the 1970s and 1980s, as well as the fact that rDNA technology was developed in 
the US and not in Europe. 
The second explanatory element presented consists of “paradigms”, i.e. 
underlying beliefs regarding agricultural biotechnology. Empirical evidence 
reveals that GM food policies in the US and the EU are each based on two main 
paradigms. US policy primarily follows the economic competitiveness and the 
sound science paradigms, which are connected to an agribusiness model and a 
narrow definition of risk focusing on short-term health and the environmental 
safety. These paradigms are compatible with a relatively permissive GM food 
policy. The EU, on the other hand, is first and foremost guided by an 
environmental and health protection paradigm and by a precautionary principle 
paradigm, which find expression in a recent emphasis on sustainable agriculture, 
as well as broad definition of risks including long-term health and environmental 
aspects and ethical and socioeconomic concerns. These paradigms are coherent 
with a relatively restrictive GM food policy. An important finding is that, despite 
the predominant paradigms in each individual case, US and EU policies on GM 
foods both incorporate elements of each of the paradigms discussed, and that they 
find themselves in a constant struggle to strike a balance between economic 
progress and health and environmental protection. 
The third explanatory element presented in this dissertation consists of the 
levels of success achieved by actors and actor coalitions in the GM food debate. 
In summary, GM food proponents in the United States have been more successful 
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than their EU counterparts since they have been able to maintain relatively 
permissive regulations. In the EU, actors critical of GM foods have done better 
than their US counterparts since they have achieved increasingly restrictive 
regulation over the years. US actors in favor of GM foods and EU actors against 
GM foods are strong coalitions, both in terms of their common positions and 
actions, and of the discourses that connect them. In contrast, US actors against 
GM foods and EU proponents have not been able to form such strong and 
successful coalitions. 
The empirical study of “preceding policies”, “paradigms”, and “actors and 
actor coalitions” further points towards the finding that certain contextual factors 
such the political system, as well as shock events in combination with public 
opinion, can be very important in determining policy outcomes. 
Importance of individual explanatory elements This dissertation draws on 
policy process theory, comparative historical analysis, and science and 
technology studies to craft an explanatory framework suitable for shedding light 
on GM food policy differences in a comprehensive manner. These explanatory 
elements are discussed and analyzed separately in the chapters of this study. 
Empirical study suggests that each explanatory variable, taken alone, offers at 
least a partial explanation of GM food policy differences. 
For the “preceding policies” variable, this means that, in the case of US 
and EU GM food policy, a relatively permissive preceding policy explains a 
relatively restrictive future GM food policy, while a relatively restrictive policy 
leads to a relatively permissive future GM food policy. For the “paradigms” 
variable, this study concludes that competitiveness and sound science paradigms 
favor relatively permissive policies, whereas protection and precautionary 
principle paradigms lead to relatively restrictive policies. Finally, empirical study 
of “actors and actor coalitions” suggests that a strong pro-GM food coalition, 
bound together by common actions and a strong story-line, can explain a 
relatively permissive GM food policy, while a similarly strong anti-GM food 
coalition results in relatively restrictive GM food policy. 
Linking the explanatory elements Each variable presented in this study 
has its own weight and offers an analytical point of entry to the transatlantic rift 
in GM food policy. At the same time, it has become clear in frequent cross-
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references throughout this dissertation that these explanatory elements are 
interlinked. 
For example, the impact of preceding policies on paradigms and actors 
and actor coalitions is apparent in the fact that current US and EU paradigms on 
GM foods developed as they did on the basis of previous regulatory experiences. 
Moreover, some current actors in the GM food debate were already active during 
the rDNA research debate, conditioning their later views on GM food and crops. 
Paradigms and actors are also interdependent, since actors and actor coalitions’ 
positions and actions are strongly motivated by the paradigms expressed in story-
lines. At the same time, actors – often unconsciously – shape paradigms, either 
keeping them stable or changing them.  
The context elements considered (political system, shock events and 
public opinion) can influence each of the three independent variables (preceding 
policies, paradigms, actors and actor coalitions) separately and thereby the GM 
food policy subsystem as a whole. For example, the explosiveness of the BSE 
crisis in the mid-1990s had an important impact on actors and paradigms, 
opening the way for a shift towards a more restrictive GM food policy. Public 
opinion, as measured and reported by institutions and the media, had a significant 
effect, especially during the development of policies on rDNA research in the 
US, and of GM food policies in the EU. Political system features and events, such 
as different electoral or judicial systems, or the election of US President Ronald 
Reagan in 1980, which in turn meant the beginning of the era of US supply-side 
economics and small government, have influenced individual explanatory 
elements, as well as the policy subsystem as a whole. 
In summary, it is possible to suggest that taken together, the variables 
investigated offer a strong and comprehensive explanation of GM food policy 
outcomes. Relatively restrictive preceding rDNA research policy, together with 
the economic competitiveness and sound science paradigms, as well as a strong 
pro-GM food actor coalition have led to relatively permissive GM food policy in 
the US. Relatively permissive preceding rDNA research policy, combined with 
the protection and precautionary paradigms, as well as a strong anti-GM food 
actor coalition, led to relatively restrictive GM food policy in the EU. 
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Figure 14 below shows the explanatory framework presented in Chapter 4 
(Figure 13), with the addition of a series of arrows which represent the 
interdependences between explanatory variables. Arrows point from preceding 
policies to paradigms and actors and actor coalitions, and paradigms and 
actors/actor coalitions are linked by two arrows running both ways, one pointing 
towards paradigms and the other towards actors and actor coalitions. Context 
factors’ impact is represented by arrows pointing toward the policy subsystem as 
a whole. 
 
Figure 14: Analytical framework including variable interdependence 
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While all explanatory elements play an important role in accounting for 
GM food policies in the US and the EU, some elements carry more weight than 
others for the cases of the US and the EU respectively. 
In the case of the United States, illustrated in Figure 15, the strongest 
explanatory elements are “preceding policies” and “actors and coalitions”, which 
both have a strong impact on “paradigms” while context factors have a lesser 
impact. The US’s previous experience with formulating guidelines for research 
with rDNA had a powerful influence on the paradigms that govern US GM food 
policy today. The fact that rDNA research guidelines were restrictive and based 
on conjectural risks furnished a strong basis for the sound science paradigm to 
develop with respect to agricultural biotechnology. As for the economic 
competitiveness paradigm, it was and remains mainly the result of individual 
actors’ and actor coalitions’ deeply held beliefs and preferences. US actors and 
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actor coalitions are strongly influenced by the paradigms put in place in the early 
1980s, but there has been relatively little interaction of the two elements leading 
to changes in paradigms and/or actor positions over time, as has been the case in 
the EU. This lack of interaction over time is the reason why the arrow pointing 
from paradigms to actors/actor coalitions is not bold. 
Context factors are less important in the US than in the EU in explaining 
GM food policy. As discussed in this dissertation, the relative lack of major 
shock events and resulting negative public opinion reinforced the positions and 
paradigms of actors and actor coalitions supporting relatively permissive GM 
food policy. Figure 15 below summarizes the interdependences between 
explanatory elements for the case of the United States, and shows the relative 
weight of “preceding policies” and “actors and actor coalitions”. The US case 
shows a relatively linear policy development, which takes into account previous 
policy experience, and is strongly based on paradigms put in place by actors and 
actor coalitions when GM food policy was first developed, and that have not 
changed significantly over time. 
 
Figure 15: Analytical framework applied to the US 
 
GM food policy 
subsystem
preceding 
policies
paradigms
shock events
and public opinion
political system
GM food policy
actors and 
coalitions
 
 
Turning to the European Union’s GM food policy (see Figure 16), the 
most important explanatory elements are actors and actor coalitions, paradigms, 
and context factors. The EU’s GM food policy represents a break with preceding 
policies, which had relatively little impact both on actors and actor coalitions, as 
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well as on paradigms. Preceding policies might have played a more important 
role if it had not been for the impact of context factors. The increasingly 
environmentally aware political climate of the late 1980s, including the rise of 
green parties just when EU policy on GMOs was first being developed, and of 
course shock events such as the 1990s food and health scares, were particularly 
important. These events were exploited by actors and actor coalitions, who were 
able to influence paradigms considerably, causing them to undergo changes over 
time. These changing paradigms also had a significant impact on actors in the 
sense that actors adapted or modified their positions, thus making it possible for 
increasingly restrictive GM food policy to take shape. This interaction is 
represented by two bold arrows going from paradigms to actors/actor coalitions 
and vice versa. In summary, EU policy on GM food has developed as a result of 
context factors, as well as through interaction and mutual influence over time of 
paradigms and actors/actor coalitions. These dynamics are summarized in Figure 
16. 
 
 
Figure 16: Analytical framework applied to the EU 
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Reflections on the ongoing GM food policy debate At the time of writing, 
the debate surrounding GM food policy has been raging for about a decade and 
shows no sign of abating. The EU’s de facto ban on GM foods and crops from 
1999 to 2004 may have ended and GM product approvals restarted, but every 
single vote within the Council of the EU so far has shown that the issue is by no 
means politically resolved. The WTO ruling on the transatlantic trade dispute on 
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GM food is expected for early 2006, after having been delayed several times. 
Even if a decision is taken, it is unlikely that the deep differences in this area will 
be set to rest. 
Moreover, the story does not stop with GM crops and foods. New 
products involving genetic engineering that are gaining importance are plant-
made pharmaceuticals (PMPs) and GM animals raised for food. Finally, the 
question of the transfer of genetic engineering technologies to the developing 
world will continue to inspire GM food proponents and incite its critics. The 
explanatory framework developed in this dissertation offers a useful tool to 
understand and explain these and other future conflicts. 
This dissertation shows that regulatory differences in the field of GM food 
are not merely a reflection of trade policies and interests. The US’s relatively 
permissive policy is not exclusively a function of its liberal trade policies, and the 
EU’s relatively restrictive policy is not predominantly a protectionist strategy. 
Policy differences are much deeper-rooted than is often believed. The EU and the 
US have developed policies that can be explained through their different 
historical experiences, the paradigms underlying their policies, the different 
levels of success achieved by actors supportive and critical of GM foods, and the 
impact of context factors. 
Attempting to determine who is right and who is wrong in the 
transatlantic debate on GM food policy, according to international trade rules, as 
is being attempted with the WTO case, may yield a short-term policy resolution, 
but cannot resolve the deeper underlying differences between the US and the EU. 
A lasting solution to these differences must be based on a long-term and 
reflective series of transatlantic discussions leading to a deeper understanding of 
all the elements explaining policy differences. 
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